Chronicles

November 2004 A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE $3.95

#BXBFHFJ **********AUTO** 3-DIGIT 943
#94301UZZ555BY003# OCT 2008
14 TURE 297 S0071
RON UNZ
555 BRYANT ST # 371
PALO ALTO CA 94301-1704

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Rockford Institute presents
How Republics Perish, Then and Now



No republic provided more inspiration to the Framers of the Constitution than the Roman republic, yet even this greatest of republics succumbed to the consequences of empire-building. Is it too late for Americans to draw lessons from the passing of the Roman republic?

Lectures and group discussions on:

- The Rise and Fall of the Roman Republic
- Republican Political Heroes: Cicero and Cato
- Machiavelli's Lessons from Roman History
- Roman Art and Architecture

Readings from Livy, Cicero, Catullus, and Machiavelli

Excursions to: Ostia Antica, the Roman Forum and Palatine Hill, the Colosseum, the Baths of Diocletian and the Museo Nationale, the Appian Way and the Catacombs. Special bonus tours of early Christian Rome will be led by architect and theologian Dr. James Patrick.

Plenty of free time for shopping and private sightseeing and dining.

Join **Chronicles** *editor*
Thomas Fleming,
Rockford Institute vice president
Christopher Check,
and special guest
Dr. James Patrick,
chancellor of the College of Saint Thomas More
for

an International Convivium
Rome
January 8-13, 2005

The price for the Convivium includes:

- Six nights at the Hotel Forum, a former convent turned luxury hotel in the heart of old Rome
- Full breakfast and four group meals
- All lectures and discussions
- Selected entrance fees to museums and archeological sites

Budget-minded travelers interested in convent lodging, undergraduate and graduate students interested in scholarships, and anyone desiring more information should contact Christopher Check, executive vice president, at (815) 964-5811.

Reserve Your Place Today!

Early Bird Rates: ❑ Single: $1,895.00 ❑ Couple: $3,195.00
(N.B. All prices increase by $300.00 after November 15, 2004)

I would like to help sponsor a young student. Enclosed is my gift of_____.
(For a gift of $500.00 or more, we will send you a complete set of the audiotapes from the Convivium.)

Name(s)_____

Address_____

City, State, Zip_____

Phone, Fax, E-mail_____

Send registration form with payment to:
The Rockford Institute
Rome Convivium
928 North Main Street, Rockford, Illinois 61103
Or pay by credit card by calling Cindy Link at (815) 964-5813

Please do not delay registering. Registration is limited and is on a first-come, first-serve basis. Previous convivia have sold out.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chronicles
A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE



PERSPECTIVE

Where's Joe McCarthy When You Need Him? 10
by Thomas Fleming

The misadventures of Douglas Feith.

VIEWS

A Third Way? 16
by Tom Piatak
When stupid and evil are the same.

Toward Real Conservatism 18
by Edward A. Olsen
Just say no to the neocons.

NEWS

Walking the Neocon Plank 20
by Timothy P. Carney
Total victory.

The Rise and Fall of the Texas Republican Party 23
by Tom Pauken
The Rove machine.

What Manufacturing Crisis? 26
by David A. Hartman
America for sale.

REVIEWS

Ditching the Cadaver 28
by Samuel Francis

Patrick J. Buchanan: *Where the Right Went Wrong: How Neoconservatives Subverted the Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency*

Bill Kauffman on Dominic Sandbrook's *Eugene McCarthy: The Rise and Fall of Postwar American Liberalism* ◆ **Clark Stooksbury** on Sen. Robert C. Byrd's *Losing America: Confronting a Reckless and Arrogant Presidency* ◆ **Fr. Michael P. Orsi** on Hugo Bedau and Paul Cassell's *Debating the Death Penalty* ◆ **Tobias J. Lanz** on Philippe Beneton's *Equality by Default: An Essay on Modernity as Confinement* ◆ 30

CORRESPONDENCE

Letter From England: The Hunt Is Up 38
by Michael McMahon

Letter From Victoria: Just Win, Baby 39
by Kevin Michael Grace

VITAL SIGNS

ECONOMICS: **Can We Trust Economists on Free Trade?** by Ian Fletcher 43

DEMOCRACY: **Democracy and God** 44
by Thomas Storck

COLUMNS

BREAKING GLASS 15
by Philip Jenkins

THE ROCKFORD FILES 36
by Scott P. Richert

THE AMERICAN INTEREST 41
by Srdja Trifkovic

IN THE DARK 46
Bright Young Things
by George McCartney

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE WORLD 48
by Chilton Williamson, Jr.

DEPARTMENTS

POLEMICS & EXCHANGES 4

AMERICAN PROSCENIUM 6

CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS 7

POETRY
The Ballad Rode Into Town 14
by William Baer

ON THE COVER

Cover by George McCartney, Jr. Inside illustrations by Melanie Anderson and Elizabeth Wolf.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITOR
Thomas Fleming

EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Scott P. Richert

SENIOR EDITOR, BOOKS
Chilton Williamson, Jr.

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Aaron D. Wolf

ART DIRECTOR
H. Ward Sterett

DESIGNER
Melanie Anderson

INTERIOR ARTIST
George McCartney, Jr.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Katherine Dalton, George Garrett, Paul Gottfried, James O. Tate, Clyde Wilson

CORRESPONDING EDITORS
Wayne Allensworth, Janet Scott Barlow, Bill Kauffman, Donald Livingston, Roger D. McGrath, William Mills, William Murchison, Andrei Navrozov

POLITICAL EDITOR
Samuel Francis

FILM EDITOR
George McCartney

FOREIGN-AFFAIRS EDITOR
Srdja Trifkovic

LEGAL-AFFAIRS EDITOR
Stephen B. Presser

RELIGION EDITOR
Harold O.J. Brown

CIRCULATION MANAGER
Cindy Link

PUBLISHER
The Rockford Institute

A publication of The Rockford Institute.
Editorial and Advertising Offices:
928 North Main Street, Rockford, IL 61103.
Website: *www.chroniclesmagazine.org*
Editorial Phone: (815) 964-5054.
Advertising Phone: (815) 964-5813.
Subscription Department: P.O. Box 800,
Mount Morris, IL 61054. Call 1-800-877-5459.

Copyright © 2004 by The Rockford Institute.
All rights reserved.

Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture (ISSN 0887-5731) is published monthly for $39.00 (foreign subscriptions add $12 for surface delivery, $48 for Air Mail) per year by The Rockford Institute, 928 North Main Street, Rockford, IL 61103-7061. Preferred periodical postage paid at Rockford, IL and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Chronicles, P.O. Box 800, Mount Morris, IL 61054.

The views expressed in *Chronicles* are the authors' alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Rockford Institute or of its directors. Unsolicited manuscripts cannot be returned unless accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope.

Chronicles
A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE

Vol. 28, No. 11 November 2004
Printed in the United States of America

POLEMICS & EXCHANGES

On Holding the Line

Derek Turner, in "The New White Moors" (*Correspondence*, September), is right to warn of the advance of Islam and the decline of the West. He would, however, benefit from reading Christopher Dawson's *The Making of Europe*.

The West is dying because it has lost faith in itself, which is inexorably linked to Christianity. Mr. Turner cites a lack of "historical consciousness" as the underlying cause of the Muslim advance and of our decline. Dawson points out that the very idea of history stems from Christianity. In fact, it is the West that has preserved other civilizations' histories.

All of this has to do with the Incarnation. Christ is real! He was born into the world! The world is redeemed! Islam and other world religions do not believe that the world is redeemed or that Creation is good. They chant and meditate to get out of a polluted world. This is why they do not treasure history or believe in a linear understanding of life and why science grew in the West.

Mr. Turner is right to point out that the West is ignorant of its own history, but this all stems from a lack of faith.

—*Patrick Walsh*
Quincy, MA

Mr. Turner Replies:

I am grateful to Mr. Walsh for reminding me of Christopher Dawson's famous 1932 book—which I must admit shamefacedly I have never read. Now that it has been drawn to my attention so publicly, I shall certainly get round to reading it at last! I agree that Western scholarship cannot be disengaged from the Christian tradition—although we should remember that there have been Christian obscurantists and world-haters, too.

Mr. Walsh suggests that any possible revival of the Western ethos is likely to be at least partly driven by a Christian revival of some kind. This is probably true. But it raises a rather large question: How exactly will this come about? I know that it is different in America, but in most of Europe today, only a very small minority of people are observant Christians. Their Christianity is a cultural artifact rather than a living Faith—and faith, once lost, cannot easily be regained. Mainstream Catholicism and the major Protestant groupings are alike in serious decline—although what growth does take place occurs within the more traditionalist Catholic or fundamentalist Protestant groups. A recent survey in the United Kingdom said that far more people here believe in horoscopes than in the Gospels—a telling illustration of Chesterton's maxim that those who stop believing in God don't believe in nothing—they believe in anything! Eastern Orthodoxy is in better shape but will also probably go into decline as the material standard of living improves across Eastern Europe. Religion always seems to go into decline in times of plenty. (If it is any comfort, this will no doubt also happen to Islam.) Of course, most Westerners remain Christians just below the surface, and this latent religious feeling could theoretically be reignited by some explosive book, or charismatic preacher, or cataclysmic event. For the moment, however, appeals to kill or die in the Name of Christ are likely to be greeted with derision or—even worse—indifference. As a motivating force for a counter-*jihad*, Christianity is likely to be just one of a set of impulses—the others being honest liberalism (cf. Oriana Fallaci), traditionalist conservatism, and ethnic nationalism, all no doubt manipulated by shrewd politicians for their (but possibly also our) advantage.

On Descending Into Hell

It seems the only thing needed to complete Scott P. Richert's 12th-century piece ("One Moment in Time," *Rockford Files*, September), in which he states that, "Deprived of Baptism, the souls of these children may never find true rest," would be "unless you give an indulgence." Can Mr. Richert please give a scriptural reference to back up the notion that our God would be so merciless toward the innocent unborn?

If God will take to task those who fail to speak out for the innocent, and His Word is full of outrage against the taking of innocent blood, it simply does not follow that hundreds of millions of un-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

born children, whose aborted lives are the shedding of innocent blood, "may never find true rest" because they have been "[d]eprived of Baptism."

The very idea that an innocent, tortured and murdered before birth, will not find God's rest is a throwback to the days when God was the cruel and vindictive retribution-taking Entity only to be feared—and that seems almost as horrible as the taking of innocent life itself.

Mr. Richert's take on a God Who, after "the death and destruction of the body," fails to bring "true rest" to the innocents, in effect, makes the Devil look good!

—Bill Scaduto
Lancaster, PA

Mr. Richert Replies:

I did provide a scriptural reference in my article: "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me" (Psalm 51:5). There are others, of course, especially Romans 5:12-21, where Saint Paul explains how Christ's sacrifice reverses the effect of Adam's sin in those who believe (cf. Romans 5:19: "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous").

From Mr. Scaduto's sarcastic characterization of my article as "12th-century," however, I suspect that I could quote Scripture until the cows come home without convincing him. It's odd that he chose to single out the 12th century; does he believe that there was some theological innovation then that constitutes a break with the previous 1,100 years of Christian doctrine? I suspect, rather, that he subscribes to theological innovations that arose much later than the 12th century—indeed, within the past two or three—and thus rejects the concept of inherited guilt shared by Catholics, Orthodox, and all of the major Reformers:

> All mankind fell in Adam's fall,
> One common sin infects them all;
> From sire to son the bane descends,
> And over all the curse impends. . . .
> As by one man all mankind fell
> And, born in sin, was doomed to hell,
> So by one Man, who took our place,
> We all received the gift of grace.

Plainly put, Mr. Scaduto's argument is with the very concept of Original Sin. He refers seven times to unborn children as innocent—and, indeed, they are innocent of personal sin. It is precisely that which makes their destruction in the womb, uncleansed by Baptism of the guilt of Original Sin, so horrifying, because "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (John 3:5).

Of course, God in His mercy might make a special dispensation for those murdered in the womb (or for those who die from miscarriage), but, *contra* the implication of Mr. Scaduto's rebuke, we don't know that from Scripture. Which makes his anti-Catholicism ("unless you give an indulgence") all the more odd, since the Catholic Church has traditionally held out the hope that, even though such children may not find true rest (the Beatific Vision), they may, at least, find some peace in the *limbus infantium*, the children's limbo—an admittedly unscriptural but nevertheless comforting thought.

On Snapping Mackerels

Alberto Carosa's article on "The Untold Story Behind *The Passion of the Christ*" (*News*, September) tells us less about Mel Gibson and his film than about the Tridentine Latin Mass and Mr. Gibson's dedication to it. Why is *The Passion* important? Why did it stir up a cacophony of denunciations as antisemitic, consequently (and presumably unintentionally) stimulating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for the producers? Surely not because of the Latin Mass. The Jewish critics were not upset by the use of Latin, even though the Romans and Jesus do speak Latin in the movie. They were afraid that the long, drawn-out, and extremely realistic presentation of Jesus' suffering at the hands of Jews would inflame Christians to commit antisemitic atrocities. This did not happen, and that ought not be a surprise. Although most of the Jewish leaders appear in an extremely odious light, it is perfectly evident that Jesus and His disciples were also Jews. Even more significant, it is evident that it was the Romans under the imperial governor Pilate who ordered the atrocities, and it was Roman soldiers who performed them.

From my perspective, the film brought home to millions of viewers the reality of what Jesus suffered. Viewers simply could not avoid recognizing that execution by crucifixion is incredibly painful and degrading. It is all too easy for churchgoers to skip through the contemplation of the Crucifixion as fast as they can say the words of the Apostles' Creed—"[He] suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried." The very duration of Jesus' suffering as displayed in *The Passion* profoundly moved many viewers who had "already read the book" but did not really know and could not imagine what it was actually like. Perhaps the trouble that Mel Gibson went through to have the Mass in Latin said every day on location, so that he and others could attend it, kept *them* going during the shooting, but it is certainly not the Mass, with its liturgical beauty, that comes through in the movie. A young man of my acquaintance, no tender-hearted dreamer, told me that he cried during the movie when it really hit him what Jesus had gone through for his sake.

It is not the beauty of the Latin Mass that stirred Mel Gibson but the Gospel itself. The Latin Mass is beautiful, and it puts the vernacular translations I have seen to shame, but, if it conveys a sense of the sufferings of Christ, it must be because those attending it already have a clear sense of what they were. "*Sub Pontio Pilato crucifixus, passus, et sepultus est*" reports the story, but *The Passion* imposes it on the viewer.

The movie, like everything human, has flaws, but to spend much time pointing them out is to miss its importance. The Latin Mass is beautiful (although Calvin called it "a perverse mockery" and worse, but that is not our point here), but the beauty of the Mass is not what we should learn from Jesus' suffering. However many priests Mel Gibson may have secured to say Mass for him, that is not what he was showing us in his film. Mr. Carosa's essay can be read with full agreement only by those who are committed to pre-Vatican II Catholicism, probably a minority among *Chronicles*' Catholic readers. Too much material in this vein will make too many of *Chronicles*' non-traditional Catholic readers wonder whether they are not reading an English version of Abbé George de Nantes' *Contre réforme catholique*. *Chronicles* has, as the saying puts it, other fish to fry. Keep frying.

—Harold O.J. Brown
Charlotte, NC

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Justin Raimondo

The Dan Rather Diversion

The "mainstream" media, we often hear, isn't covering the *real* stories—it shies away from controversy and supinely bends under pressure from government officials, corporate sponsors, and warmongering demagogues. All of this may be true, but what we don't hear is what happens when the media *does* do a little investigative reporting, especially when the resulting story violates the unwritten but universally enforced strictures of political correctness. What happened when CBS News reported that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) colluded with neoconservatives in the Pentagon to pass classified information to Israel is telling.

On August 27, Lesley Stahl reported that "the FBI has a full-fledged espionage investigation under way and is about to—in FBI terminology—'roll up' someone agents believe has been spying not for an enemy, but for Israel from within the office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon." The suspected mole: Larry Franklin, a 57-year-old Iran specialist and Defense Intelligence Agency officer working out of the office of William J. Luti, deputy undersecretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs.

It was Luti's office, a branch of the Department of Defense policy shop headed by Undersecretary Douglas Feith, that "stovepiped" ersatz intelligence—often provided by now-discredited liar and embezzler Ahmad Chalabi—to the White House in the run-up to the war in Iraq, including the notorious Niger uranium forgeries that were the genesis of George W. Bush's infamous "16 words." Saddam, the President claimed in his 2003 State of the Union Address, was looking to buy weapons-grade uranium somewhere in Africa in order to build a nuclear bomb. However, it wasn't long before the "intelligence" fed to the White House on this matter—a bunch of documents that mysteriously appeared at the U.S. embassy in Italy—was proved to be bogus, a crude forgery that was debunked in five minutes by scientists at the International Atomic Energy Agency using Google.

Stahl's story turned out to be bigger than originally reported. While CBS has merely reported on the Franklin-AIPAC-classified documents connection, and *Newsweek* followed up with a gripping report on how the spy was caught (they bugged a luncheon meeting of AIPAC officials and Israeli government agents), it was left to Knight-Ridder's Warren Strobel to report as fact the clear implications of such extensive surveillance, revealing (in a story dated August 28) that the FBI investigation "is broader than previously reported." Citing "three sources" in the know, Strobel goes on to report that the investigation into Israel's spy nest in the Pentagon "has been going on for more than two years." Not only that, but the feds have also focused on "other civilians in the Secretary of Defense's office" suspected of giving highly classified information to Chalabi. The charges of espionage against the exiled Iraqi leader had been all over the papers for months, but this was the first indication that the investigation had gotten beyond the initial stages. "The linkage," writes Strobel, "if any, between the two leak investigations, remains unclear," but what links them is the people and government agencies involved: Luti's shop nurtured Chalabi, the neoconservative poster boy, and fed the White House phony "intel," but the AIPAC-Franklin-Department of Defense spy nest implies that this was a two-way transmission belt. The cabal not only fed George W. Bush a pack of lies, it fed classified information to their Israeli handlers and Chalabi (who is widely recognized in Iraq as Tel Aviv's sock puppet).

I had heard rumors, *via* Joshua Marshall's blog, that CBS News was working on yet another story, this time focused on the Niger uranium forgeries. Who, after all, compiled these obvious forgeries—and, more intriguingly, how did they go undetected and enter the U.S. "intelligence" stream as the real thing? Marshall, a respected journalist and writer for the *American Prospect*, was working on a story, and, he strongly implied, it was about to break. Then, somehow, it got bumped—in favor of the Dan Rather piece featuring the documents that supposedly "proved" George W. Bush had failed to fulfill his obligation to the National Guard. Forget all that complicated stuff about Niger uranium, forged documents, and the complex, cloak-and-dagger circumstances under which obvious fakes were passed off as authentic "intelligence": Here was a real "scoop," a scandal the masses could understand!

Except that these documents, too, turned out to be forgeries. Like George W. Bush, Dan Rather was burned by a forgery that was quickly exposed not by experts but by bloggers who knew enough about computers to recognize computer-generated type when they saw it.

So Dan Rather is "biased" against the President: Now there's a real revelation. What really ought to make us sit up and take notice, however, is the sequence of events leading up to the decision by CBS not to run the Niger uranium expose, because it wouldn't be "fair" to the President.

CBS exposes Israel's spy nest in the Pentagon and prepares to do a story on how the same neoconservative coven influenced policy by passing off forged documents as real. The Niger uranium forgery story is killed before it can air, as CBS is itself duped by a forgery passed off as authentic by a shady group of shadowy political operatives. And it isn't long before doubts start being cast on the AIPAC-Franklin story as yet another example of "bias" on the part of CBS. Writing in the *New York Post*, Eric Fettmann avers that Rathergate is not the only CBS "scoop" that "failed to materialize." Ignoring Strobel's reportage, Fettmann trivializes treason as, "at worst, a case of the possible misuse of classified documents."

Move along; nothing to see here . . .

Somehow, I have a feeling that CBS News won't be following up on Stahl's original report. And, after an initial flurry of stories in the national media—over 300 in a little over a week—the AIPAC-Franklin affair has dropped completely out of sight, although a grand jury is rumored to be empanelled in Northern Virginia. The case has been handed over to Republican hack Paul McNulty, and, the *Financial Times* reports, investigators have been told to "slow down."

In other words, the fix is in, the whole thing is being hushed up—at least until after the election—and it's no wonder that the media isn't covering it. Look what happened to Dan Rather. Any one of them could be next. c

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES usually are overrated, but the 2004 foreign-policy contest was informative. Although John Kerry is not an attractive personality, he knows the issues. George W. Bush knows his lines.

Americans undoubtedly were relieved when the President declared, "I know that Osama bin Laden attacked America." Apparently, he has learned something while in office.

To his credit, the President opposes sending troops into the Sudan, questions the usefulness of the United Nations, and rejects U.S. membership in the International Criminal Court. The President, however, does not recognize the mess he has created in Iraq. He will not acknowledge that his arguments for invading Iraq were erroneous. And he will never, ever admit that he has made a mistake.

Indeed, it is hard to know what Bush really believes. The President offered slogans rather than facts. For instance, he repeatedly insisted that Kerry could not serve as commander in chief after saying that Iraq was "the wrong war at the wrong time at the wrong place." That is, even when it becomes evident that a war was based on falsehoods, the peace was bungled, and the conflict was creating more terrorists, a president must claim the contrary. Americans must not think that their rulers have erred. It's North Korean-style governance.

Kerry danced around the challenge of justifying a continued occupation while highlighting the administration's mistakes. "I can do better," he said, without inspiring much hope that he actually could do better.

The President continually relied on platitudes. We are "making progress," he chirped, even as attacks and casualties climb. We are spreading "freedom around the world," he enthused, without showing where liberty was flourishing.

Equally disturbing was the President's conflation of Iraq and the "War on Terror." "We were attacked," he said. Kerry responded: "Saddam Hussein didn't attack us. Osama bin Laden attacked us."

Moreover, observed Kerry, Bin Laden was using "the invasion of Iraq in order to go out to people and say [that] America has declared war on Islam." An uncomprehending Bush replied, "Osama bin Laden isn't going to determine how we defend ourselves." Apparently the President doesn't believe he needs to take into account the likely consequences of his decisions.

President Bush, who otherwise posed as a tough-minded unilateralist, praised the vast coalition that he has assembled (the one including the 65-man Albanian contingent; the Filipino, Spanish, and Thai units that have gone home; and the Japanese and South Korean soldiers who won't fight). He indignantly chided Senator Kerry for "denigrating" our allies, leaving unanswered the latter's observation that "we're now 90 percent of the casualties in Iraq and 90 percent of the costs."

Kerry also won the argument over Iran and North Korea. True, he tried a bit too hard to impress, talking about his various "plans" almost as often as the President lauded his own "hard" decisions.

Nevertheless, Kerry pointed out that both Iran and North Korea have been surging ahead with their nuclear programs while the Bush administration has been sacrificing American lives trying to create democracy on the Euphrates. Kerry also recognized that China could apply pressure whether or not she was formally sitting at the table: "Just because the President says it can't be done, that you'd lose China, doesn't mean that it can't be done. I mean, this is the President who said 'There were weapons of mass destruction' and 'mission accomplished,' said we could fight the war on the cheap—none of which were true."

In the end, President Bush played the leadership card. "I've shown the American people I know how to lead," he declared, ignoring the mess into which he has led us.

Here, too, Senator Kerry surprisingly got to the nub of the issue: "This president has made, I regret to say, a colossal error of judgment. And judgment is what we look for in the president of the United States of America." Indeed, added Kerry, Bush invaded "without a plan to win the peace," even sending "troops to war without the body armor that they need."

The President's response to these devastating charges? "The way to win this is to be steadfast and resolved and to follow through on the plan that I've just outlined"—a plan that manifestly is not working.

It didn't take the Florida debate to demonstrate that America is ill-served by a choice limited to George W. Bush and John Kerry. The latter's policy reversals are legion, even as he trends left. What will he do if the allies he intends to corral behind us tell us to clean up our own mess?

President Bush's failings, however, are far worse. "I see on the TV screens how hard it is" in Iraq, he allowed. Alas, he apparently doesn't watch enough TV to recognize how serious things really are.

Nevertheless, the President claimed: "Of course we are doing everything we can to protect America. I wake up every morning, talking about how to protect us." He probably is doing everything he can think of to protect America. That's the problem.

—Doug Bandow

PRESIDENT BUSH announced in September that he would partially support key proposals for intelligence reform made by the September 11 Commission, which, in its final report, recommended a sweeping restructuring of the U.S. intelligence apparatus. The commission called for the appointment of a National Intelligence Director (NID) who would have full authority over the personnel and budgets of the various intelligence agencies. It further proposed that the NID would be located in the Office of the President and that a National Counterterrorism Center be created. One of the key issues the commission's proposals sought to address was intelligence "stovepipes," interagency breakdowns in information sharing. The commission's list of possible changes included consolidating a number of congressional intelligence-oversight committees and transferring responsibility for covert paramilitary operations to the Pentagon (now within the purview of the CIA).

President Bush backed the idea of creating an NID but stated that the NID post should not be located in the Office of the President and would have authority over only the nonmilitary part of the intelligence budget. The President further stated that the NID should not have control over intelligence-agency personnel appointments. Instead, the NID would appear to duplicate the theoretical coordination powers of the current director of Central Intelligence. Commen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tators quickly pointed out that the CIA director's efforts to influence other agencies are now often ignored, making it difficult to see how an NID would be an improvement. The President had earlier agreed to create a National Counterterrorist Center, but he did not make the center's authority clear: Would the new national center subsume both the more recent Terrorism Threat Integration Center and the older CIA Counterterrorism Threat Center (formed in 1986)? Would this result in yet another layer of bureaucracy and more, not less, "stovepiping"?

Democratic spokesmen drubbed the President for what they portrayed as foot-dragging on intelligence reform, with Democratic congressmen calling for an emergency legislative session to enact reforms suggested by the September 11 Commission. John Kerry has joined the chorus calling for accelerated intelligence reforms, endorsing the commission's report and proposals in full. Meanwhile, it seems clear that the Bush White House has no intention of reducing the authority of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld or putting Republican representation on intelligence-oversight committees at risk *via* the September 11 Commission's proposed committee consolidation.

The partisan infighting left some observers pessimistic that anything good could come out of the wrangling over intelligence reform. William Odom, a respected former head of the National Security Agency who testified at congressional hearings on intelligence reform, was frank: "I was sitting there thinking, 'What are the prospects of anything useful coming out of this?' . . . If I had to guess, I'd say probably nothing in the way of reform is going to take place."

Both the CIA and the Pentagon have opposed proposed changes that might diminish their powers and status, underscoring the rivalry—even antagonism—that exists between members of what is commonly called the "intelligence community" and thereby telling the layman all he needs to know about the "stovepipe" effect: Turf battles are inevitable in any bureaucracy, and an administrative reshuffle, no matter how well thought out, will never entirely do away with the danger of important information not reaching the people who need to see it. Anthony Cordesman, a former intelligence analyst at both the State Department and the Department of Defense, described the proposed solutions as "typical," with policymakers and bureaucrats alike thinking that "if you change the organization chart you've solved the problem."

Cordesman, however, has pointed to a larger problem in the intelligence picture of the "War on Terror": He—as well as other intelligence professionals—has long complained that, in the case of Iraq, the White House went to war not because of a threat from Baghdad but for ideological reasons that had nothing to with the CIA's actual findings. Indeed, the history of the War on Terror demonstrates that the Bush administration was not willing to listen to the best information available—from the Pentagon's creation of an Office of Special Plans to pass unvetted, often highly questionable intelligence from equally questionable sources to the White House, to dubious White House claims about Iraq's nuclear capabilities, to the pre-September 11 focus on Iraq instead of on warnings that a major terrorist attack was in the offing.

And more fundamental questions have not even come up in the intelligence-reform debate: Can the United States ever hope to prevent another terrorist attack without a serious revamping of immigration policy, regardless of how well the intelligence agencies function? The terrorists, after all, could not have struck here if they had not been inside the United States in the first place. Terrorism will be a perpetual problem if we insist on antagonizing the Arab and Muslim world with our no-questions-asked support of Israel and the occupation of Iraq. Is it worth it? Intelligence operatives can be successful in thwarting attacks nine times out of ten—and the effort will be seen as a failure upon the successful tenth attempt. Do Americans want to live in constant fear of attack? Washington does not want to know. And all the warnings, all the analysis, all the painstaking work of intelligence gathering and assessment will be for nothing if the powers that be don't want to listen.

—*Wayne Allensworth*

TERRI SHIAVO's tragic struggle is a hard case, and hard cases, we are taught, make bad law. Her husband, Michael, believes she is in a permanent vegetative state and that she would not have wanted to be kept alive artificially. Her parents, however, believe that she stands a chance of recovery and, further, that, as a good Catholic, she would have wanted to follow the Pope's recent directive that people in vegetative states have the right to healthcare and nutrition. Michael sought the aid of the Florida courts to remove Terri's life support; her parents fought him in court, lost, and appealed to Gov. Jeb Bush, who got the legislature to pass a special bill allowing him to intervene and order that Terri be put back on life support. This was the matter before the Florida Supreme Court in September, following more than six years of litigation, dozens of hearings, and immeasurable anguish for family and friends.

Mrs. Shiavo suffered brain damage in 1990, following a heart attack apparently brought on by an eating disorder. According to the Florida courts, "Over the span of this last decade, Theresa's brain has deteriorated because of the lack of oxygen it suffered at the time of the heart attack. By mid 1996, the CAT scans of her brain showed a severely abnormal structure. At this point, much of her cerebral cortex is simply gone and has been replaced by cerebral spinal fluid. Medicine cannot cure this condition. Unless an act of God, a true miracle, were to recreate her brain, Theresa will always remain in an unconscious, reflexive state, totally dependent upon others to feed her and care for her most private needs." State officials, including the judges, charged by law with the responsibility of ascertaining what the patient herself (who left no directions) would decide, concluded that, given the knowledge that she would be in a permanent vegetative state, Mrs. Shiavo would have decided to pull the plug on herself.

In their decision, delivered some 14 years after Terri's initial brain damage, the Florida Supreme Court justices unanimously ruled in late September that the legislature and the governor, by seeking to overrule a court decision, violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers, which restricts legislators to legislating, governors to executing the law, and judges to telling us what the law is. The Florida Supremes declared that "we are a nation of laws and we must govern our decisions by the rule of law and not by our own emotions. Our hearts can fully comprehend the grief so fully demonstrated by Theresa's family members on this record. But our hearts are not the law. What is in the Constitution always must prevail over emotion." Further, "in the end, this case is not about the aspirations that loving parents have for their children." Rather, said the justices, "this case is about maintaining the integrity of a constitutional system of gov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernment with three independent and co-equal branches . . . "

Had this not been the same state supreme court that virtually rewrote the Florida election laws in a manner that had to be reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2000, the language might have been a bit more convincing—but better late than never. Following this opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, Terri's parents' lawyer (who had once reportedly told one of her husband's lawyers, "You're going to burn in hell, lady") withdrew from the case. An associate of his immediately stepped in and sought to get the courts to reverse their decision that Terri would have wanted life support removed because she would have understood that, as a practicing Catholic, she would have been committing a sin. Her husband's attorney was likely to argue that Church doctrine was unclear on the issue, and that the courts correctly retrospectively read Terri's mind. The governor's lawyers could also appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, further prolonging the controversy. Observers could only wonder which was worse—the courts' clinical dismissal of faith and human sympathy or the interminable litigation.

—*Stephen B. Presser*

THE CURRENT PRESIDENTIAL race has witnessed an unprecedented drive, especially by the GOP, to court the Catholic vote. Democrats, who for decades snookered Catholics into believing that theirs was the party of the laborer and the immigrant, are finding their social-justice platform of little use among Catholics who find Democrat enthusiasm for infanticide and "gay marriage" repugnant. Blessed-are-the-peacemaker Catholics (like the Holy Father) can take no more solace in the voting record of Senator Kerry than they can in the foreign policy of the Bush administration. There remain pro-life Catholics who still feel the pull of loyalty to the Democratic Party, but their numbers are decreasing.

While a small number of courageous bishops have denied Communion to pro-abortion candidates, at least one has seemingly lowered the stakes to the partisan level. René Henry Gracida, bishop emeritus of Corpus Christi, has published a letter (enjoying wide internet circulation) in which he describes Senator Kerry as "completely for abortion on demand," President Bush as "in favor of greatly restricting abortion," and Michael Peroutka as "universally recognized as being unelectable." In case you cannot connect the dots, Bishop Gracida does it for you at the end of his letter: "Those Catholics who love moral absolutes would have no choice but to vote for Peroutka, but those Catholics who recognize that in the real world it is sometimes necessary to choose the lesser of two evils in order to prevent greater harm—in this case harm to innocent children—would vote for Bush."

Abortion is key to the GOP's courting of the Catholic vote. The letter asserts, as have other Catholic commentators, that abortion is so singularly wicked that no question of proportionality can inform the Catholic voter. Following Gracida's reasoning, a Catholic voter who stays home on Election Day is guilty of a sin of omission for his role in "assisting in the election of Kerry."

Abortion is a grave evil and is justly identified as one of five "non-negotiable" issues by Catholic Answers' *Voter's Guide for Serious Catholics*, a guide that admirably stays above party politics. For a Catholic to vote for a candidate because he is likely to introduce or support pro-abortion legislation would constitute formal cooperation in a mortal sin.

With a different set of motives and circumstances, however, the morality of a vote becomes a complex question. Single-issue (abortion) voters will hear no argument that war is a proportionate issue. Their deliberate deafness may be the result of their support for the war, or it may be a recognition that the body counts aren't anywhere near equal—though, if we count Iraqi civilians (especially deaths of women and children caused by sanctions and a decade of air strikes) the gap closes. If we ponder the possibility of plunging a major region of the world into decades of war, the gap closes even more.

Moreover, a politician may be pro-life, but, if he cannot bring his influence to bear on the matter, the merits of a vote for him are diminished. Or a candidate may be marginally pro-life, such as President Bush, but altogether unwilling to go the mat on the question. Bush's judicial appointments, or the four abortuaries that operated in his state capital when he was governor of Texas, say more than his claims that human life is sacred.

A third element of the proportionality question is urgency. If a pro-life candidate cannot or will not meaningfully address the abortion problem, there may be another pressing matter—a foreign policy that is antagonizing our enemies and our allies, for example—that might be solved by the pro-abortion candidate. An America-first Catholic could reason it this way: Neither Ralph Nader nor George W. Bush is likely to slow abortion, but the former may at least try to arrest the growth of the American Empire.

Cardinal Ratzinger has neatly distilled the moral complexity of voting: "A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation with evil . . . if he were to deliberately [*sic*] vote for a candidate precisely because of the candidate's permissive stance on abortion or euthanasia. When a Catholic does not share the candidate's stance in favor of abortion or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons." Leftists journalists have given Ratzinger's words the usual spin, arguing that they are a green light for Catholics to vote "pro-choice." They aren't, of course—only a concise rendering of a moral question that the simpletons in both parties have no interest in trying to understand.

—*Christopher J. Check*

OBITER DICTA: *The Conservative Bookshelf: Essential Works That Impact Today's Conservative Thinkers*, by **Chilton Williamson, Jr.**, was published early in October 2004 by Citadel Press. To order, see the ad in next month's issue.

Our poet is **William Baer**, the founding editor of the *Formalist*, a journal of metrical poetry. Dr. Baer has published two books of poems: *The Unfortunates*, which received the T.S. Eliot Prize in 1997, and *"Borges" and Other Sonnets* (2003). His work has appeared in the *Hudson Review*, the *New Criterion*, *Ploughshares*, *Poetry*, the *Southern Review*, *Michigan Quarterly Review*, the *Iowa Review*, the *Antioch Review*, the *New York Quarterly*, and elsewhere. He currently teaches creative writing and cinema at the University of Evansville in southwest Indiana.

Our cover art is provided by our interior artist, **George McCartney, Jr.**, of New York City.

Our interior art is provided by our designer, **Melanie Anderson**, and **Elizabeth Wolf** of Chicago. Mrs. Anderson received her B.F.A. from Northern Illinois University. Miss Wolf received her B.F.A. from the School of Art at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Thomas Fleming

Where's Joe McCarthy When You Need Him?

Many Americans are so disappointed with the Bush administration that they are tempted to vote for John Kerry. Some Democrats who spent the past 80 years waiting for the Revolution to blow over may think theirs is still the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion," as it was dubbed in 1884, but, by the 1960's, the Democrats had become the party not of the three *R*'s but of the three S's: Sex, Socialism, and Sedition, the enemies of every decent thing this country had ever done or stood for. How did the party of William Jennings Bryan and Al Smith turn into the party of Bill Clinton and Barney Frank?

Democrats did not get out in front on the sex issue until fairly late. In fact, Southern Democrats were, if anything, more conservative than Midwestern Republicans on questions of divorce, pornography, and abortion. Beginning with *Playboy* President John Kennedy, however, Democrats have embraced sexual liberation, in every form and combination, with a passion. Of course, their speeches still resound with the fine old Democratic rhetoric of free speech, civil rights, and the Tenth Amendment, but these days, free speech means the rights of pornographers to abuse children; the only important civil right is a mother's right to have her living baby hacked to death as it is being born; and the rights of the states are reduced to providing fake marriage certificates for homosexuals who want to shack up for three days or more.

Socialism, as every American knows, was embraced by the Democratic Party in 1932, and, despite a few dissident voices in the South, the party has not looked back since FDR won reelection in 1936, and, although neoconservatives would like us to look back nostalgically at Harry Truman, FDR's Vice President was nothing better than a coarse-mannered machine politician who defended Alger Hiss.

The Democratic Party's protection of treason and sedition did not begin with the employment of Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and other known communists and subversives. Throughout World War II, the President had been protecting communists in America as part of his constructive engagement with Stalin. Before Stalin, however, there was Churchill, and, partly as a result of FDR's special relationship with Churchill, British agents were able to do as they pleased in the United States, and some agents assassinated their German counterparts in America; others kept tabs on influential American political figures who opposed U.S. entrance into the war. Sen. Arthur Vandenberg, among the most prominent isolationists, was set up with a girlfriend and then blackmailed.

Far from blaming perfidious Albion for these activities, I salute the bravery and resourcefulness of patriotic Englishmen who helped to drag a reluctant America into the war. Both interventionists and isolationists, however, should acknowledge that it was a mistake bordering on treason to allow foreign agents to ply their trade within the United States.

After the war, Democrats gave up their bellicosity and began slowly evolving into the party of appeasement. By 1972, the imperialists had ceded control of the party to the appeasers, and, ever since, the American people have quite correctly regarded the Democratic Party as incapable of defending their interests or security. On the one occasion in over 30 years that Democrats have gone to war—Mad Albright's illegal bombing of the civilian population of Yugoslavia—they picked the wrong side. American money was spent, and American lives risked, to put Islamic Albanian terrorists—the allies of Osama bin Laden—into power in Kosovo.

Small wonder that many patriotic Americans, who think that the Bush administration has simultaneously botched the "War on Terror" and the economy, are refusing to support the party of John Kerry. Kerry is a study in deceit: a Catholic who supports infanticide and keeps mum on the subject of homosexual "marriage"; a soldier who returned from Vietnam and denounced his comrades-in-arms for political gain; a senator who voted for the Iraq War and yet reserves the right to attack the war without every changing his position. So far from voting for such a representative of such a party, I would not even let him enter my house.

Then why not swallow hard and vote to give President Bush four more years? He is no conservative, but the Republican Party has never been the conservative party that some of its members have wanted to believe in. Of its presidential candidates since the election of 1940, only two would qualify as to any extent conservative by a reasonable definition: Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan. Willkie and Dewey were clones of FDR; Eisenhower had no discernible political ideology. Russell Kirk's famous response to the Birchers—*Ike's not a communist, he's a golfer*—comes close to defining the prince of managers, whether as general or as statesman. Nixon never claimed to be a conservative and believed that the only reason conservatives ever supported him was his prosecution of Alger Hiss.

Despite their lack of principle and incoherence, Republican presidential candidates have typically represented the lesser of two evils. On economic matters, Republicans have been uniformly better than their rivals. Where the Democrats have always been good at spending money, Republicans have usually spent their lives making money, which is a far more difficult business. Even when Republicans engage in deficit spending, it is not out of a desire to extend the socialist state. Republican presidents are typically driven to extravagance by a Democratic Congress, by political necessity, or by a mistaken belief that "deficits don't matter." Yes, it is true that the Republican Party's free-trade ideology is destroying our manufacturing base, but the Democratic Party is in the grips of exactly the same ideology—if somewhat different lobbyists. The same might be said of the two parties' actual positions on immigration, as well as on most social and cultural issues. There is hardly George Wallace's dime's worth of difference between them, and a dime does not buy what it did 35 years ago. It was not, after all, a Democratic NEH chairman who wrote a pornographic lesbian novel: It was Lynne Cheney, the wife of the current Vice President. Mrs. Cheney, who sold herself to the neoconservatives in her first year at the NEH, is just smart enough to block the republication of *Sisters* but not smart enough not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to have written it.

And yet, for all the cowardice, vice, corruption, and lack of principle among Republican leaders, the Republican Party continues to represent the more nearly normal elements of American society, and, despite the trade policies that are throwing Americans out of work and the Iraq War that was apparently engaged without sufficient cause and continues to be fought without conspicuous success, I would be tempted to vote for George W. Bush: Kerry and Bush are both spoiled Yalies, but Bush's bubba persona, whether real or feigned, is less hard to take than a stuck-up prig who talks through his nose down to ordinary Americans.

Then why are so many conservatives so reluctant to hold their noses one more time? During the summer, an old friend came to my office and wanted my opinion on the election. He had been a Republican all his life and had cast his first vote in a presidential election for Thomas Dewey. This time, he was ready to support Kerry, if only to rid the GOP of the pernicious influence of the neoconservatives. Although he has always supported the U.S. alliance with Israel, he was particularly disgusted with the obvious pressure that Israel's government is able to exert on our foreign policy through such prominent neoconservatives as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith. I told him I did not think a man of good conscience could vote for Kerry. He could, however, choose not to vote at all. I have had the same conversation with not a few conservatives, some of whom are determined to vote for Kerry—or Ralph Nader, who has been denounced by the Christophobic ADL for describing George Bush as the puppet of Ariel Sharon.

My friend's suspicions must have been aggravated when, a few weeks later, it was revealed in the press that the FBI was engaged in a two-year investigation of Lawrence Franklin, of the Office of Special Plans in the Department of Defense. Franklin, who had served in the Defense Intelligence Agency and as military attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv, is suspected of passing secrets to the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and to the government of Israel. Longtime neoconservative policy analyst Michael Ledeen calls the charge "nonsensical," but then Ledeen—best known these days as the most hysterical imperialist at *National Review Online*—is widely rumored to be implicated in the leakage. He is also a contractor hired by Feith.

The real issue is not Franklin himself: He is only a small cog in a vast network of Israeli influence that extends to the highest circles of the Bush administration. Franklin reports to Douglas Feith, undersecretary for policy and thus the number-three man in the Department of Defense. It is Feith who put Franklin in a position to damage his country's national security, and it is Feith who should be held accountable.

Feith is an amazing character. Like many American bureaucrats, he has gone through the usual revolving door between public and private, but Feith's door has also opened on to Tel Aviv. His law-firm, Feith and Zell, which does the predictable lobbying for Israeli interests, allied itself with the Israeli firm Zell and Goldberg, in order to better serve their Israeli clients.

In 1996, Feith was one of the principal sources (along with Richard Perle, David Wurmser, Meyrav Wurmser, James Colbert, and Charles Fairbank) of a policy paper drawn up for then-prime minister Netanyahu, the Likud Party extremist who continues to denounce Ariel Sharon for his timidity. The paper, "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm," advocates an aggressive, no-compromise approach to the Palestinians. That was to be expected. What is disconcerting, however, is the American authors' decision to speak in the first person when describing Israeli interests:

> We have for four years pursued peace based on a *New Middle East*. We in Israel cannot play innocents abroad in a world that is not innocent. Peace depends on the character and behavior of our foes. We live in a dangerous neighborhood, with fragile states and bitter rivalries. Displaying *moral ambivalence* between the effort to build a Jewish state and the desire to annihilate it by trading "*land for peace*" will not secure "*peace now.*" Our claim to the land—to which we have clung for hope for 2000 years—is legitimate and noble. It is not *within our own power*, no matter how much we concede, *to make peace unilaterally*. Only the unconditional acceptance by Arabs of our rights, *especially* in their territorial dimension, "*peace for peace,*" is a solid basis for the future.

Meyrav (Mrs. David) Wurmser is an Israeli national (like the wife of Douglas Feith), and she has a perfect right to lobby for Likud, but her husband (Dick Cheney's advisor on the Middle East), Douglas Feith, and Richard Perle—American citizens who have served the government of the United States as high-level advisors on security and foreign policy—are not only advising Netanyahu to reject U.S. policy in the Middle East but speaking as spokesmen for Israel and the Likud Party. If they have been misrepresented, they have not apparently said so.

The provision of "A Clean Break" that has attracted most attention is the recommendation to oust Saddam Hussein:

> Israel can shape its strategic environment, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, by weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria. This effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq—an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right—as a means of foiling Syria's regional ambitions.

The authors also advised Netanyahu to make a "clean break" with American independence and to turn away from Israel's status as American dependent to that of a mature ally, "formulating the policies and stress themes he favors in language familiar to the Americans by tapping into themes of American administrations during the Cold War which apply well to Israel." In other words, manipulate American opinion by appealing to Cold War anxieties. This is exactly what Ariel Sharon did in the weeks following September 11, when he and his adherents rang endless changes on the theme: "Now Americans know what it is like to be Israelis."

When Feith is not advising Israeli politicians on how to manipulate the United States, his supposed expertise is in areas of military intelligence: It was Feith who was in charge of setting guidelines for the new, more aggressive methods of interrogation used on Iraqi prisoners, and it was Feith who brilliantly suggested that the United States was not bound by the Geneva Convention—the two biggest p.r. blunders of the war in Iraq. Feith also failed to deliver accurate intelligence to the commanders who led the invasion of Iraq. Gen. Tommy Franks was so disgusted with the quality of the intelligence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he received that he told Bob Woodward that Feith is "the f---ing stupidest guy on the face of the earth." Bush's neoconservatives seem to elicit obscenity. In the build-up to the war, Colin Powell, according to BBC reporter James Naughtie, referred to the lot of them as a bunch of "f---ing crazies."

Feith hardly ever talks in public about Israel *per se* or about his own strong connections with the Likud Party; he justifies his total opposition to negotiating with the Palestinians on the grounds of their violations of human rights. Israel's denial of basic rights to Christians, however, never seems to come up. In 1997, the Zionist Organization of America honored Douglas Feith along with his father, Dalck Feith. Who is Dalck Feith? A follower of Ze'ev Jabotinsky and a member of Jabotinsky's fascist youth group, Betar. Jabotinsky was no liberal Zionist or even a Likudnik like Ariel Sharon. He boldly called for the elimination of Palestinian Arabs as a people. Ridiculing the more moderate Zionists who hoped to live in peace with Arabs, Jabotinsky demanded that the Zionists emulate the Americans who destroyed the Plains Indians and eliminated their cultural identity.

In other words, Feith comes out of a Zionist tradition that even Begin and Sharon would rather not talk about, and, as a senior official in the Department of Defense, he has never ceased to advocate policies designed to promote Israeli, not American, interests. In this, however, he is no different from Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Michael Ledeen, and the entire neoconservative network of think tanks and publications that have dominated the foreign policy of the Bush administration. When Feith wanted to put out the disinformation that the CIA had clinched the connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, he leaked his own memo to the *Weekly Standard*, whose bogus article was then quoted triumphantly by Dick Cheney—a disinformational triple play. (See Laura Rozen's "Ye of Little Feith," *American Prospect Online*, May 18, 2004—though some caution may be needed in treating statements from Karen Kwiatkowski.)

Ronald Hatchett, retired U.S. Air Force colonel and arms negotiator, worked under Feith from 1984 to 1988 and knew him well. In an interview, Hatchett describes Feith as pure Machiavellian. "He is almost Straussian in his contempt for the public. Tell them whatever is necessary, he would say, all we need is plausible denial. The important thing is to win. The public always supports a winner." Hatchett added that Feith was completely devoted to two things: surrounding himself with like-minded associates (whom he referred to as "true patriots") and promoting the security of Israel. "He did believe that America should be kept strong, but the main reason was to support the security of Israel."

In his combination of arrogance and incompetence, Feith is just another neoconservative policy expert. One thing does distinguish Feith from his colleagues: He lost his first job at the National Security Council in the first Reagan administration when he fell under suspicion of passing secrets to Israel. National Security Advisor Richard Clark gave as grounds for dismissal that Feith "had been the object of an inquiry into whether he had provided classified material to an official of the Israeli Embassy in Washington." Pentagon officials from those days (and others in the Reagan administration) told me they were shocked to learn that Feith's disgrace was only a temporary setback, since his mentor Richard Perle, another Netanyahu advisor, got him rehired at the Department of Defense six months later. This proved, as one Pentagon source told me, that Perle was virtually omnipotent. Ever since, Feith has been obsequious in his obedience to Perle.

I do not at all blame the Israelis for the espionage and treason they have instigated in the United States. On the contrary, I salute them for their bravery and their patriotism. In Israel, I met many solid supporters and advisors of the Likud Party. They love their country the way Crockett and Travis loved America, and they would, as they say in Texas, rather fight than run. I think they are quite wrong, but I can only admire them.

Most governments, from time to time, practice espionage against foes and keep tabs on their friends. There is this difference, however: Israel depends upon the United States for her very existence, and the Mossad is not an occasional eavesdropper on diplomatic conversations. Israel has been spying on her principal benefactor for decades, counting on the fact that American governments will not retaliate by cutting off the aid and loans that subsidize Israel's lavish welfare state—and her expensive war machine. A few years ago, I spoke with a man who retired from the CIA decades ago, because of the steady leakage to Israel. The worst part of it, he said, was not the treason committed by agents more loyal to Israel than to the United States but the fact that Israel used some of her stolen intelligence as bargaining chips with countries that were enemies of the United States. Such deals could ruin an operation and put agents at risk, but, after repeated complaints, he concluded that the CIA was never going to stop the leaks. That was four decades ago; now, the problem is worse.

Why blame Sharon for crimes committed by American citizens and ignored by the American government? If the Mossad is more effective than the CIA, so much the better for the Israelis. When we discover their agents—like Jonathan Pollard or, if he is guilty, Lawrence Franklin—they should be prosecuted exactly the same as if they were agents of China or Iran. We should also consider punitive measures against *any* country caught spying on the United States. We should not, however, fall into the trap of blaming "the Jews" for the crimes committed by a few ultra-Zionists, nor should we allow the lunatic fringe at *Commentary* and the ADL to get away with the claim that they represent Jewish-Americans.

On the other hand, espionage and influence-peddling are very serious matters. People such as Douglas Feith and Richard Perle have time after time displayed their loyalty to a foreign power, and, even if their activities *may* fall short of treason and espionage, they are clearly unfit to be trusted with any important position in government.

Instead of weeding out these agents of influence, however, the Bush administration continues to rely on them for guidance on the Middle East. First Iraq, then Iran, then Syria. And even when the FBI was on the verge of arresting Lawrence Franklin, Attorney General John Ashcroft apparently decided to postpone the arrest and to reduce the charge to something less than espionage. Ashcroft's reluctance to antagonize AIPAC two months before the election may be politically justified, but Republicans cannot expect the support of patriotic conservatives until they clean out the nest of vipers in the Department of Defense. If President Bush would only promise to fire, in order, Franklin, Feith, and Wolfowitz—along with the man who hired them and bungled the war in Iraq—he would have their support. Until then, I do not see how he can even look them in the eye. ‹C›

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



"No more important book has been published in this new century."
—**E. Christian Kopff**
The American Conservative

"Crisp and spellbinding . . . [T]he antidote to the stifling, suffocating, corrosive banality of modern culture and politics."
—**Paul Likoudis**
The Wanderer

"Writing much more accessibly and knowledgeably than most modern professional philosophers, Fleming revivifies the body of thought with which civilization was created and without which it is disintegrating."
—**Ray Olson**
Booklist

The Morality of Everyday Life: Rediscovering an Ancient Alternative to the Liberal Tradition

by Thomas Fleming

What passes for conservatism today is really nothing more than the impossible moral and social theories of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, in which universal abstractions, such as democracy and equality, are presented as hard truths, when, in fact, they have never existed in any society in human history. Nonetheless, they are to be applied worldwide, at the tip of a spear (or cruise missile) if necessary. Dr. Fleming's alternative is rooted in "everyday life," the local realities of blood and soil, custom and tradition, friendship and faith, and in the wisdom born of the experiences these realities beget. This wisdom finds expression in folktales and fables, in ancient Hebrew Scriptures and Greek philosophy, and in medieval casuistry. It is the method to solving ethical problems great and small, and it is the method that undergirds authentic conservatism.

The Morality of Everyday Life Order Form (please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery)

MORA

Hardcover Price $49.95
($44.95 + $5.00 shipping and handling each)

X Quantity _____

Total _____

Please mail form (with payment) to:
Chronicles/Products
P.O. Box 800, Mount Morris, IL 61054

or, to order toll-free,
call 1-800-397-8160

AMOR11

Name _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

☐ Check or money order enclosed

☐ Please bill my: ☐ MasterCard ☐ Visa ☐ Amex ☐ Discover

Card # _____

Expiration Date _____

Signature _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Ballad Rode Into Town

by William Baer

The ballad rode into town one day,
wearing his deadly gun,
and his Mexican spurs jingled along
in the heat of the mid-day sun.

He wore his blacks, he wore his boots,
he wore a Colt on his hip,
with a re-bored barrel, its trigger filed,
and a custom black-butt grip.

He'd come across the desert heats,
like Dante through his hell,
over the mesas, day and night,
through the sage and the chaparral.

Right up the only street in town,
he and his Morgan came,
and the free-verse rummies scattered,
and slithered away in shame.

But at the saloon, the rondels came out,
with the pretty villanelle,
"Now, *that's* what I would call a man—
a man with a story to tell."

And even the gambler couplet agreed,
"That's a mighty heroic chap,
who'll face them alone, and fire his Colt,
with the crack of a thunderclap."

They followed him past the Sheriff's door,
abandoned back in June,
then passed the burned-out *Weekly Press*,
in the silent afternoon.

The ballad rode into town that day,
wearing his deadly gun,
and his Mexican spurs jingled along
in the heat of the mid-day sun.

He rode his Morgan up the street,
and stopped at the only birch,
as all the decent blank-verse folk
were coming out of church.

"Where is she?" he said and waited,
under the Texas skies;
"I'm here!" the lovely sonnet called,
as heaven flashed in his eyes.

"They've terrorized this western town,
and bullied us all, my dear.
So set things right and proper,
then take me away from here."

Right then, the critics gang rode up,
a motley crew of thugs,
with .38s and rifles cocked
with lethal dum-dum slugs.

Quickly, the fearful crowds dispersed,
to hide and watch and wait,
as the gang boss sneered, "Any last words?"
as he aimed his .38.

But the ballad blew a bullet hole
right through the de-con's eye,
and dropped the freud and marxist crits,
and then the gender guy.

There were, when his chambers were empty,
six dead in the Texas heat;
there were, when he holstered his .45,
six thugs on the dusty street.

And when the celebration peaked,
Miss sonnet reappeared,
and she and her man rode off to the west,
and even the rummies cheered.

So the ballad rode out of town that day,
still wearing his deadly gun,
and his Mexican spurs jingled along
in the heat of the mid-day sun.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Philip Jenkins

The People's Militia

The U.S. Capitol may be the most easily parodied symbol of America. It is a gift to cartoonists, who can use the dome to symbolize graft, foolishness, hot air, scandal, self-seeking—everything, in fact, that can go wrong with a democratically elected legislature. In the past few years, though, all that has changed utterly, and not, of course, because of any decline in the amount of foolishness spoken therein, but in the fact that the building stands at all. These days, whenever I see the Capitol—and now I really do see it in ways I never have before—I know that I am looking at one of the most powerful lessons ever written on the nature of American government. To see the Capitol is to see material proof that the American people came first, before the government, and before the nation itself.

It all comes down to a matter of 15 minutes. Thanks to the commission that reported this past summer on the attacks of September 11, 2001, we now know much more about that day and, above all, about the epic of United Flight 93. The story is familiar enough. A group of vermin hijacked the aircraft, murdering some of the crew and passengers, and then directed the flight to Washington. It is morally certain that their target was the Capitol, since the principal plot organizer has admitted as much. Knowing roughly what the terrorists intended, the surviving passengers attacked their captors, overwhelming one thug, and then storming the cockpit door, using an airline food cart as a battering ram. Realizing they were about to lose control of the aircraft, the terrorists crashed the plane into a remote area near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing everyone on board.

So much has been known for three years, but now we have two more critical pieces of information. First, we know how very close the enemy came to achieving their objective. The airliner crashed at 10:03 A.M., with between 10 and 20 minutes separating them from the Capitol. Let's split the difference and assume it was 15 minutes. Around 10:18 A.M., the aircraft would have smashed into the Capitol. News crews, ordered to evacuate the area, were waiting nearby, the cameramen told that on no account should they take their lenses off the building in what were presumed to be its last minutes of existence. Physical devastation apart, the enormous moral shock of September 11 would have been compounded beyond imagination.

And that brings us to the second piece of new information. The United States defends herself with a great deal of high-tech weaponry. On September 11, though, virtually none of that was remotely near ready or available for use. Aircraft summoned to defend Washington were careful not to break the speed limit, lest windows be broken and citizens agitated. Meanwhile, fighters that were in reach of the city were under strict orders not to intercept hijacked flights without direct authorization from the highest command. That, in practice, meant Vice President Dick Cheney, who did his job superbly in an impossible situation, though never sure when or whether his orders were finding their way to their intended recipients. And Cheney's order permitting airliners to be shot down reached the fighters no earlier than 10:31 A.M. If matters had gone very slightly differently, the orders might have been received just as the pilots were circling the billowing flames emerging from the Capitol dome, after it had smashed down to destroy the building below. All of which is to say that the passengers of Flight 93 saved the Capitol, at a moment when all the President's aircraft and all the President's men did not stand a chance of doing so.

The way they acted sounds like an unlikely civics lesson from the most heroic days of the Revolutionary War. Knowing they had no one to depend on but themselves, the passengers returned to the most basic principles of Anglo-American popular democracy. Despite the desperate circumstances, they *took a vote* on possible courses of action and then formed what can only be termed an unorganized militia. From their phone calls, we know some of the reasons motivating them, and they were beyond what the most farfetched superpatriotic scriptwriter might have devised. The words of Todd Beamer have entered history: "Are you guys ready? Let's roll." Other remarks, however, deserve to be remembered no less. Passenger Tom Burnett told his wife, "If they're going to crash the plane into the ground, we have to do something. We can't wait for the authorities. We have to do something now." The last words of flight attendant Sandy Bradshaw to her husband were: "Everyone's running to first class. I've got to go. Bye." Mark Bingham, Jeremy Glick: Every surviving word from these heroes deserves to become an American legend.

We can't wait for the authorities. They have multimillion-dollar F-15's, and we have—a food cart. And the fate of the Capitol depended on as tough and dedicated a fighting unit as the nation has ever produced. The salesmen, the corporate honchos, the rugby player . . . and Sandy Bradshaw in the galley boiling pots of good hot water to throw in terrorists' faces. Not long ago in these pages, H.A. Scott Trask wondered whether the U.S. Army in these degenerate modern days was indeed the lineal descendant of its Continental predecessors in the 1770's. I am happy to tell him that that spirit is very much alive in our time. The Capitol stands because of what the people did, the people who existed before the government, who made the government.

Everyone should visit the site of the crash at Shanksville, a beautiful, tranquil place. You need very little imagination to think that the spirits of Sandy Bradshaw and the rest still haunt the site. The ghosts are serene, triumphant, and about 60-feet tall. ☙

Visit the
CHRONICLES BOOKLOG
at
www.ChroniclesMagazine.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Third Way?

When Stupid and Evil Are the Same

by Tom Piatak

I went into the 2000 presidential campaign an enthusiastic supporter of Pat Buchanan's bid for the White House as a third-party candidate. I emerged more convinced than ever that Buchanan would have made an outstanding president but skeptical that a serious right-wing party will be able to emerge, at least in the short run.

I knew that no major national party had emerged since the Republican Party was formed in the 1850's, helped along by the implosion of the Whig Party and the increasingly sharp divide between North and South. I knew, too, that the most successful of all third-party candidacies, Teddy Roosevelt's in 1912, accomplished little beyond the election of Woodrow Wilson.

There were more recent precedents, however, showing how third parties could effectively shift the national debate. George Wallace's 1968 campaign sounded the death knell for the great New Deal coalition that had dominated American politics since 1932. Wallace's campaign pushed the GOP to the right on social and cultural issues and laid the groundwork for millions of Southerners and ethnic Catholics to join Reagan and the Republicans in 1980. Ross Perot's 1992 bid forced both the Republicans and the Democrats to make at least an effort to address ballooning deficits and burgeoning debt, helping make the 1990's a time of comparative fiscal restraint in Washington. In fact, if Perot had not temporarily withdrawn from the 1992 race and if he had never begun talking about Republican dirty tricksters plotting to ruin his daughter's wedding, he may very well have won: Most Americans had soured on Bush the Elder and were wary of Clinton, who was better known for the many scandalous rumors (most of them true) swirling around him than whatever he may have accomplished as governor of Arkansas.

I knew, too, that the major argument offered against conservative third parties by Republican propagandists—that the worst Republican candidate for president would always be better than the Democrat—was both unconvincing and, taken to its logical conclusion, a guarantor of the continued incremental leftward drift of American politics. The flaw in this argument can be seen by examining a favorite specter raised by those making it, that of a Democratic president being able to nominate new justices to the Supreme Court. Although we are always told that the Supreme Court hangs in the balance, this is seldom the case. Republican commentators poured forth column after column in 2000, warning that Al Gore would get to pick three Supreme Court justices if he were elected. In point of fact, he would have been able to appoint zero. None of the current justices seems particularly eager to leave, and the only events that will reliably create a vacancy—death or disabling illness—are beyond the control of even Karl Rove.

Tom Piatak writes from Cleveland, Ohio.

More to the point, justices appointed by Republican presidents have repeatedly been responsible for the decisions that have caused the most distress to conservatives, beginning with Eisenhower appointee Earl Warren. The two decisions of most concern to the GOP's conservative base were both written by Republican justices: *Roe* v. *Wade* was authored by Nixon appointee Harry Blackmun; and *Lawrence and Garner* v. *Texas*, which struck down all statutes against sodomy, was penned by Reagan appointee Anthony Kennedy. (Ironically, a Democratic appointee, Byron White, both dissented in *Roe* and wrote *Bowers* v. *Hardwick*, the opinion overturned by *Lawrence*.) So many liberal justices have been appointed by so many Republican presidents that conservatives who insist that Bush will appoint only conservatives to the high court sound like nothing so much as a battered woman insisting that, "this time," her drunken, abusive boyfriend will act differently. After all, a Machiavellian Republican strategist might not want the Supreme Court to overturn *Roe* v. *Wade*, which would both risk the wrath of voters who want abortion to remain legal (a group that includes many major GOP donors and such figures as President Bush's mother and wife) and perhaps allow some pro-life voters to declare "Mission Accomplished" and return to their ancestral home in the Democratic Party.

Taken to its logical conclusion, the Republicans' standard argument against third parties also paves the way for a continued, incremental movement to the left in American politics. If conservatives should vote for George W. Bush because he is better than John Kerry, shouldn't they also support Rudy Giuliani for president? Only when Republicans are made to realize that they cannot take conservatives for granted will Republicans regularly begin giving conservatives anything more than occasional rhetoric.

Unfortunately, my experience with Buchanan's Reform Party candidacy—while not vindicating Republican arguments—fell far short of my hopes. I underestimated the many practical challenges facing third parties. I was not aware of the often fractious and occasionally unstable nature of some of the people attracted to third-party efforts. Above all, I mistakenly believed that most Americans were interested in having presidential candidates willing and able to conduct a serious debate on the major issues facing the country. These factors doomed Buchanan's candidacy, and they threaten to doom any attempt to create a serious conservative third party in the foreseeable future.

Ballot access is a daunting challenge for a third-party candidate, consuming a large amount of his scarce resources: Third-party candidates need to be familiar with the election laws of all 50 states, and campaigns need to allocate many volunteers to gather the necessary petitions, pay professionals to do it, or both. Furthermore, they must deal with the open hostility of the two major parties. For a time, virtually all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Buchanan's national campaign staff disappeared in 2000, because they were all in North Carolina gathering signatures to get Buchanan on the ballot. Even though he had greater resources than other third-party candidates, Buchanan was unable to get on the ballot in all 50 states. The GOP kept him off the ballot in Michigan, just as the Democrats are trying to keep Nader off the ballot in such places as Oregon and Pennsylvania this year.

Getting media access is also a challenge. Media coverage is geared toward the horse-race aspects of campaigning, which means little attention is given third-party candidates, even those who regularly provide good copy, such as Buchanan. In 2000, both Buchanan and Nader were shut out of the debates, even though there is little doubt that they would have enlivened them and forced Bush and Gore to confront issues of great concern to many Americans, including the impact of globalization.

Globalization is also directly related to another daunting obstacle—money. In 1996, Buchanan was able to finance a credible run for the GOP nomination by raising small amounts from many individual donors, mostly through direct-mail solicitations. This is how conservative candidates have raised money since the early 1970's. Buchanan enjoyed the support of only one Fortune 500 CEO. By contrast, in 2000, George W. Bush almost wrapped up the GOP nomination before the first primary vote was cast by raising an unprecedented amount of money from many large donors throughout the country. Estimates of the total cost of this year's campaign near one billion dollars. Any candidate skeptical of globalization (as any conservative third-party challenger likely would be) simply cannot compete in the money race with candidates enjoying ready access to corporate donors, which means that such candidates will find it increasingly difficult to compete in the primaries and almost impossible to run a third-party campaign.

Another obstacle facing third-party candidates can be the nature of some of the people drawn to third parties. Both the Republican and Democratic parties tend to be relatively cohesive because those running the parties are motivated primarily by the prospect of enjoying monetary gain from holding office, lobbying those who hold office, and cashing in on connections made while holding office. Few congressmen ever return to gainful employment (or even go home) after reaching Washington. By contrast, third parties are often fractious, as shown by three of the third parties that competed in 2000: The Reform Party has split into two parties, the America First Party and the Reform Party; Nader has run away from the party that supported him last time, the Green Party; and the Natural Law Party, which attracted Reform Party members who opposed Buchanan's nomination, has simply disappeared.

Such infighting takes a toll. There is little doubt that Buchanan's campaign was badly hurt by the protracted battle for the Reform Party nomination and the well-publicized walkout of malcontents from the party's Long Beach convention. In my experience, those who bitterly fought Buchanan were motivated not by ideology (which can be a cohesive force) but by personality: Fighting was what they enjoyed doing. Indeed, Buchanan's opponents gravitated toward the unlikely (and gravity-defying) figure of John Hagelin, an instructor in physics at a school established by the Transcendental Meditation movement in Iowa. Hagelin, like other TM adherents, believes in "yogic flying," which so far consists of crossing one's legs and bouncing but is said to offer the possibility of effortless flight through the air.

The greatest obstacle facing a serious third-party effort on the right is not the suprarational beliefs of the likes of John Hagelin but the suprarational nature of politics today. Our politics are at once acrimonious and meaningless. The acrimony is obvious to anyone who spends five minutes watching cable TV. The meaninglessness is shown by the nature of the debate between the major candidates. They are in substantial agreement on such major issues as globalization, immigration, trade, the need for an interventionist foreign policy, and the need to continue expanding the federal government, differing largely on how best to tinker with the tax code. They do not even have any fundamental disagreements over Iraq: Kerry voted for the war and has said he would cast his vote the same way today, even after we found no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and no link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. Can any debate be more meaningless than the one we have seen so far this year, with the liveliest discussion focusing on what John Kerry did or did not do in Vietnam 35 years ago?



Melanie Anderson

At least since the beginning of the Clinton presidency, American conservatism has been characterized less and less by an interest in ideas and policies and more and more by intellectually disabling cults of personality—first, the negative cult of personality surrounding Bill Clinton; now, the more conventional one surrounding George W. Bush. The left is following suit, as many Democrats now feel about Bush the way many Republicans feel about Clinton. For each side, there is far more passion generated by the real or imagined misdeeds of the other candidate than by the policies advocated by their own candidate.

Presidential politics have become so bitter because the major differences between the candidates are now cultural, not ideological; many voters now treat the presidential campaign not merely as one front in the Culture War but as the *only* front. This is dangerous for conservatives because the White House has not been the instrument of the left's victories in the Culture War, and merely having a Republican in the White House will do little to alter the outcome of that struggle, especially when the President is committed to nothing more rigorous than "compassionate conservatism." As long as conservatives view voting for president as a way of registering which side they are on rather than as a way of advancing a meaningful agenda, there is little chance of building a credible third party focused on promoting conservative issues. c

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Toward Real Conservatism

Just Say No to the Neocons

by Edward A. Olsen

According to most prominent Democrats, the United States is being seriously hurt by the conservatives running Washington today. While their allegations about the damage being done by those in power may be plausible, what warrants skepticism is the premise behind the allegations. Do those whom the Democrats criticize deserve to be called "conservatives"? Given their willingness to accept enormous budget deficits and massive national debt, they do not qualify as fiscal conservatives. Similarly, their embrace of big government fueled by budgetary pork falls short of the conventional notion that conservatism stands for minimal government. Perhaps most important, their enthusiasm for Wilsonian interventionism in international affairs falls far short of genuine conservatism. If these policies can be labeled "conservative," then what are the "liberal" policies on these issues?

The major role of neoconservatives in shaping relatively liberal policies and bestowing the label "conservative" on the results has contributed to the controversy surrounding the authenticity of contemporary conservatism. In the international arena, the neoconservatives' philosophical roots are deep in the Wilsonian-Stimsonian globalist wing of the Democratic Party. Just as the co-opting of many Republicans by the post-World War II liberal internationalist vision of the Truman administration divided conservatism, in the post-Vietnam era—after the McGovernites divided Democratic Party ranks with their leftist advocacy of disengagement—the Democrats' extreme interventionists broke ranks and shifted allegiance to the Republican Party. That was plausible, in part, because of the legacy of such men as Henry Luce (of *Time* fame) who deemed it conservative to oppose noninterventionism and to favor an American leadership role in the world based on moral imperatives. The neoconservatives' growing influence among Republicans from the Reagan administration to the current Bush administration comes at the expense of mainstream traditional and libertarian conservatives. For better or worse, however, conventional wisdom today—especially in the mainstream media—identifies "conservatism" with neoconservatism.

When the neoconservatives were still in the ascendancy—at the height of major combat in the Iraq War—a genuinely conservative member of Congress, Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX), blasted the neocons' credentials in a piece that appeared on *Antiwar.com* (July 15, 2003):

> They have successfully moved the Republican Party away from the Goldwater-era platform of frugal government at home and nonintervention abroad, toward a big-government world of empire mentality more reminiscent of Herbert Hoover or Woodrow Wilson. In doing so, they have proven that their ideas are neither new nor conservative.

Congressman Paul's critique was on the mark and will remain valid as long as the neocons persists in their attempt to define American conservatism.

The neocons deservedly bore the brunt of much of the criticism that spilled over from the Bush administration's pursuit of the "War on Terror" during a tangential war in Iraq, which raised profound questions about their staying power. Yet, it would be unrealistic to expect the neocons to lose influence as long as they enjoy the kind of exposure they receive through the *Weekly Standard*, Fox News, and the American Enterprise Institute.

The situation within the Republican Party will not change any time soon. For all those conservatives who dissent from the media's conventional wisdom about who defines conservatism and who hope to revitalize the traditional/libertarian approaches to conservatism, a third-party option may make sense. In terms of existing parties, the most widely recognized is the Libertarian Party, which has well-defined positions on noninterventionism and small government and will be on the ballot in all 50 states. The Constitution Party, which has taken a pointedly anti-neoconservative position on international affairs, will likely be on the ballot in about 40 states. The fledgling America First Party, which evolved from the Reform Party and whose goals are clearly defined by its name, was gaining momentum until factional frictions halted it. One of these parties may yet prove to be a credible conservative alternative to the Republican Party over the long run. Just as the Republican Party emerged in the mid-19th century from a Whig Party that had lost its bearings, it is conceivable that a more authentically conservative party could do the same thing today.

Unfortunately, the Libertarian Party has an image problem. For many conservatives, "libertarian" sounds too much like "liberal." They should know better, considering the philosophical roots of classical liberalism. One way to get past this problem would be to persuade the Libertarian Party to modify its name by inserting the word *conservative*. Many more conservative voters are likely to be drawn to a Libertarian Conservative Party. It also would be far better positioned to attract authentically conservative politicians with significant reputa-

---

Edward A. Olsen is a professor of national-security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, California, and the author of U.S. National Defense for the Twenty-First Century: The Grand Exit Strategy *(Frank Cass) and* Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations: In Due Course? *(Lynne Rienner). The views expressed are personal and do not represent those of the U.S. government.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions and name recognition to run for president and lesser offices under its banner. Similarly, the "America First" label on a national political party can be a hard sell for those who see that phrase as symbolic of what went wrong with U.S. policy on the eve of World War II. That should not deter those conservatives who grasp the sound logic of putting America first in our foreign, defense, and economic policies from pursuing this entirely legitimate form of conservatism as the basis of a third-party alternative, but they may not want to use that name. The Constitution Party's name does not send any ambiguous signals, but it remains much less known than the Libertarian Party.

It is plausible that such a third party could become credible enough, fast enough, to establish itself as *the* truly conservative party. If such a party could avoid the fate of virtually all third parties, it could survive and prosper politically. It could prevail electorally and replace the Republican Party by absorbing its genuinely conservative constituencies. On the other hand, it would be sufficient if such a third party could pose enough of a challenge to the Republicans to cause that party's remaining true conservatives to rid themselves of pseudoconservatives—abandoning big deficits, big government, and global interventionism—and reach out to the conservative challengers in a constructive manner intended to transform the Republican Party. This would be reminiscent of how the former Whig Party evolved into the Republican Party in the 1850's, without going quite that far. Here, too, genuinely conservative Republicans could learn something from the Nader experience, as the Democrats seeks to convince his supporters that their party has not lost its liberal compass. Either way, a more authentic conservative political option would be presented to the American people.

If conservative Americans—through either a transformed Republican Party or its replacement—could pursue a genuine conservative agenda for the 21st century, they could avoid future electoral choices where the differences between Republican and Democratic versions of internationalism are difficult to detect, where both parties can be accurately described as devoted to big government, and where the quest for budgetary pork undermines fiscal conservatism. Americans in 2004 will choose between two candidates who proclaim their virtues as global leaders, favor big government, and are not fiscal conservatives. This overlap is more pronounced today under the influence of neoconservative ideas on Republicans, but it evolved throughout the Cold War electoral cycles. While interventionist internationalism had become acceptable in conservative circles as a Wilsonian-Stimsonian way to cope with the threats of global communism, it remained a questionable precept, as demonstrated by U.S. entanglement in a number of controversial conflicts—notably Vietnam. It became still more questionable as U.S. leaders from both major parties, adapting President Roosevelt's aspirations for "four policemen" to guide the United Nations hegemonically toward maintaining postwar world peace, positioning the United States to play the role of global cop on her own. All of this became still more questionable in the post-Cold War era, where the Wilsonian internationalist similarities in a series of presidential races (Bush-Dukakis, Bush-Clinton, Clinton-Dole, and Bush-Gore) were striking.

Given this legacy of Wilsonian internationalism, the 2004 choice is by no means surprising. After all, both President Bush and Senator Kerry fit the definition of proactive Wilsonian interventionist internationalist. This was underscored after September 11 by a prominent neocon, Max Boot, in a *Wall Street Journal* column entitled "George W. Bush: The 'W' Stands for Woodrow" (July 1, 2002). As predictable as the internationalist similarities are in today's Republican and Democratic parties, and despite partisan wrangling over who should be anointed the best internationalist based on differing road maps, this situation should be unacceptable for genuine conservatives.



Melanie Anderson

The old imperial-age moral metaphor from Rudyard Kipling about the "white man's burden" clearly has become politically incorrect in the 21st century, but many Americans—Democrats and Republicans—believe the United States should embrace an equivalent that could be labeled the "free man's burden," imposing a mandate on the United States to export U.S.-style freedoms worldwide to help assure global peace. Furthermore, that burden entails a geopolitical commitment to intervene where necessary to assure that others will have an opportunity to embrace the American way of life. This is a flawed paradigm that is not at all in keeping with the conservative noninterventionist traditions rooted in the admonitions of Presidents Washington and Jefferson to avoid permanent and entangling alliances. This internationalism does not focus clearly on U.S. national interests and blurs the line by injecting transnational and pan-national criteria. It is time for American conservatives to revive priorities based on American strategic independence within U.S. foreign and defense policies. By no means does this entail a revival of stereotyped "isolationism." A number of creative conservative ideas have been raised in the post-Cold War era as viable alternatives. A notable example is libertarian conservative Ivan Eland's appropriately titled *Putting "Defense" Back Into U.S. Defense Policy* (Praeger).

Conservatives should use strategic independence priorities to reengage in an essential national debate over the United States' proper role in world affairs—a debate that will help them either transform the Republican Party or create its successor. If conservatives succeed in this endeavor, those revised international priorities predicated on rejection of rampant Wilsonian interventionism would, in turn, lead to a smaller and less-expensive government. In short, it would be a truly conservative approach to governing the United States.

c

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Walking the Neocon Plank

Total Victory

by Timothy P. Carney

For a political reporter looking for a good story, a national convention has become a pretty barren field. Journalists typically just enjoy the expense account, skip most of the scripted, focus-grouped speeches, and listen instead to Jack Germond or David Broder reminisce about the Taft-Eisenhower floor fight of 1952 or the Chicago riots of 1968. In New York this year, even the protests were made for TV.

The oasis in recent Republican conventions has been the platform committee. In these hearings, the week before the convention, conservative activists and local party officials would spend four days hashing out the party's official stance on such issues as taxes, defense, abortion, and education.

In contrast to the convention proper, where every word is vetted by the campaign and the party to make sure it will appeal to the undecided voters watching on TV, the platform hearing provided debate, ideas, substance, and (something certainly not found on the podium at the convention) actual conservatives.

Predictably, the Bush-Cheney reelection campaign put an end to that. Beginning with the party's refusal to give platform delegates the names and contact info of other delegates, it was clear that things were going to work differently this year.

The typical four days of debate was cut down to two. The platform was a monstrous 90-page document drafted by Bush-Cheney campaign hands instead of by movement conservatives, as it had been in past years.

Even the subcommittees were created in such a way as to replace debate and substance with polished message. Whereas in 1992 there was an "Economy, Trade, Jobs and Budget" subcommittee, this year saw a "Building an Innovative Economy to Compete in the World" subcommittee and another one called "Ushering in an Ownership Era."

The "Protecting Our Families" subcommittee dealt with abortion and homosexual marriage, thus drawing the bulk of the staunch pro-life delegates, who then were frustrated when they found that embryonic stem-cell research was in the "Strengthening Our Communities" subcommittee as a healthcare issue rather than as a life issue. Delegates who wanted to talk about curbing illegal immigration were shoved aside when their efforts to oppose amnesty were ruled nongermane in the "Winning the War on Terror" subcommittee.

At the end of the whole process, the mainstream media reliably told the story of how the Republicans for Choice and pro-"homosexual marriage" Log Cabin Republicans were shot down, belying the big-tent image the party placed up on the podium. Untold, except in a few conservative outlets, were the victories the Bush-Cheney campaign won for big government, open borders, and Wilsonian interventionism. In short, the current administration has put the GOP on record as the party of neoconservatism.

Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum gnashed its teeth over amnesty and open borders. The American Conservative Union rolled its eyes over the big government. Traditional movement conservatives resigned themselves to biting the bullet one more time and hoping against reason that Bush would act like a conservative in his second term.

The Bushies were cursed as unprincipled pragmatists, but no one really asked *why* the GOP has decided neoconservatism is the most pragmatic way to run. Also unasked was why the party rank and file—lawmakers and platform delegates—have gone along with this neocon transformation.

In the name of compassionate conservatism, the right has accepted bigger government. For the false promise of the Hispanic vote, conservatives have embraced open borders. For the sake of a wedge issue and as a result of a love of country, the right has come to terms with a utopianist, interventionist foreign policy. In other words, while holding on to some conservative goals, the right has somehow accepted most of the political premises of left.

In 1996, the Republican platform still contained a plank calling for the abolition of the Department of Education (ED). There is no constitutional justification for such a Cabinet department—created by Jimmy Carter as a gift to the teachers unions—and its price tag was rapidly growing. In 2000, however, the abolish-the-ED plank was torn up in recognition of the GOP nominee's pledge to be the "Education President." "No Child Left Behind" was one of George W. Bush's top campaign pledges, expanding the federal reach into education and increasing the budget of the Department of Education.

By 2004, the Republican plank on education read like a retort to the 1996 platform. The original draft triumphantly declared: "President Bush and Congressional Republicans have provided the largest increase in federal education funding in history and the highest percentage gain since Lyndon Johnson."

Why would conservatives and the party of local control and limited government think outspending LBJ was something to brag about?

Ronald Reagan taught that, in the face of a problem, government ought to look for the things it does to cause or exacerbate the issue and then stop doing those things. If the party and the conservative movement he led ever believed that, they do not anymore.

The GOP has granted the Democrats' premises of what the problems are in this country, including inadequate public schools and high prescription-drug prices. It has gone one step more and granted that the government ought to *do some-*

Timothy P. Carney is a reporter for the Evans-Novak Political Report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thing about these problems. This imperative may be a flaw inherent in democratic politics in the world of 24-hour media, where results and accomplishments are demanded. Now, it has infected the right, granting a victory to a big-government "conservatism" that tries to use government for its ends.

Indeed, one of President Bush's advantages in this campaign is that he can point to four years of "accomplishments" in the White House (including two regime changes and a drastic increase in the federal role in prescription drugs and education) while John Kerry's 20 years in the Senate are strikingly lacking in accomplishments.

That most voters look for the government to *do something* might not be enough to cause so much bad policy in a Republican government if the conservatives, in their hearts, did not agree with this liberal view. The right, however, signed on to the *do something* doctrine in nominating and electing George W. Bush, who promised from the beginning of his campaign to use Washington to fix our schools and prescription-drug prices. "If we don't do something about this now," one conservative Republican staffer told me during the prescription-drug debates, "the Democrats will when they take over."

He was probably correct. Republican leaders are no longer able to articulate the idea that the best thing for the government to do about some problems is to get out of the way. If any problem arises, and a Republican government doesn't *do something* about it, they are philosophically unequipped to explain themselves.

Years of tactical posturing and contracts with America have produced Republican wins, but they have also eroded any conservative philosophy. In the end, stuff like "No Child Left Behind" is the best that such an emasculated conservatism can produce. This bill buys into the left's philosophy of throwing more government and more tax dollars at already failed government programs. Its conservatism is in the "accountability" it imposes on school districts: rewarding success and punishing failure. Limited government has given way to "good government"—a victory demonstrated by a *Weekly Standard* mailer featuring a caricature of California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and a battle cry to "terminate bad government."

Terminating government's role in any aspect of our lives is out of the question. A few conservatives at the platform debates objected to the declaration that "[p]ublic education is the foundation of civil society." What about family, community, or religion? Efforts to strike this phrase, or even the word *public*, were summarily rejected.

The message was clear, and typically neoconservative: Government has a central place in our lives, so let's make it work for us.

Education is only one example of where the current Republican government, with the endorsement of most of Washington's "conservatives," has shown it really has no alternative to the left's belief that more government is the solution. Prescription drugs, increased farm subsidies, and a general explosion in federal spending demonstrate that the GOP has bought wholly into this worldview.

Even less successful than the opposition to the big-education platform language was the push for stronger immigration enforcement and border control. With the platform transformed into campaign propaganda, it naturally contained a ringing endorsement of President Bush's amnesty program for illegal aliens, while simultaneously and nonsensically declaring that "we oppose amnesty."

The amnesty plank reads:

> A growing economy requires a growing number of workers, and President Bush has proposed a new temporary workers program to match willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers, when no Americans can be found to fill the jobs.
>
> This new program would allow workers who currently hold jobs to come out of the shadows and to participate legally in America's economy.

All efforts to modify or remove this plank were summarily rejected by the campaign's proxies. Less ambitious amendments, such as one asserting illegal immigrants ought not to receive Social Security benefits, were also crushed. Denying drivers' licenses and in-state tuition to illegals were both rejected.

It is fitting that a conservative *movement* would become a neoconservative movement. In a movement, there are jobs and promotions. There are foundation grants and subscribers. Once conservatives become *professional* conservatives, the neoconservative dispositions become more natural.

Since unemployment may be President Bush's Achilles heel this election year, the call for a greater supply of labor seems an odd one. Further, non-Cuban immigrants tend to vote overwhelmingly Democratic. Finally, as the GOP makes the case that we are fighting a war that was "brought to us" and tries to defend John Ashcroft's increased surveillance power, why would we not try to keep tighter control over who enters our country?

At the platform hearings in New York, however, these arguments got nowhere. Unfettered immigration has always been favored by the Republican establishment. While the conservative base generally argues for more control on immigration, every Republican presidential nominee in the last half-century has favored open borders. The Democratic establishment, for the most part, agrees with the GOP on this. At the platform hearings in August, one Washington conservative leader gave a succinct answer as to why he never expected success in trying to curb illegal border-crossing: "Republicans look at illegal immigrants and see cheap labor. Democrats see votes."

The key to the establishment's victory over the grassroots

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on this issue lies in the Bush campaign's claim that it, too, expects to garner Hispanic votes as a result of increased Mexican immigration. In meetings with reporters for the past three years, top Bush political aides Karl Rove and Ken Mehlman have stressed that they are going after the Hispanic vote. In 2002, they pointed to the success among Hispanic voters of GOP gubernatorial candidates George Pataki and Jeb Bush as signs that President Bush can improve on his share of 35 percent of the Hispanic vote in 2000, as long as they play nice. Most political signs, however, suggest the GOP has given up on the Hispanic vote. If a congressional district is more than one-third Hispanic (again, excepting Cubans), Republicans almost never run a serious candidate at all, and those that they do run almost never win. In fact, to protect Texas's only Hispanic Republican congressman, the state party, in the latest redistricting plan, had to make his district nearly 20 percent less Hispanic.

Rove has said in private that Arizona and Nevada are in danger of voting Democratic in 2004 because of their increased Hispanic population.

Come election time and decisions regarding candidates and cash, the party does not really act like it can win the Hispanic vote; in public, however, the Bushies pretend they can. At the Republican National Convention, the GOP led up to Bush's speech with a movie about Hispanics and an introduction by former Housing Secretary Mel Martinez.

The claim that the Republicans are pursuing the Hispanic vote serves two purposes. First, it creates an impression of a tolerant big tent to make undecided white voters feel better about voting GOP—an old trick. Second, and more to the point, it quells rebellions in the base.

Angry conservatives who do not put a premium on cheap workers can wince and accept Bush's open-borders policies for the same reason they accept his Medicare prescriptions-drug entitlement: They are politically necessary evils. Accordingly, most platform delegates stuck to the campaign's line on immigration.

That a false promise of Hispanic votes can cause the conservative movement to roll over surely shows a weakness of spine. On big government, the right might actually have bought into the left's philosophy; on immigration, however, the right has simply shown its willingness to sacrifice principle for the sake of politics.

In this way, the conservative movement has started to forget its purpose. Sacrificing issues that involve the preservation of American lives (every September 11 terrorist had to cross our borders) and culture for perceived political gain should be the stuff of a campaign, not of a movement.

The conservative movement, however, has apparently accepted its role as a part of the GOP campaign. Such a transformation may be inevitable whenever career considerations start playing a large role, as is always the case in any sizable movement.

If the Republican platform is read as the philosophical foundation of the party, then the GOP exists mostly for the sake of foreign policy. "Winning the War on Terror" made up nearly half of the platform. The document sounded nothing like the "humble" foreign policy George W. Bush called for in the 2000 election. It enshrined as party policy the Bush doctrine of spreading democracy throughout the Middle East for the sake of stability.

The platform adopts Bush's line that "freedom is the Almight's gift to every man, woman, and child in the world." The War on Terror section opens with President Bush's words: "Our nation's cause has always been larger than our nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace. . . . [W]e will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."

Worrying about everyone else's business used to be the hobby of the left. At the highest levels, however, foreign intervention has always been the dogma of the establishment in both parties. Every President and every Republican nominee going back to Wendell Willkie has been an interventionist, even when the party's base has been more like Robert Taft.

Now, however, grassroots conservatives have abandoned their skepticism of the establishment's overseas ambitions. This acquiescence is the result of the workings of the conservative press and the radical left.

On September 11, 2001, the most hawkish elements on the right were perched atop *National Review* and the *Wall Street Journal*'s editorial pages, two of the most prominent publications on the right. Throw in William Kristol's *Weekly Standard*, and you have a "conservative" press that comes down almost entirely on the neoconservative side of the right's foreign-policy debate.

For many conservatives undecided about the wisdom of nation- and region-building, a quick look at the most vocal opponents of Bush's wars and Israel policy was decisive. Driven largely by an adolescent hatred of America inculcated in academia and public schools, the leftist antiwar and anti-Bush protestors have made fools of themselves over the past three years. The pinnacle of their absurdity may have been when some American leftists volunteered to be human shields for the Iraqis.

The other faces of resistance to a neocon foreign policy were conservative journalists Pat Buchanan and Bob Novak, who were repeatedly smeared as antisemitic and unpatriotic by the rest of the conservative press.

Thus, most of the right, reluctant to join the America haters or the accused racists, signed on to the war in Iraq. Following some variation of the imperative to halt partisanship at the water's edge, the GOP grassroots at the platform hearing faithfully followed Bush's Wilsonian lead. The grand language and ambitious foreign-policy goals, unlike the big-government and open-borders language, received absolutely no vocal resistance, because it appealed to a real sensibility in these conservatives: patriotism.

Neoconservatism, as Norman Podhoretz made clear in his book *Making It*, is conservatism adapted to fit in with Georgetown cocktail parties and to avert the career disasters traditional conservatism often yields. It is also a conservatism, its adherents say, that holds optimism and pragmatism at its heart.

It is fitting, then, that a conservative *movement* would become a neoconservative movement. In a movement, there are daily fights in the media and on Capitol Hill. There are jobs and promotions. There are foundation grants and subscribers. Once conservatives become *professional* conservatives, the neoconservative dispositions become more natural.

The Republican platform approved this summer in New York enshrines the near-total professionalization of the right. The efficient platform process produced a feel-good, well-polished document that solidifies the neoconservative victory over not just a party but a movement. c

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Rise and Fall of the Texas Republican Party

The Rove Machine

by Tom Pauken

How did the Texas Republican Party, which was in the forefront of the battles to win the Republican presidential nomination for Barry Goldwater in 1964 and Ronald Reagan in 1976 and 1980, become a wholly owned subsidiary of Karl Rove and George W. Bush?

Today, the Republicans in Texas control every statewide elected office, yet it is hard to see much of a difference in policy matters from the time when centrist Democrats such as Lyndon Johnson, former Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, and the late Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock (George W. Bush's favorite Democrat) ran the state. Our two Republican senators include a pro-abortion Rockefeller Republican (Kay Hutchison) and a Bush loyalist (John Cornyn) who was the deciding vote as a Texas Supreme Court jurist in upholding Gov. Ann Richards' unconstitutional school-finance scheme (known as the "Robin Hood" plan).

Our elected state officials, with a few notable exceptions, have continued the business-as-usual approach of their Democratic predecessors. In fact, two of our state officials, who happen to be feuding at the moment, are former Democratic officeholders. Our comptroller, Carol Strayhorn, was the former Democratic mayor of Austin, the liberal stronghold in Texas and home of the Molly Ivins crowd. Strayhorn jumped ship and became a Republican as the state began to lean that way. Her two sons work in the Bush administration, with Scott McClellan serving as Bush's press secretary and Dr. Mark McClellan, as assistant secretary in the Department of Health and Human Services. Carol Strayhorn is a likeable politician who styles herself "one tough grandma," but her political views on state issues are more in tune with the Austin liberal crowd than with Texas conservatives. In the most recent legislative session, Strayhorn pushed her scheme of providing "free" education to any Texan wanting to attend community college in our state. She also blasted the Republican governor and Republicans in the legislature for not spending more money on a variety of government programs. Comptroller Strayhorn, like most advocates of big government, never seems to concern herself with where the money will come from to fund her pet projects.

Our current governor is Rick Perry, another former Democratic officeholder, whom Strayhorn plans to run against if Senator Hutchison does not decide to make the race herself. Governor Perry finally may have learned his lesson on the spending front. Two legislative sessions ago, he stood by while the Democratic-controlled state House of Representatives went on a budget-busting spending spree. In that same session, the legislature mandated a number of new entitlements. Apparently, our legislators thought that the booming Texas economy of the 1990's would never end. Their timing, however, could not have been worse, as all of this new and increased state spending came just as the stock-market bubble burst and an economic recession hit Texas. The ensuing revenue shortfall led to a huge deficit, which had to be made up in the 2003 legislative session. Unlike the federal government, which has been piling up record deficits during the Bush presidency, Texas has a constitutional obligation to balance her budget.

Fortunately, the Republicans took control of the Texas House of Representatives after the 2002 elections; led by a new wave of conservatives, the legislature (with support from the governor) slammed the brakes on state spending and entitlements in order to balance the budget without raising taxes. Their actions upset Comptroller Strayhorn, the editorial writers of most Texas newspapers (generally owned by national chains), and liberal Democrats; but it showed that the conservative instincts of most Texans remain intact.

While Governor Perry deserves credit for going along with those conservatives in the legislature who were determined to hold the line on taxes and spending in 2003, there is not much else positive to say about his four years in office. The Austin lobbyists (generally Bentsen/Bullock Democrats who now call themselves Bush Republicans) exercise the greatest influence over legislation, just like they did when the Democrats were in power. In fact, one of the most prominent Austin lobbyists, Mike Toomey, served as Governor Perry's chief of staff for a couple of years before recently resigning to resume his lobbying career. Toomey, a former Republican state representative, was also a key advisor to Gov. George W. Bush.

Once in power, Texas Republicans have all-too-often become what conservatives complained about when the Democrats ran everything—a party beholden to the special interests, rather than representing the views and values of middle-class Texans. Nothing exemplifies this better than Republican failure to get rid of the hated "Robin Hood" school-finance scheme. I have been involved in this issue from the beginning, having led the fight against Governor Richards' attempt to impose a statewide property tax on Texans through a proposed constitutional amendment that would allow state officials to transfer property taxes from "property-rich" districts to poorer ones. We defeated this plan in a statewide vote by a 2-to-1 margin, only to have Governor Richards impose it on Texas by legislative action. Her refusal to listen to the Texas voters on this unfair taxing plan was a key factor that led to her defeat (in 1994) by George W. Bush, who made the Robin Hood scheme a central issue in his campaign.

Republicans now have held the governor's office for more than a decade and currently control both houses of the Texas legislature. Even so, the Robin Hood scheme has yet to be repealed, while Texans face a ever-increasing property-tax burden to fund education—and not just in the Robin Hood dis-

---

Tom Pauken is a member of the board of directors of The Rockford Institute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tricts. Those districts are hit the hardest, however, with more than a billion dollars in local property taxes taken annually from local school districts and shipped elsewhere.

Governor Perry recently called the legislature into special session, ostensibly to eliminate the Robin Hood scheme. However, the solution he proposed relied heavily on expanding gambling. Ironically, Carol Strayhorn, his bitter foe, had first promoted such a plan as a way to "fix" our school-finance problems. Perry's proposal would have benefited certain gambling interests that, coincidentally, have made major contributions to his reelection campaign. The Texas House of Representatives took one look at the Perry plan and voted unanimously against it. The special session turned out to be a complete waste of time and money, though it did lead to the employment of a host of lawyers and lobbyists who were hired to represent competing gaming interests. Now, the legislature may be forced to act in light of a recent court decision declaring aspects of the Robin Hood scheme unconstitutional.

Why has the Texas Republican leadership strayed so far from the conservative principles that propelled it to become the majority party in Texas in the mid 90's?

One of the key leaders in the Goldwater movement in the early 60's was a young, wealthy Texan named Peter O'Donnell, who had wrested control of the Republican Party machinery away from the Eisenhower Republicans and put it behind the Goldwater insurgency. Because of his financial independence, O'Donnell was able to devote much of his time to building a Republican Party in Texas. He was a skilled organizer, an accomplished fundraiser, and was the undisputed leader of this emerging conservative force within the Republican Party.

Along with Cliff White and a few other influential conservatives, O'Donnell helped lead the Goldwater forces to victory in the bitter nomination fight against Nelson Rockefeller in 1964. O'Donnell was shunted aside in the general-election campaign against LBJ. After the Goldwater debacle, many wrote off the conservative movement as politically dead. However, Ronald Reagan assumed leadership of the conservative movement after winning election as governor of California in 1966. Grassroots conservatives who had supported Goldwater for president in 1964 by and large had become Reaganites by 1968, when Reagan mounted a last-minute, abortive challenge to Richard Nixon at the Republican National Convention. Not Peter O'Donnell: While O'Donnell had solidified his position in Texas as the dominant leader of the party, he was now with the Republican establishment in helping to deliver the Republican presidential nomination to Nixon. He would remain in that camp, supporting Gerald Ford against Reagan in 1976, George H.W. Bush against Reagan in 1980, and George W. Bush in 2000. The man who built the Goldwater movement in Texas was now using his formidable talents and financial clout against the conservatives.

Although O'Donnell assumed a less-public role in Texas Republican politics from the 1970's onward, his influence over the party was as strong as ever. He was the power behind the Nixon reelection campaign in Texas in 1972, and he organized Bill Clements' successful bid in 1978 to become the first Republican governor elected in Texas in the 20th century. While George H.W. Bush may have encouraged Karl Rove to set up his political consulting shop in Texas, it was O'Donnell who gave Rove his big break by approving Rove's hiring as a political operative for Governor Clements in 1979. Rove became acquainted with the Bushes in the early 70's while serving as executive director of the College Republicans when George H.W. Bush was chairman of the Republican National Committee. Rove ran for National College Chairman in 1973 against Robert Edgeworth. Both Rove and Edgeworth claimed victory in that race, with the Edgeworth camp accusing the Rove forces of engaging in "dirty tricks" by throwing out the votes of delegates pledged to Edgeworth. The decision to declare Rove the victor was ultimately made by RNC chairman Bush. Rove later became Bush's special assistant at the RNC. He moved to Texas in 1976, established his business in Bush's hometown of Houston, and has been associated politically with the Bush family ever since.

A very thorough discussion of Karl Rove's *modus operandi* as a political operative and his rise to political power can be found in the book *Bush's Brain*, written by longtime Austin political reporters Wayne Slater and James Moore. One mistake that the authors make is their depiction of Rove as a "right-winger." Rove is much more a Cardinal Richelieu figure, obsessed with acquiring and keeping political power. Rove's well-deserved reputation for employing a scorched-earth approach is simply a reflection of his willingness to say or do whatever it takes to win. Rove will use conservatives when necessary but only as a means of consolidating and maintaining political power for the establishment wing of the Republican Party.

Despite the success of O'Donnell, the Bushes (aided by their *consigliore*, James Baker, and Rove, their hired gun), and their network of supporters across the state in turning the Texas Republican Party into a more pragmatic, centrist party, Texas conservatives have occasionally stormed the barricades and taken power back from the establishment. In 1976, Ronald Reagan won a convincing presidential primary victory over George H.W. Bush, garnering votes from Democrats and independents. Conservatives were even able to name one of their own, Reagan campaign leader Ray Barnhart, as Republican state chairman in 1976. Control of the party by conservatives would last for little more than two years, however, as Bill Clements replaced Barnhart with his own man when he was elected governor in 1978.

Then along came Phil Gramm, a libertarian economics professor from Texas A&M, who ran an unsuccessful race for the U.S. Senate in the Democratic primary against Sen. Lloyd Bentsen in 1976, then won a congressional seat as a Democrat in the late 1970's. Gramm was a key supporter of the 1981 Reagan tax-cut proposal and helped along its passage in the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives. He later switched parties, winning reelection to his congressional seat as a Republican before succeeding John Tower in the U.S. Senate. While never close to the O'Donnell/Bush crowd, Gramm built a statewide coalition of Republicans loyal to him personally, rather than organizing a network of solid conservatives, as Jesse Helms and Tom Ellis had done in North Carolina. The Goldwater and Reagan grassroots leaders who had stayed true to the conservative cause were there for the taking, had Gramm invited them. Instead, he concentrated most of his attention on wooing the big-money crowd, a group that tended to be more in tune with the establishment wing of the Republican Party. Rather than helping movement conservatives win election, he lent his potent political support to such opportunistic politicians as Rick Perry and Carol Strayhorn. Gramm's political career ended with a failed presidential campaign in 1996. Thereafter, he tried and failed to be selected president of Texas

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A&M, losing that post to the Bush candidate, Robert Gates, a former CIA director under President George H.W. Bush. Had he built a conservative network in Texas, things might have turned out differently. Gramm, however, sees issues and policies in terms of "economic man" and never could manage to forge a conservative coalition composed of independent conservatives not driven by money and power.

In 1990, Clayton Williams, an independent oilman and Goldwater conservative, won the Republican nomination for governor over the O'Donnell/Bush-supported candidate, Dallas attorney Tom Luce. That year, Karl Rove ran the campaign of Kent Hance, who had defeated George W. Bush as a Democrat in a 1978 congressional race. Hance started out as the early favorite to win the Republican nomination for governor, but Williams won the primary without a runoff. Williams appeared to be headed for victory over Ann Richards in the general election. This was not good news for the Bush/O'Donnell faction, which had very little influence over Clayton Williams. A series of widely publicized gaffes in the Williams campaign, however, turned enough voters against him to cost him the election. That opened the door for Karl Rove to run George W. Bush for governor four years later.

During this period, the establishment Republicans maintained control of the party machinery, with Fred Meyer, a prodigious fundraiser, as state party chairman and Karen Hughes as his executive director. Karl Rove ran the political operation for the party as its chief political consultant and direct-mail vendor. If you wanted to run as a Republican for the Texas Supreme Court or any other statewide elected office, you had better hire Rove as your consultant. He was well connected and good at what he did.

The Texas Republican Party and its preferred candidates had become a consultant-driven operation with Karl Rove as the dominant player. I decided to do something about it by running against Meyer for state chairman in 1994, the same year Bush ran for governor. We organized a strong, grassroots coalition of Old Right, Goldwater/Reagan conservatives along with the social conservatives of the Religious Right. Conservative activists turned out at the precinct and district conventions, and there was enough support going into the state convention to defeat Fred Meyer. In an effort to split the social-conservative vote, the establishment (and Phil Gramm) got Meyer to withdraw from the race and put up Congressman Joe Barton to take his place. Even though I was not part of the Religious Right, most of its grassroots activists continued to support me against Barton. Our side won, and it was another temporary success story for the conservative forces in Texas. My first act as party chairman was to fire Karl Rove as the party's political consultant. (Rove claims that he quit before I fired him.)

When George W. Bush was elected governor in the fall of 1994, Rove wanted to minimize the influence of the party under my leadership. He made sure that we had no influence over the governor's political appointments and did all he could to discourage big contributors from financially supporting the party as long as I was chairman. Rove wanted to make sure that the party apparatus did not develop into an effective and independent force in Texas, which might get in the way of Bush's presidential ambitions. Rove also sought to divide the right and to woo social conservatives by enlisting the services of Ralph Reed (the former head of the Christian Coalition), whom Rove got placed on the Enron payroll to help in the Bush presidential bid. When I resigned as chairman to run for state attorney general in 1997, Rove succeeded in getting two well-known and well-financed candidates to enter the race against me. John Cornyn ultimately won, as a Rove-inspired attack achieved its purpose of knocking me out of the primary. I know how John McCain must have felt after Rove went after him in a similar fashion in the South Carolina presidential primary two years later.

I was succeeded as party chairman by Susan Weddington, who had risen to her position of influence in the party through the support of the Religious Right. Like Ralph Reed, Weddington joined the Bush/Rove quest for the White House. Any criticism of Bush's policies from the party chairman (no matter how unacceptable to conservatives those policies might have been) ended when Weddington took her post. She was "on the team." A few social conservatives who were elected members of the State Board of Education, led by Donna Ballard and Bob Offutt, bravely stood up to Bush and Rove when Bush sided with the public-education establishment against the conservatives on education-policy issues. Ballard and Offutt felt so strongly about Bush's failed education policy in Texas that they publicly endorsed Steve Forbes in 2000. That was the political kiss of death for Offutt; Rove made sure he was defeated in his reelection bid for the State Board of Education.

Many of us conservative activists in Texas laughingly refer to ourselves as "political exiles" during this era of Rove/Bush dominance of Texas politics. Other Texas conservatives have convinced themselves that the President really is "one of us." I tried to convince myself of the same thing as a young conservative in 1970 when I joined the Nixon administration after returning from my military tour in Vietnam, only to leave after one year when I realized that Nixon was no more a conservative as President than he had been when I first met him in the mid-60's during my tenure as national chairman of the College Republicans.

Right now, the future looks bleak for Texas conservatives. The state party has been effectively neutered, and the evangelicals are fighting among themselves for control of it. The new chairman, Tina Benkiser, was Susan Weddington's candidate, defeating Gina Parker at the state convention this summer. Predictably, Tina is going along with the powers that be. Control over state government is where the real power in Texas politics resides these days, and the Bush/Rove faction of the party has nearly complete control of the executive branch of government. Independent conservative leaders have been marginalized or defeated.

As I write, Bush is in a tight race for reelection against John Kerry, in a campaign reminiscent of Nixon's run against George McGovern in 1972. In fact, this Bush administration, run by men like Rove and Vice President Dick Cheney, reminds me much more of the Nixon administration than of the administration of Bush's father. Assuming Bush wins reelection to the White House, it will be interesting to see if it comes to an unpleasant end, as the Nixon administration ultimately did.

Read the latest news and commentary
NEWS & VIEWS
www.ChroniclesMagazine.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What Manufacturing Crisis?

America for Sale

by David A. Hartman

The recent U.S. recession, if judged by its effect on total employment, was the shortest and mildest of the post-World War II period. In the six months from the peak of July 1998 to the low of January 1999, employment declined by only 1.43 million workers, and, by May 2004, 7.5 million additional workers were employed.

For American manufacturing, however, the employment recession has been the longest and most severe since the Great Depression. During the same six-month period (July 1998-January 1999), 3.5 million workers lost their jobs—a decline of 19.7 percent. As of May 2004, only 187,000 were reemployed, just one out of every 19 laid-off employees.

Since the 1950's, manufacturing's share of the U.S. economy has been in a relentless decline, and its current share of GDP is less than half of what it was in the 50's. Employment in manufacturing, as a share of total U.S. employment, has fallen proportionately. (See Exhibit I.)

The origin of this downward trend can be explained partly by manufacturing's relatively greater productivity and partly by the rapid growth of government and the "service" economy. Since the 1970's, however, this trend has been exacerbated by the growing competitive advantage enjoyed by foreign competitors. In a follow-up article in the December issue, I will show that this advantage is largely the result of a system of border-adjusted taxation that is not available to U.S. manufacturers. As a consequence, the trade deficit in goods, which began in 1971, has increased ever since. To put the deficit in simple terms: U.S. companies today are only producing the equivalent of 4 dollars worth of every 5 dollars of manufactured goods consumed in the U.S. The U.S. trade deficit in goods for 2003 was more than $500 billion, the bulk of which was in manufacturing.

The United States has a sizable negative trade balance in goods with every principal nation and region. Although the negative balance in goods has been somewhat offset by exports of U.S. services, this positive balance has leveled off. The merchandise deficit is predicted to continue to grow through at least 2005, despite the recent devaluation of the dollar (which, according to conventional wisdom, makes U.S. goods more attractive to foreign customers). The trade deficit is currently more than five percent of GDP, and the net amount of U.S. assets now owned by foreigners is currently estimated at four trillion dollars. This figure is roughly comparable in scale to the total privately owned portion of the U.S. federal debt. The United States, which was the world's largest creditor in 1982, has since become the world's largest debtor—a consequence of the relentless growth of the trade deficit.

David A. Hartman, a retired banker, is chairman of the board of directors of The Rockford Institute.

The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) warned earlier this year that "the country may be dropping below critical mass in manufacturing." This is not hard to believe, as depressed manufacturing centers lose vital supporting services and as traditional industries provide neither the volume nor the financing required for the new factories and equipment that employ the newest and most productive technology. The United States is the leader in high-tech product innovation, yet current exports are only one third of the value of imports in electronic data processing and office products.



One crucial element in the trade deficit is American industry's higher manufacturing costs. According to a study prepared by the Manufacturing Alliance/MAPI for NAM (December 2003), the U.S. cost of $24.30 per labor hour exceeds the $19.30 average of nine principal trade partners by $5 per hour. The study goes further to show that other disadvantages saddle U.S. manufacturers with added costs of regulation, energy, employee benefits (particularly health insurance), and a significant difference in corporate-income-tax rates that total an additional $4.45 per labor hour. This adds up to a $9.45 disadvantage.

What is *not* considered by the MAPI/NAM study is the effect of border-adjusted value-added taxes (VAT) imposed by U.S. competitors on imports from the United States and rebated on exports to the United States, which exceed the total of the average U.S. disadvantage in labor and burden costs identified by MAPI. The average VAT imposed on U.S. exports by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) trade competitors is 17.7 percent *ad valorem*, which, expressed as MAPI's labor "raw cost" index, is the equivalent of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$14.76 per hour, over *half again more* than the $9.45 total burden calculated in the study. A conservative estimate of average VAT rebated on OECD exports to the United States is $13.04 per hour, nearly 40 percent more than the total of all adverse cost factors identified by MAPI. This important advantage enjoyed by our competitors is the source of much of our misery, but it also points the way to the solution.

Many optimists look to our strong improvement in manufacturing productivity as the source for a restoration of U.S. competitiveness. However, a recent *BusinessWeek* article, "U.S. Factories Falling Behind," showed that our principal trading partners are increasing their productivity at higher rates than the United States. The other straw the optimists grasp at is the devaluation of the dollar, which will supposedly right the trade balance, but such predictions have not proved reliable in past.

In an open world economy, in which neither commodity pricing nor capital is limited by borders, the parity achieved by devaluation is temporary. What devaluation *does* achieve is recurrent bargain-basement prices for the most strategic and productive American economic assets. In other words, "America is for sale and for a low, low price." Once markets have adjusted to the new exchange rates, the principal burden of lower real prices is forced upon labor. In the area of corporate taxation, Arnold Harberger arrives at the same conclusion: The wedge of corporate taxation primarily impacts labor. When governments at the federal, state, and local levels raise taxes (unless they are border adjusted) to augment depressed revenues and pay for rising welfare costs, they only pour fuel on the fire. After World War II, the United Kingdom opted for the quick fix of devaluation. The effect was to prolong rather than to remedy the problems caused by their uncompetitive manufacturing sector. It was only by adopting competitive VAT policies and supply-side income-tax reductions that Britain became productive.

There are many experts who actually deny that a trade imbalance is a problem, since foreigners must reinvest their dollars in the United States if they do not buy our merchandise. However, those dollars invested in U.S. debt and equity securities or productive assets by foreigners have a price tag—the interest, dividends, and rentals that will leave the United States increasingly indebted.

Most neoconservative and libertarian economists think that the problems in manufacturing can be resolved by tax reforms that will provide greater saving for investment and lower composite marginal rates of taxation. But greater investment in manufacturing productivity in the 1990's and lower marginal rates in the 1980's did not reverse the downslide.

The crisis in manufacturing is being obfuscated by internationalists who are indifferent to American concerns and by those who profit from the trade advantage of foreign-produced goods in competition with U.S. manufacturers. The federal government has negotiated bilateral trade agreements that have exposed U.S. manufacturers and their workers while granting them no commensurate concessions in return. This is not in our national interest. Yet all who have profited from or gave their blessings to this folly are joined in a chorus of denying reality.

The deterioration of the U.S. manufacturing sector threatens the progress and prosperity of the American economy. It also poses a risk to our military security. Manufacturing has traditionally provided the technological advances that drive productivity across all sectors of the economy, and America's military capability has been strengthened by the industrial development of new technology.

Industrial decline also threatens social stability. The declining employment and earnings in U.S. manufacturing are a principal cause of the declining incomes of blue-collar workers. The average factory wage per hour in real dollars declined 11.3 percent from 1978 to 2001, despite an increase of productivity by one half in the business sector and a *doubling* of productivity in manufacturing. The laid-off workers from manufacturing seeking re-employment in highly price-elastic service markets have brought further pressure to bear on blue-collar workers. The increasing share of income enjoyed by the top ten percent of wage earners is *not* the result of, as leftists would have us believe, excessive returns on physical and intellectual capital; it is the result of the stagnation of labor income, itself the result of the stagnant demand for manufacturing employment, which is exacerbated by the excessive immigration. It may be true that, in the years following World War II, labor (especially organized labor) was overpaid. Today, the opposite is the case: It often takes two workers to provide a family with a living income. The United States, which adopted the 40-hour work week in the 20th century, enters the 21st century with many families working an 80 hour week, often of necessity.

Dollars invested in U.S. debt and equity securities or productive assets by foreigners have a price tag—the interest, dividends, and rentals that will leave the United States increasingly indebted.

Many of the proposed remedies will do some good without actually solving the basic problem. Supply-side economic prescriptions—lower government spending, lower marginal-income-tax rates, and deferred taxation of saving for investment—though helpful, will not be sufficient to overcome the VAT advantages enjoyed by our competitors. Internationalists sometimes forget that we are not the only country in the world. Foreign competitors can also lower their own corporate income taxes relative to U.S. levels, and some of them are already undertaking fundamental tax reform. The Netherlands has adopted a system for expensing fixed investment, and Russia has adopted the flat tax.

As David Enger and Kevin A. Hassett of the American Enterprise Institute observed in their recent review of international corporate taxation, "[I]f current EU trends continue, the corporate income tax may virtually disappear and be replaced by revenue from the VAT in just a few decades." And, if the United States fails to adopt border-adjusted taxation, the U.S. corporate income tax may all but disappear for a different reason—the loss of manufacturing corporations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ditching the Cadaver

by Samuel Francis

"Republics exist only on tenure of being agitated."
—Wendell Phillips

Where the Right Went Wrong: How Neoconservatives Subverted the Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency
by Patrick J. Buchanan
New York: St. Martin's Press;
264 pp., $24.95

◆

If anything might have transformed the presidential election of 2004 from a dull ritual of mass democracy into an interesting and perhaps even meaningful act of civic decision, it would have been the presence of Patrick J. Buchanan, whose wit and sharp conservative intelligence enlivened the elections of 1992, 1996, and 2000. Despite his absence as a candidate this year, Mr. Buchanan rides again in his most recent book, *Where the Right Went Wrong*, a work obviously crafted for the current election and—supposedly—for future ones as well.

"Supposedly" is appropriate because the book's real message is directed at the conservative base of the Republican Party and what it can and should do to recover the party and its cause after this election. Toward the end of his book, Buchanan tells us, after recounting and analyzing what is wrong with the Bush administration,

> A crunch is coming, and a civil war is going to break out inside the Republican Party along the old trench lines of the Goldwater-Rockefeller wars of the 1960s, a war for the heart and soul and future of the party for the new century.

Melanie Anderson

There is no indication that Mr. Buchanan intends to be a contestant in that battle, but, if there is a flaw in his book, it is his belief that there will be such a battle at all.

What is wrong with the right is a question that he answers fairly simply—neoconservatism—and there is little reason to doubt that he is largely correct. The Old Right, he tells us in the beginning of his book, is defunct. "Conservatism, as taught by twentieth-century leaders like Robert Taft, Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and Jesse Helms[,] is dead," and its death was not a natural one. The neocons murdered it.

Buchanan's documentation of this argument is ample. He describes in some detail how what representative neoconservatives—Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol, Bill Kristol, Richard Perle—say and write blatantly contradicts Old Right conservatism, and why most of what they say is simply bunk. Buchanan generally avoids the easier neoconservative targets such as David Frum and John Podhoretz (though he is probably the only writer anywhere who has ever quoted Tod Lindberg) and, instead, confronts what pass for neoconservatism's heavy lifters. Thus, the senior Kristol, who is as heavy a lifter as the neocons possess, wrote in 2003 that "the United States will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal," and that this is why "it was in our national interest to come to the defense of France and Britain in World War II" and why we should "defend Israel today." Buchanan's deconstruction of this tissue of inanities is savage:

> Not until eighteen months after the fall of France did we declare war on Hitler and not until after Hitler had declared war on us. America did not go to war to defend democracy. We went to war to exact retribution from a Japanese empire that had attacked us in our sleep at Pearl Harbor. Kristol is parroting liberal myths.
>
> In the Cold War we welcomed as allies Chiang Kai-shek, President Diem, Salazar, Franco, Somoza, the shah, Suharto, Sygman Rhee, Park Chung Hee and the Korean generals, Greek colonels, militarists in Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey, President Marcos, and General Pinochet—because these autocrats proved more reliable friends and allies than democratists like Neh-

Samuel Francis is the political editor of Chronicles *and a nationally syndicated columnist.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> ru, Olaf Palme, Willy Brandt, and Pierre Trudeau. When it comes to wars that threaten us, hot or cold, ideology be damned, we Americans are at one with Nietzsche: "A state, it is the coldest of all cold monsters."

The pontifications of the godfather of neoconservatism are simply wrong (indeed, they are illiterate) in historical fact and irrelevant to serious discussion of foreign policy and national interests.

Buchanan sustains his polemic throughout the book, closely examining the buckets of evidence for neoconservative premeditation of the war on Iraq, from their obsession with Israeli goals as understood in the Likud Party to their ideological Wilsonianism that seeks global hegemony for the United States for the ostensible purpose of imposing "democracy" all over the world. Thus, Charles Krauthammer openly advocates a "new universalism" that would absorb the United States into a "super-sovereign entity" that would be "economically, culturally, and politically hegemonic in the world" and would include Europe and Japan along with the United States. Norman Podhoretz demands that we launch what he calls "World War IV" against virtually every Arabic state on the planet. Michael Ledeen writes: "We do not want stability in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and even Saudi Arabia; we want things to change. The real issue is not whether, but how to destabilize." Whatever the merits of the claims that these targeted states—or some of them—possess or are trying to acquire "weapons of mass destruction," we can easily understand why they might want them and feel tempted to use them against a country whose foreign policy is in the hands of these nuts. When they hear the word *neoconservative*, they would be well advised to reach for their nukes.

Buchanan's account of neoconservatism and its derailment of Old Right conservatism is not confined to foreign policy. He also offers chapters analyzing neoconservative defections on cultural conservatism and in trade policy. In the latter case particularly, most neoconservatives (like the Wilsonians they are) are ideological free traders, in contrast to most Republicans, who espoused economic nationalism up to the 1950's or even later; yet the main culprit here is less neoconservatism *per se* than the multinational corporations that demand globalization to bolster their own interests and to undermine wages for American labor. As Buchanan acknowledges, "the character of corporate America, the exchequer of the GOP, has changed" from a force supporting economic nationalism to one pushing its own global interests at the nation's expense. Unfortunately, he says little about immigration policy, though he does repeat from his previous book, *Death of the West*, his warnings about the demographic implosion of the white West and endorses both a moratorium on legal immigration and putting troops on the Mexican border to control the illegal kind.

Finally, Buchanan surveys the history of the Supreme Court and its role in destroying American federalism, as well as the traditional cultural and moral fabric of American society. Though his account of such decisions as *Brown* v. *Board of Education* and others is excellent, he curiously never mentions what is undoubtedly the most far-reaching judicial usurpation of all: the Incorporation Doctrine and its application to the process of gutting states' rights and local autonomy. In place of the usual litany from conservatives of the 57 constitutional amendments they claim they want to enact to correct every folly the Court inflicts, Buchanan wisely proposes relying on constitutional provisions for limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the courts and urges governors simply to refuse to enforce or obey the Court's illicit decisions. They, after all, have taken oaths to uphold and defend their state constitutions, too.

Buchanan also shows how the neoconservative mafia has managed to seize control of the Republican Party and the organizational infrastructure of the American right, though he might have gone into somewhat more detail on the latter issue. Though massive documentation exists describing the process by which neoconservatives undermined the Old Right in the Reagan administration and in think tanks, magazines, and conservative groups around the same time, most of this sordid story has never been told in detail. "Neoconservatives," Buchanan writes,

> captured the foundations, think tanks, and opinion journals of the Right and were allowed to redefine conservatism. Their agenda—open borders, amnesty for illegal aliens, free trade, an orderly retreat in the culture wars, "Big Government Conservatism," and Wilsonian interventions to reshape the world in America's image—was embraced by Republican leaders as the new conservative agenda.

And the man who has embraced neoconservatism the most warmly has been George W. Bush. The amnesty for illegal immigrants proposed last January and the disastrous war with Iraq are the principal fruits of this union.

Given the line of analysis that he pursues in the book, Buchanan's conclusions about the Republican Party simply do not follow. Despite being billed by its publishers and some critics as "an attack on President Bush," *Where the Right Went Wrong* is, in fact, an endorsement of the incumbent President and a plea for his reelection. Buchanan's argument here is twofold: First, Bush is better than John Kerry, and, since the next president will appoint new Supreme Court justices who will control the future of the Court for a generation, it is critical that Bush be the man who appoints them. Second, the Republican Party—not some hypothetical third party—is the only vehicle by which a serious right can recover its position and power. I find neither reason compelling.

George W. Bush may or may not be "better" than John Kerry, but there is little reason to think that any Supreme Court justices Bush might appoint in the next four years will be superior to the disastrous ones Republican presidents have given us in the past—Earl Warren and William Brennan (appointed by Dwight Eisenhower), Harry Blackmun (Richard Nixon), John Paul Stevens (Gerald Ford), Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy (Ronald Reagan), and David Souter (George H.W. Bush). Without these particular justices, the "judicial dictatorship" of which Buchanan rightly complains could never have occurred—a fact of which he is entirely aware and which he discusses frankly. Yet his answer, insofar as he offers one, is that the lower-court judges Bush has appointed so far have been conservatives, and this augurs well for the high court in the second term. Granted that they are, however, there is no particular reason to assume such appointments will continue into a second term, when Bush no longer needs to woo the political right and when key personnel in the Justice Department and the White House are likely to change. Unfortunately, the Republican track record on the Supreme Court has for so long been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one of political expediency that conservatives cannot count on what a Republican administration will do.

The other reason Buchanan offers seems more persuasive at first glance. He is quite right in saying that no serious third party of the right exists in this country and that there probably is not going to be one. The political oligarchy has simply contrived to make it too difficult for alternative parties to gain the needed funding and ballot access that would make a serious third party possible. Another and deeper reason that such a party cannot develop, however, is that the American right as it exists today does not really want one. What it wants is the party it has, and something like the soft, smiley-face conservatism the party now offers.

The real task of conservative counter-revolutionaries today is not so much to create a new party as a practical political vehicle but to begin rebuilding (not recapturing) an infrastructure of journals, publishing houses, organizations, websites, and think tanks that can make a start at recovering what neoconservatives stole in the 1980's (rather, more precisely and to be entirely fair, what the Old Right either allowed or actually invited them to steal). Buchanan quotes his old friend Richard Whalen in the aftermath of Watergate as saying that what conservatives needed to do was "go back to the catacombs." That is exactly where they went, and, six years later, after constructing an impressive labyrinth of ideological and propaganda caverns, they had themselves a new president. That is what the real right needs to do again. There are signs—in this magazine and others—that it is beginning to do it.

If the kind of right that Pat Buchanan and most other real conservatives want is going to survive, it has to get out of, and away from, the Republican Party. Whatever conservatives remain within the party today have no discernible influence on its leadership, and, if that leadership is reconfirmed this month, it will have even less reason to pay them attention than it had in the administration's first term. There already has been a struggle for the heart and soul and future of the Republican Party, and the man who led that struggle for the right—through no fault or flaw of his own—lost. If the heart and soul of the party are going to survive, they need to ditch the political cadaver in which they are now trapped and start building a new body to animate. The long march toward creating one needs to begin now. c

War From a Cabbage Patch

by Bill Kauffman

Eugene McCarthy: The Rise and Fall of Postwar American Liberalism
by Dominic Sandbrook
New York: Knopf; 397 pp., $25.95

◆

"Gene just isn't a nice person."
—Bobby Kennedy

You know you are not in for a Doris Kearns Goodwin/David McCullough hagiography when a biographer uses as an epigraph a character assessment by the thuggish Marilyn-mauling (Joe) McCarthyite RFK. (Isn't the three-letter monogram usually a tip-off to a sinister force?)

In March 1968, Eugene McCarthy earned the everlasting gratitude of American patriots when he came within a beagle's ear of defeating Lyndon B. Johnson in the New Hampshire primary, thus forcing into retirement one of the more repulsive monograms ever to occupy the presidency. "For his youthful volunteers, McCarthy was a brave and dashing champion who would unseat the brutal Johnson and bring a swift and just end to the carnage of the Vietnam War," writes Dominic Sandbrook, McCarthy's 30-year-old English biographer; and Sandbrook is eager to show us just how wrong his young followers were. His McCarthy is a "frivolous maverick" whose frivolity consisted of such ridiculous acts as writing poetry and calling for the legalization of marijuana and whose maverickness manifested itself in *lèse majesté* remarks directed at such eminences as Walter Mondale, LBJ ("a barbarian"), and, most damningly, John F. Kennedy ("shallow, unintelligent, and unequipped for high office, his reputation bloated with his father's money," in Sandbrook's paraphrase).

Born in 1916, Eugene McCarthy enjoyed a happy, baseball-playing childhood in the small German-Irish Catholic town of Watkins, Minnesota, and studied with the Benedictine monks at nearby St. John's University. The strength of Sandbrook's book lies in establishing just how deeply Catholic was the McCarthy matrix. At St. John's, where McCarthy later taught, the air was fresh with the influence of the saintly Dorothy Day and her Catholic Worker movement, which gently preached a cooperativist anarchism. The bright, acerbic McCarthy was much taken with his Church's rural life initiatives, which encouraged small-scale farming, home production, and the village economy. In best Midwestern fashion, McCarthy was also an isolationist pacifist before Pearl Harbor.

McCarthy read Chesterton, Belloc, and the Catholic distributists who were seeking humane and decentralist alternatives to communism, fascism, and corporate capitalism. He bought 80 acres of land from his dad and planned a cooperative farming community. Alas, Gene and his wife Abigail turned out to be typewriter agrarians who would rather read about the land than labor in it; and, in a not-so-simple twist of fate, he fell into the trade of politics.

McCarthy's mentor, Fr. Virgil Michel, called communism "an all-devouring, godless collectivism . . . certain to crush all human and spiritual values." Father Michel was right on the money, of course. But where the good monk would combat communism in the Catholic Worker way, through the establishment of human-scale institutions compatible with a Christian anarchism, young Gene McCarthy joined the social democrat Hubert Humphrey in purging Minnesota's Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of its Henry Wallace lefties, narrowing "the permissible range of political debate within Minnesota," as one historian has noted, and making the Upper Midwest safe for Harry Truman. Given that Nagasaki Harry ranks right down there with Woodrow Wilson and LBJ as a presidential enemy of liberty, one wonders: Would we really have been worse off had the muddleheaded Henry Wallace Democrats not been hunted down like rats by the welfare-warfare liberals of Americans for Democratic Action?

In any event, McCarthy was elected to Congress from St. Paul in 1948: News of his victory came by phone as he and his supporters were saying the rosary. He ran as a "quintessential Fair Deal liberal," and his subsequent record was every bit as dreary as one would expect. If it cost money, McCarthy voted for it, without fail, down the line; from 1949-58, he voted "right" on all 56 of the AFL-CIO's "key votes." In foreign affairs, he traded the grand Shipstead-Lindbergh isolationist tradition of Minnesota for Humphrey interventionism, scolding Taft conserva-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tives for their "failure to recognize the basic evil of communism." McCarthy even spoke in favor of HHH's 1954 bill to ban the Communist Party.

McCarthy's personal style was cool, detached, ironic: One almost expects to find photos of him shooting heroin with Johnny Depp. He was a loner, a cynical wit, handsome star of the House Democratic baseball team and chronic skipper of the tedious meetings of the Post Office Committee.

Elected to the Senate in 1958, "he struck observers as listless and lazy." He also despised the Kennedys—a potential problem strategy for a politician fated someday to draw a biographer who believes that Teddy Kennedy is a "bright, attractive" man. Sandbrook ascribes McCarthy's antipathy to JFK to "sheer jealousy," though many of his coreligionists shared McCarthy's belief that the first Catholic president should not be a priapic skirt-chasing male bimbo.

We search McCarthy's first 20 years in politics in vain for evidence of the magnificently inspiring Catholic anarchism of his youth. By 1960, Gene McCarthy was writing that "Government has a positive and natural function to assist man in the pursuit of perfection and happiness"—an idea wholly at odds with the Catholic Worker and, in fact, the writing on the road signs to school busing, urban renewal, and the progressive programs that destroyed much of American community life in the Vital Center years. As a party-line Democrat, McCarthy had only one criticism of internationalist Republicans: They did not spend enough money on foreign aid. Like JFK, he slammed President Eisenhower for penny-pinching on the military-industrial complex. "Nowhere did he contemplate the limits of American power or the morality of intervention overseas," writes Sandbrook. Then came Vietnam, and, with it, the salutary influence of the courageous Arkansas Democratic Sen. William Fulbright, a kind of Tory Confederate anti-imperialist whose chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee did so much to smash the suffocating consensus of the early 1960's.

Vietnam changed McCarthy, drew him back, at least partway, to his pacific roots. In 1964, he was an unquestioning supporter of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; by 1968, he was saying that "America's contribution to world civilization must be more than a continuous performance demonstration that we can police the planet." Tentatively, then with gusto, he began uttering "the first criticism of the Cold War orthodoxy by a major candidate in a presidential campaign since 1948." Since, that is, Henry Wallace.

When Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach haughtily informed Fulbright's committee that a presidential declaration of war was "outmoded in the international arena," McCarthy walked out of the room and told a reporter, "Someone's got to take them on. And if I have to run for president to do it, I'm going to do it." One of the monks at St. John's told McCarthy in late 1967, "*Viriliter agite*" ("Act manfully"). He did. And in so doing, he gave antiwar patriots who believed in the two-party system a meaningful choice in 1968. (Where were the Gene McCarthys in the 2004 Republican Party?) "They say I'm committing political suicide," said McCarthy as he launched his campaign. "Well, I'd rather do that and face up to the wrongness of the war than die of political old age."

McCarthy raised a pile of Wall Street money from antiwar businessmen, which is perhaps why he later opposed campaign-finance reform so strenuously. The press claimed that hippies were forsaking hirsuteness by the communeful and going "Clean for Gene," but most of his young supporters were student-council-president-types, earnest liberals who preferred "Feelin' Groovy" to "Surrealistic Pillow."

On March 12, 1968, McCarthy polled 42.4 percent of the vote in the New Hampshire primary, coming within 230 votes of LBJ if one includes Republican write-ins. Four days later, the timid Bobby Kennedy entered the race. At month's end, the homicidal Texan in the White House announced that he would not be a candidate for reelection.

McCarthy was a charmingly diffident candidate. He cancelled dawn handshaking sessions at factory gates because "I'm not really a morning person." He preferred the company of the pacifist poet Robert Lowell to that of the usual officious aides. Asked in 1968 for his greatest political influence—any Democrat with an ounce of insincerity would have said FDR or JFK—McCarthy cited Edmund Burke, and, indeed, in the Burkean idea of "little platoons," we can see an alternative to the folding, bending, spindling, mutilating ideology of the Johnson-Humphrey Democrats.

Norman Mailer, as usual, hit McCarthy's nail on the head: "He was probably, left to his own inclinations, the most serious conservative to run for nomination since Robert Taft." It is a measure of the nescience and cowardice of the modern American right that only the left-wing conservatives, the Dwight Macdonalds and Mailers, appreciated McCarthy; the conmen of the organized right were hustling for jobs in the Nixon campaign.

McCarthy's conception of the presidency was constitutional. Sandbrook, as if under the malign influence of James Barber, characterizes it as "negative, even passive." McCarthy believed in a one-term "depersonalized" presidency; the biggest problem in government, he said, was "the concentration of power in the executive." He once said that two hours per day should be sufficient for a president to do all his necessary work, and he wasn't kidding.

In a perceptive observation in this informative if maddening book, Sandbrook writes that "it appeared that McCarthy was reaching back to the old liberal drive to curtail the rise of central power over the individual, an impulse that many in the 1960s saw as conservative rather than liberal." McCarthy scorned the "bureaucratic control" that "deprives the individual of all sense of individual initiative, and nourishes the belief that he can do nothing if it is not planned and organized and somehow fitted into a pattern of action."

I do not want to misrepresent McCarthy as some sort of quasilibertarian Democrat. He betrayed his rural roots and demanded massive government spending on cities. In contrast to Bobby Kennedy, with his occasional concern for neighborhood integrity, McCarthy urged the central state to uproot "large numbers of Negro workers and their families to jobs and housing opportunities in the nation's suburbs," a piece of social engineering that would reduce human beings to the status of chessboard pawns, significant only in that they are black or white.

Sandbrook is constantly exasperated by McCarthy's refusal to take himself seriously. He is—Sandbrook tells us repeatedly—"frivolous." Asked by Johnny Carson if he would be a good president, candidate McCarthy replies: "I think I would be adequate." Horrors: self-deprecation! What will the World Community think?

And the frivolities just keep on coming. We are informed that McCarthy "kept the *New York Times* columnist James Res-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ton waiting while he composed a poem about wolverines." Well, what man born with a living soul wouldn't do that?

When McCarthy left the Senate in 1970, one supporter fumed, "I cannot understand how he could abandon a useful career to indulge himself in a fancied talent for poetry." Tell such a fellow that making poetry is a far more beautiful and also more useful endeavor than making laws, and he will look at you the way George W. Bush might look at a page of Faulkner (with dull incomprehension mixed with a subsurface fury).

McCarthy never again came close to the Rose Garden (which he promised to replace with "humble vegetables," since "You'd have trouble announcing war in a cabbage patch"). He ran a listless campaign for the Democratic nomination in 1972 and then set up the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency—great name—which metamorphosed into his independent campaign of 1976.

With "mischievous glee," McCarthy endorsed Reagan in 1980. The Democrats, he said, had become "the party of little other than the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare." From his stone farmhouse at the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains, he ran whimsical campaigns in 1988 and 1992, confirming the conventional view that

> he was an unruly, disloyal eccentric who had squandered his own reputation in a series of self-indulgent campaigns that never ended in victory and had little impact on American politics and society.

That describes another quadrennial candidate from Minnesota, the silly internationalist Republican Harold Stassen, but not Eugene McCarthy. My God, Sandbrook: McCarthy slew LBJ, for which he still deserves the thanks of any American this side of Paul Wolfowitz. And, in later years, he proposed solutions—some creative, others eccentric, the best rooted in his radical reactionary Catholic youth—to the maldistribution of wealth and power in these United States.

"There is not always honor in failure," concludes Sandbrook. Gene McCarthy, we are to believe, was a dishonorable failure, an arrogant, jealous, spiteful man who ought to have played the good soldier. He should have been a "professional, respectable and dedicated Democratic politician" who supported JFK, HHH, Muskie, Mondale, and the rest of his era's Democratic colossi. That he went into opposition—that, motivated by his Catholic conscience and his region's glorious radical lineage, he finally came to understand that the American Empire is the enemy of the American people—damns him in the court histories.

Well, to hell with them. Eugene McCarthy stood up to the machine; he walked out of the party; like the noble Senator Fulbright, he took his stand for the republic. Whatever his personal crotchets, he was an American patriot. And, in case you haven't noticed, they are in damned short supply in Washington, D.C., these days.

Bill Kauffman's most recent book is Dispatches From the Muckdog Gazette: A Mostly Affectionate Account of a Small Town's Fight to Survive *(Henry Holt/Picador).*

Blame All Around

by Clark Stooksbury

Losing America: Confronting a Reckless and Arrogant Presidency
by Sen. Robert C. Byrd
New York: W.W. Norton & Co.; 270 pp., $23.95

◆

Robert Byrd is the ultimate political survivor. He has served in Congress for more than 50 years and has cast more votes than any other senator in American history. Publicists for the Stupid Party generally sneer at the senator from West Virginia for being an ex-member of the KKK (some 60 years ago) and for directing as much pork to his home state as possible. The occasionally sensible Michelle Malkin recently suggested that Byrd is senile. Her colleague Ann Coulter described him as a "vain, ranting windbag of a kleptocrat" shortly before Congress authorized war in Iraq. The far wiser Paul Craig Roberts recently suggested that Byrd is the "Constitution's greatest—and perhaps only—defender in the US government." Roberts is on to something: Byrd is the closest thing to a constitutionalist in the U.S. Senate. He is particularly concerned with maintaining the separation of powers and defending the prerogatives of the Congress.

Subjects that provoke Byrd's anger in *Losing America* are President George W. Bush's attempts to infringe on Congress's spending power and the latter's frequent refusal to fight back. Immediately after the attacks of September 11, the President sought "such sums as may be necessary" to respond to the terrorists, and Congress did not require the executive branch to account for how the money was spent. The infamous $87 billion request in the fall of 2003 contained several provisions undermining congressional appropriations power, including three billion dollars in "transfer authority" funds for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to spend as he sees fit. Byrd states that, "in setting up large accounts to be spent without congressional 'meddling' we have legislated a return to the slush fund." In attempts to score points against the Kerry-Edwards ticket (both men voted nay), administration supporters regularly imply that voting against the appropriation was the equivalent of voting against the troops—as if American soldiers would have been abandoned in the field had Congress failed to fund the "War on Terror." Byrd shows that the issue is far more complex.

The middle of President Bush's term was marked by a stunning victory for the Republicans in the 2002 elections, built largely on the GOP advantage on national-security issues and on Republican support for creating a Department of Homeland Security. The (bad) idea for this new department originated with Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-CT). President Bush originally made Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge a member of the White House staff with responsibility for homeland security, answerable only to the President. Citing his position as a presidential advisor, the White House turned down requests from Byrd (then chairman of the Appropriations Committee) and Sen. Ted Stevens, a Republican from Alaska, to let Ridge testify about a homeland-security funding request that would cover multiple agencies. Before the administration flip-flopped on creating a Department of Homeland Security, the two senators introduced legislation to require that Ridge be confirmed by the Senate, so that he would have to testify.

Byrd denounces the President's rush to create the department without thinking the issue through. He describes a particularly fruitless meeting on this topic in which members of Congress were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

brought in to serve as "potted plant" backdrops. Byrd's assessment of the President is scathing:

> I was struck by the president's dismal performance. To say it was mediocre would be a gross exaggeration. He was disorganized, unprepared, and rambling. This fellow was all hat and no cattle, as they would say in Texas. It was obvious that he had no idea what was in his Department of Homeland Security proposal, nor did he seem to care.

While so many prominent Democrats, spines as stiff as macaroni noodles, went along with the administration's drive to invade Iraq, Byrd stood firmly and solidly against the rush to war. In *Losing America*, he examines the war from several different angles. As an advocate of the separation of powers, he is especially angry about the blank check that Congress gave the Bush administration to wage war. Byrd describes a depressing meeting of Democratic senators before the vote, in which he learned that some of his colleagues helped draft the resolution that "complete[ly] hand[ed] over [the] congressional war power to the president." Most of them then voted for the resolution in order to be able to highlight other issues in the 2002 elections.

Senator Byrd also takes offense at Bush's carrier-landing stunt in May 2003, during the brief triumphal period after Saddam's fall and before terrorists and guerrilla warriors started to exact a heavy price in blood from U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. Byrd strenuously denounced the President from the floor of the Senate a few days later. He includes the speech in the book and notes the contrast between the "simple dignity" of Abraham Lincoln, speaking at Gettysburg, and the "flamboyant showmanship" of the current occupant of the White House.

There is plenty of politics in *Losing America*, which nevertheless rises above the usual partisan blather. Byrd's criticism of the President is harsh but principled, and he does not spare his Democratic colleagues. The book is a worthy addition to what will someday be a vast library of volumes describing the disaster that is Bush II's presidency.

Clark Stooksbury writes from Knoxville, Tennessee.

Where Lawyers Fear to Tread

by Fr. Michael P. Orsi

Debating the Death Penalty: Should America Have Capital Punishment? The Experts From Both Sides Make Their Case
by Hugo Bedau and Paul Cassell
New York: Oxford University Press; 234 pp., $26.00

◆

This book was occasioned by former Illinois Gov. George Ryan's blanket commutation of all death sentences imposed in his state to life imprisonment without parole. Philosopher Hugo Bedau and U.S. District Judge Paul Cassell have compiled a collection of outstanding point-counterpoint essays from leading members of the academic, legal, and political communities, discussing the validity of capital punishment in contemporary America. The arguments center on common themes: the utility of capital punishment as a deterrent; racial prejudice as a determining factor; incompetent defense for the poor; and due-process violations. For all of these issues, the data, both statistical and narrative, are quite contradictory—so much so that the reader, in moving from one essay to the next, is hard-pressed to formulate a confident opinion. This is hardly surprising, as the book reflects the ambivalence with which many people confront this emotional topic.

What is important, however, is that capital punishment is not portrayed by any contributor as, of itself, a metaphysical evil. There is inherent agreement among most of the authors that, if defects in the justice system could be ameliorated, if execution could be proved a deterrent to crime, and if there could be absolute surety of the guilt of the condemned, at least a philosophical justification might be established for the death penalty. Yet, for some, theoretical argument cannot justify practice, since civic and humane factors (they contend) may nullify its social value. Bedau's argument that capital punishment overreaches is based on the principle of "minimal invasion," which, he contends, allows government to go no further than what is necessary to achieve an important social goal. This position ignores the possibility that the state has an obligation to provide moral instruction or retributive justice. Another philosopher, Louis P. Pojman, advocates, on the other hand, that the use of capital punishment should be expanded from its present limited application in first-degree-murder cases to other instances, such as corporate scandals, where CEO's and other executives have ruined the lives of countless employees and stockholders, thus destroying the basic trust on which democracy depends. Such an expansion, Pojman believes, would raise the moral consciousness of the citizenry.

It is doubtful that one can make a universal argument for or against capital punishment, as the historical data seem to ebb and crest according to circumstances. This leaves to the citizens of each jurisdiction the responsibility for deciding what is needed for their particular community. In my state of Michigan, for example, there is currently no death penalty; however, a recent spate of cop killings has brought about a public cry for a death-penalty measure to be placed on the 2006 ballot. According to some of the qualitative data, Cassell says, such laws make criminals think twice. The opening essay by U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski is most clear on the im-

NEW!! EXCITING!!

JOIN With Others in a Fascinating Adventure to Discuss. . .

Rebuilding Human Society

Go To: www.committeefor correspondence.com

C.L.Corey, Retired Professor
Published Author

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portance of home rule. Although he thinks execution should be reserved for the "worst of the worst," he argues that it is the role of the court strictly to interpret and enforce the law, which itself should reflect the will of the people as it is enshrined in each state's penal code.

All of the authors agree that no evidence exists of an innocent person having been executed. Moreover, many convicts have been freed from death row solely on procedural grounds. Of this group, some convicted murderers have killed again following their release. Joshua Marquis, a district attorney who defends the death penalty, readily admits that any system for punishing criminals needs constant refinement to prevent errors. However, he warns, "that doesn't mean we should throw out the baby with the bath water." He effectively counters defense attorney Bryan Stevenson's "race card" argument as outdated, while showing Stephen Bright's "sleeping lawyer" argument to be a myth. Marquis holds that the federal trial and execution of Timothy McVeigh, as a punishment that clearly fit the crime while making a social statement regarding that crime's particularly heinous nature, served as an effective model for a surer promotion of justice.

Even Pope John Paul II's opposition to the death penalty is not absolute. One has to presume that the Pope is sensitive to the historical vagaries of the value and use of capital punishment. What may be justifiable in another time may not be in ours. Therefore, community standards, circumstances, and caution must be weighed in its application.

The book ends with Governor Ryan's "I Must Act" speech, in which he announced the commutations. What is obvious in the context of the preceding essays is that Governor Ryan's unilateral and blanket action was, in the end, a subversion of the will of the people, insensitive to the rule of law and to justice itself. Since capital punishment is such an important issue, the presentation of facts, cogent arguments, attentiveness to due process, and the will of the people are the only ways to build a consensus regarding how society should protect itself and the accused. This book may inspire better-considered decisions regarding the imposition of capital punishment, now and in the future.

Fr. Michael P. Orsi is a research fellow in law and religion at Ave Maria School of Law in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Beyond Politics

by Tobias J. Lanz

Equality By Default: An Essay on Modernity as Confinement
by Philippe Beneton
Wilmington: ISI Books;
217 pp., $15.00

◆

Most Americans think of the terms *modern* and *modernity* as denoting something positive. A modern society is advanced in science, reason, hygiene, and human goodness. To condemn modernity is to be against progress and all of its material benefits. Even American conservatives are essentially modern in outlook, identifying modernity with material improvement. European conservatives are different. To many, modernity is a more complex phenomenon that is both material and spiritual in nature. French legal scholar and political thinker Philippe Beneton is one of these; he represents a long line of conservative writers who have looked beyond the material benefits of modernity to reveal its disturbing spiritual essence.

Beneton's thesis is not new. His contribution is nonetheless important for a number of reasons. First, Beneton accurately describes the contemporary condition in the West. Forthright about his religious conservatism, he nevertheless writes without polemical or critical bias but, in the tradition of Tocqueville, paints life as he sees it. Second, he presents the modern world in a clear and concise way that can be readily understood by the layman. (Credit here is also due to Prof. Ralph C. Hancock of Brigham Young University for translating the manuscript and introducing Beneton's ideas to an American audience.) The book is particularly suited to the reader who finds himself baffled by how rapidly the old order has vanished, while failing to understand precisely why or how it happened.

For Beneton, late modernity betrays true human freedom, which rests on the biblical view of human dignity in which all people have absolute moral value. Historically, both Church and state upheld this vision. However, since the 1960's, this ancient view of human freedom has been thoroughly radicalized, leading to the proliferation of human "rights" and the subsequent disintegration of society. As these "rights" have multiplied, they have lost their substantive meaning. More importantly, as people have pursued individual rights, the idea of the good life, shared in common and rooted in human dignity, has given way to the atomistic world of individual autonomy. As the author quips, "In order for [modern] man to be equally autonomous, he must have nothing but the freedom to have nothing in common." People are thus equal by default. The idea of freedom is distinguished by mutual indifference.

Because reason in the modern world is focused purely on self-gratification, man is confined and cut off from the world. Relationships with other men, nature, and God disintegrate. Cultures are replaced by "systems" that have their own institutions, ideas, and elites to govern the newly freed lumpen rabble. The new elites are different from former ones, however, in respecting not order and authority but only power, in the interests of which they have learned to divide and conquer by reducing society to the elemental level of the individual and thereby fragmenting it. Once the individual has been cut off from traditional religious mores and customs, he can more easily be reoriented by modern ideas and techniques.

Scientific knowledge is the ultimate source of this new social power. Science, after revolutionizing man's understanding of the natural world, was then misapplied to the social realm. Here, it became perverted into a crude scientism whose attitudes of skepticism, universality, and abstraction now define modern social life. Pervasive doubt is particularly destructive in undermining traditional cultural forms, especially religion, that are based on trust and faith. Thus, science became the great social equalizer, eschewing the natural hierarchies and human differences that sustained order in favor of the universal scientific (mathematical) concept of equality. Once freedom was equated with equality, equality became the overarching social goal of modern life.

Science has replaced religion as the source of identity and the basis of human existence. Modern ideologies are defined by universal scientific concepts such as sex, race, and class. The modern state is a model of scientific rationality and organization. It gauges virtually every aspect of human life and makes policy decisions according to scientific analysis. The modern university is the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

center of scientific research. More importantly, it is where scientific language and ideas are refined and assiduously applied to every sphere of life. Today, the liberal arts are bastions of scientism. It is here that positivists, Marxists, and feminists have successfully employed the scientific method to deconstruct traditional forms of knowledge and replace them with radical ideas.

However, it is in the world of commerce that the spread of scientific rationality has been most thoroughgoing and successful. Like the state, the modern business corporation is an agent of revolution. It has changed the nature of work, and it is the most effective producer and distributor of technology, which is the embodiment of scientific rationality. Technology purportedly helps save time, labor, and money. It also helps reinforce human autonomy and freedom. And people desire technology because it enhances their power. But it offers a Faustian bargain that few technophiles understand. Technology has allowed humans to achieve autonomy by severing their traditional bonds and obligations. As the old ties vanish, however, new forms of dependency and conformity are created. Beneton drives home the great irony that radically free modern man is utterly dependent on massive and soulless institutions, like the corporation and the state, for his very freedom and survival.

The author identifies the McDonald's Corporation as the great icon of economic rationality, the first global corporation. It not only integrated production and consumption into a single process but created a standardized setting to serve that product. By multiplying this formula, it revolutionized food production and consumption and helped create the food "industry." McDonald's transformed eating from a natural and spiritual event to a purely economic function.

For Beneton, the McDonald's phenomenon represents the hubris of scientific rationality as well as its absurdity. Clearly, there are limits to the application of scientific thought and method. Beneton reminds us that scientific rationality is purely material and functional in its nature. It knows no direction or purpose. It has no boundaries. In contrast, the older forms of reason embodied by religion sought to establish limits to human behavior. Most importantly, they gave purpose to life by reflecting purpose. Beneton does not present a program for change *per se*, but, by contrasting the "dead" knowledge of scientific rationality with the "living" knowledge of religion, he points us in the right direction.

Conservatives must begin to understand that the modern crisis is intellectual and metaphysical in nature, the victory of scientific rationality in every sphere of life. Modern liberalism is but an ideological manifestation of this deeper ontological shift. Thus, any serious conservative movement must be go beyond politics to be successful. While political action is crucial (especially as a defensive measure), it is insufficient: The real struggle is existential and must begin with the individual and his immediate household and community, where the influences of scientism can best be identified and controlled. At the personal level, conservatives could begin by shifting allegiances away from career, consumption, and technology—the seductions on which the modern world feeds—and rediscover the obligations that once sustained community and culture. Resistance is *not* futile. The real question is: How many conservatives are willing to trade the comfortable life for the good life?

Tobias J. Lanz teaches politics at the University of South Carolina, Columbia.

radical \'rad-i-kəl\ *adj.*: "going to the root."

Why let the neo-cons get all the credit? Let these IHS Press titles help you to become a *radical* conservative by re-acquainting you with the *roots* of Western Civilization, and the religious and philosophical Tradition that built it.

Economics for Helen
by Hilaire Belloc
160pp, $12.95
Foreword by Dr. Alberto Piedra, Prof. Emeritus of Economics, Catholic Univ.; Introduction by Dr. Edward McPhail, Dickinson College

Belloc's accessible, introductory sketch of economic science, which takes a *realist* approach, as opposed to a mathematical or mechanical one: mindful of the fact that economic transactions are conducted not by machines and calculators, but by men.

5½"x8½", paper, ISBN: 1-932528-03-2

Richelieu
by Hilaire Belloc
272pp, $16.95
A Gates of Vienna Books title
Foreword by Fr. Michael Crowdy

A compelling life of Cardinal Richelieu of France, masterful statesman and creator of modern Europe. Belloc is the Catholic historian *par excellence*, who sketches Richelieu's career in light of the Faith which is the measure of all things.

6"x9", paper, ISBN: 0-9718286-8-7

Dollfuss: An Austrian Patriot
by Fr. Johannes Messner
160pp, $12.95
Foreword by Dr. Alice von Hildebrand & Introduction by Dr. John Zmirak

A critical biography of the unknown man who was one of the most honorable and impressive statesmen of the 20th century. Engelbert Dollfuss ruled Austria for two years (1932–1934) and attempted explicitly to build its politico-economic structure upon the Social Doctrine of the Church, as explained in Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno*. His impressive social experiment achieved much in the short time Dollfuss held the Chancellorship, until his life was ended prematurely by Austrian National Socialist assassins. A *must read!*

5½"x8½", paper, ISBN: 0-9718286-6-0

ALSO AVAILABLE



Ethics and the National Economy, by Fr. Heinrich Pesch. Translated and Introduced by Dr. Rupert Ederer. An introduction to the *Catholic* way of thinking about economics, by a great Catholic economist. 5½"x8½", paper, ISBN: 0-9718286-5-2, 192pp, **$13.95**

Distributist Perspectives – Volume I. Introduction by Fr. Lawrence Smith. Primary-source essays of the Distributist school, and including a new essay by Duke Economist Dr. Thomas Naylor. 5½"x8½", paper, ISBN: 0-9718286-7-9, 96pp, **$8.95**

IHS PRESS
222 W. 21st Street, Suite F-122, Dept. D
Norfolk, VA 23517

The exclusive publisher, dedicated exclusively to the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church.

ORDER TODAY:
- phone/fax toll-free: **877-IHS-PRESS** (877-447-7737)
- online: www.ihspress.com or order@ihspress.com
- mail, including $3.50 s/h for the 1st book, plus $1.00 each add'l. book.
- Check, money order, or credit cards accepted.

VISA MasterCard

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Scott P. Richert

Polka Can't Die

Rockford's annual On the Waterfront festival is just the sort of thing I should like—in theory, at least. Held every Labor Day weekend since 1985, On the Waterfront is the largest community event in Rockford and features both local and national musical acts. The entire downtown is closed to all but foot traffic for three days, and local non-profits provide most of the food and drinks, making a tidy sum in the process. In Illinois' largest small town, such expressions of community solidarity are, sadly, rare.

Still, in nine years in Rockford, we had never attended On the Waterfront, partly because the Richert family reunion is held in Southern Indiana on the Sunday before Labor Day, but mostly because we had always heard—even from people who enjoy it—that the festival is more than a little overwhelming, and certainly not a place for children.

Yet here we are, at 4:30 in the afternoon on the Friday before Labor Day, waiting at the gate closest to the Ethnic Stage, sponsored by—of all organizations—my favorite local Gannett paper. As we enter, the children can barely contain their excitement. "Where do you want to sit?" I ask. "In the front row!" they respond with one voice, and we make our way past the tables and the white plastic lawn chairs to within a few feet of the stage.

Scott P. Richert

Action Jackson Wilson on drums and Dandy Don Hedeker on guitar and vocals.

Minutes later, they appear in all their glory—three grown men in ruffled shirts, bow ties, dark pants, horned-rim glasses, white bowling shoes, and sequined vests. Bubbles rise from the front of the stage, and then, from a frenetic burst of electric guitar and a clash of cymbals emerge the familiar strains of the "Pennsylvania Polka," but with very different words:

> Ladies and gentleman
> the show has begun.
> We are the Polkaholics.
> We're here to polka
> It's second to none.
> We are the Polkaholics.

Half-Polish, half-German, and all Midwestern, I had grown up with polka on the fringes of my life, but in recent years, my exposure had been limited to "The Chicken Dance" at weddings. About a year ago, however, I'd been seized by one of my momentary obsessions and started Googling around for polka on the internet, stumbling first across a round-the-clock internet polka station, *247PolkaHeaven.com*. Polka, however, is meant to be experienced live, and typing *polka* and *Chicago* into Google brought me to the website of the Polkaholics (*Polkaholics.Chicagogigs.com*). A few minutes later, I was listening to mp3's of their songs, and I was hooked. I tried to get Molly Fleming to book them at the Irish Rose, but she decided she couldn't afford them. She did, however, bring them to the attention of Craig Nagus, who was scheduling the Ethnic Stage, and so here we are.

Billing themselves "a Chicago band that plays a high-speed collision of polka and rock 'n' roll," the Polkaholics emerged not from the traditional Chicago polka scene but from the punk rock of the late 70's and early-to-mid 80's. Guitarist and lead singer Don Hedeker founded the band (along with bassist George Kraynak and drummer Mike Werner—that's right, no accordion) in 1997 "just as an experiment to see if we could play polka songs in a rock kind of format." A first generation German-American, Don admits that he had never really liked German-style polka. "We definitely started with—I don't know if a joke is right—but kind of on a lark." He and his wife shopped at thrift stores, and when he ran out of closet space, he began looking at records. Living in Chicago, many of the records in the bins were polka albums.

Today, Don has over 500 polka records in every style, European and American. When he started the band, however, he knew only one polka song: "The Beer Barrel Polka." His main desire was not so much to play polkas but to bring some fun back to rock music, a point echoed by bassist James Wallace, who joined the band in June 2001: "You go to a rock show now and people just kind of stand there. I think at a show people should be talking with each other and drinking with each other and making new friends."

The polka culture, however, is quite different. While the Polish honky-tonks that used to line the Polish Broadway in Chicago (the stretch of Division Street between Ashland and Western) have largely disappeared, polka is still, Don believes, "the biggest underground kind of music in the United States." And, he argues, it's distinctly American: "I used to view it as European music. But there's not very many people in Europe putting out polka records over the past 50 years. But there are a lot of people in the United States putting out polka records." Every major region in the United States has its own style of polka, partly conditioned by the ethnic groups that settled there, partly by the other music styles of each region.

In the Chicago area, of course, Polish polka predominates, and so it's no surprise that the traditional part of the Polkaholics' repertoire is primarily Polish. Still, they play a lot of Oktoberfests in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Chicago area, dressed in *lederhosen*. "We do not want to get put into any one ethnic group," Don says. "I'm the only one with any kind of ethnic background. James and Jackson [Wilson, the current drummer, who joined the band in January 2001] are rather WASPy sounding names."

Here at On the Waterfront, there's a pretty decent mix of ethnic groups, but after some initial skepticism (probably a result of the clothes), everyone seems to enjoy the show. Early on, Don jumps off the stage and moves through the crowd. My children are a little shell-shocked but loving it. A week before, we had returned from our circle tour of Lake Michigan, during which I'd unwisely told the kids I would play "Old Style Polka" every time they spotted an Old Style Beer sign on a restaurant or tavern. There are, as you can imagine, a lot of establishments serving Old Style in Wisconsin and the U.P. I don't think we drove more than five minutes without playing the song, which lasts three minutes and 20 seconds. (At least, it seemed that way.)

"Old Style" may be the Polkaholics' most-famous song—it's been played without permission at Chicago Cubs games—but it's certainly not their only song about beer or drinking or parties or bars. From covers of polka classics such as "In Heaven There Is No Beer" to their own compositions, such as Jolly James' "We Drink 'Cause We Must Polka" and Dandy Don's "Ten Drinks to the Floor," this is after-hours music for the working man—some of it, like "Drinking With My Boss," triumphally so:

Sitting at my desk
the one I have at work.
And I start to think
my boss, he is a big jerk
Just when I started to think
that he was acting queer
That's when he comes on over
and asks me if I want a beer.

Raise a glass to the working man
a toast to the ladies, too.
You work real hard and
they bust your chops.
Hey, this beer is for you.
Your boss is a jerk
He's just plain mean
He acts like a rotten skunk
But he says he's buying so—
Let's get drunk!

There's a certain country feel to some of these songs, both in the lyrics and in the music, accentuated by the use of guitar and bass. Indeed, Don compares the band's work in the polka world to that of the traditionalist musicians who occasionally rebel against the slick, pop-style packaging of Nashville and try to bring country back to its roots. While some may object that you can't play traditional polka without an accordion (or at least a concertina), Don replies that it all depends on what the meaning of *traditional* is. As he points out, Li'l Wally Jagiello, "The World's Polka King" who came out of retirement in Miami to return to his roots on the Polish Broadway and play a concert with the Polkaholics in September 1999, forbade his musicians from using sheet music during performances. That meant three things: They needed to know the music by heart; they could better improvise; and, most importantly, their eyes were where they belonged—on their audience, making connections with the people.

That's the sense in which the Polkaholics are, in some ways, more traditional than a "traditional" polka band. Asked what they are really up to, James simply replies, "Bringing polka to the people." Their hope, he says, is that the audience "might look at polka music in a different light, go out and get interested in more traditional polka music," just as he did. "Before I joined the Polkaholics, I was like, 'Polka, that's corny, that's goofy.' Then I saw the Polkaholics, was amazed by them, became a convert, started looking for records, going to shows."

"Sometimes for a tradition to survive," Don argues, "the idea of a tradition can remain the same, but it has to be made fresh in some way. Many of the current polka bands are not traditional in that sense of being true to the tradition."

Here at On the Waterfront, I'm probably the only one musing on tradition. Much of the crowd is up on its feet now, rocking to an extended version of "The Chicken Dance," while James hops around, weaving in and out of the dancers. Some of the better dancers are on stage with Don and Jackson, while the rest of us are clapping to the beat.

Their 75-minute slot is up, but the Polkaholics plow ahead into their final song, the title track from their latest album, *Polka Can't Die*, whose refrain is a passionate statement of the Polkaholics' purpose:

The polka it can't die
The polka it can't die
It's been around so long
You have to sympathize
The polka it can't die
The polka it can't die
Please don't ever forget it
If it's gone we'll soon regret it
Help us try to resurrect it
Please don't let the polka die.

To a standing ovation, they leave the stage as the next act, a zydeco band, starts to set up. I want to stick around, but the children decide it's time to leave: The zydeco band has an accordion.



Scott P. Richert

Concertgoers doing "The Chicken Dance," while Jolly James Wallace plays bass.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Letter From England

by Michael McMahon

The Hunt Is Up

◆

On September 15, 2004, Tony Blair cried havoc and let slip the dogs of war. They were particularly ugly dogs. Ill-bred, untrained, snarling, spitting, hate-driven mongrels led the pack; half-witted lapdogs yapped along behind, their pampered noses tight up against the backends of those in front—except when taken momentarily away to add a feeble, unintelligent yelp to the general hue and cry. There was never any chance that their quarry might get away, for the pursuit was not across open country but in a confined space: the debating chamber of the House of Commons, where resistance to the massive New Labour majority is as futile as the struggles of a bear tied to a stake.

That day, the object of their unequal pursuit was not a social evil, a burning injustice, a rotting immorality, or a threat to the freedom of the nation: It was a pastime, a sport. MP's voted by a majority of 339 to 155 to criminalize foxhunting, a pursuit that has, for centuries, brought color to the English landscape and kept down the population of a pest.

And yet, to listen to the speeches made by the abolitionists, you would think that foxhunting was as great an affront to humanity as cannibalism, human sacrifice, or slavery. MP's vied with one another to produce superlatives adequate to the Great Cause on which they were embarked, but there are only so many ways of dressing up the words *barbaric* or *cruel*, and their efforts were no more imaginative than they were appropriate—for neither term can be properly applied to foxhunting, and they know it. The "cruelty" argument was lost long ago, when a committee appointed by Parliament to consider the case against hunting concluded that the killing of foxes by hounds could not be shown to involve more suffering than other methods, although it could be shown that it sometimes caused less. But Lord Burns' report was not what the abolitionist majority wanted to hear, so they ignored it, and carried on ranting regardless.



Elizabeth Wolf

So the madness barked that day was hypocritical, and the expressions of compassion false, for those MP's know their arguments are nonsense. And even if they were valid, there are many greater cruelties visited upon animals in contemporary Britain, and on an incomparably greater scale. If the abolitionists were genuinely concerned for the welfare of animals, they would be puffing themselves up to pontificate on factory farming, in which millions of creatures endure half-lives in little-ease cages so that their processed carcasses can be sold cheaply in supermarkets.

They aren't, however—because they are not motivated by any sympathy for or understanding of the fox; they are motivated by hatred of the huntsman. And now that a law to ban hunting is in the bag, that hatred is being openly expressed. Writing in the leftist *Guardian* and speaking on national radio the following day, the campaigning journalist George Monbiot acknowledged that hunting ranked "about 155th" on the list of animal-welfare issues demanding attention, but, in the struggle for a classless society, its importance was second only to the abolition of independent schools. In the same newspaper a few days later, Polly Toynbee acknowledged that "killing a few foxes is not more cruel than battery farming," admitted that "liberals should always be wary of banning people from doing as they like," and asked why "the left" is "unable to summon up a fraction of that anger about the things that really matter." She then unwittingly answered her own question by devoting most of the rest of her article to mocking a class that she identifies as "the countrysiders," whose members "cannot and will not reconcile themselves to their new place on the far margins of national consciousness in a profoundly urban culture."

The war that Tony Blair unleashed on September 15 is a war against anyone who dares to hold to the traditional values of the countryside, and it is a war motivated by ignorance, resentment, and spite. The New Britain that New Labour is striving to build is indeed "a profoundly urban culture," in which the countryside is valued only as a leisure amenity to be roamed over by retired office workers in rustling nylon anoraks. The clever-dick denizens of latte-land that have divvied up political power between them chant the manipulative mantra of multiculturalism, but its all-embracing liberality does not extend to the hunting fraternity, because the culture of hunting is identified with a hated, alien class.

That class and culture has immediate and obvious connections with the past and is thus doubly damnable in Blair's Brave New Britain, which exults in such vacuous, transient modernity as the Millennium Dome, and where reminders of what have gone before are an embarrassment. Our capital city's iconic red Routemaster buses have been consigned to the scrap heap, and the same fate is planned for our countryside's men in red coats—not because either has ceased to perform a useful service, but because both are reminders of times when values held in common were different.

The bullies that run Britain burn to eradicate such vestiges of tradition. The closed-shop control-freaks think that to allow a man or woman to dress in hunting pink and mount a horse is to allow the perception that an equestrian class still exists, and that people might defer to it rather than to them. The fact that many hunting men and women are absolutely ordinary folk is irrelevant; it is what things look like that matters. It looked as if Saddam Hussein was harboring weapons of mass destruction, so we were justified in waging war on him, even if he wasn't; and the man in the red coat on a horse has to go, too, because he looks like a "toff"—even if he is a farm worker living in a tied cottage on one hundredth

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the salary earned by the prime minister's wife.

According to the rural affairs minister—the feeble figure at the dispatch box when those plucky protesters made it onto the floor of the Commons—these and any other arguments now count for nothing. The lower house has voted for the abolition of hunting, and that's that; in our democracy, it is now incumbent on the minority to accept the will of the majority. That the second chamber exists and has the right to delay, amend, or challenge the folly of the legislation is just as confidently dismissed. We have already been told that, if the lords get in the way, they will be pushed aside by the use of the 1911 Parliament Act—a measure created to resolve profound constitutional crises, not to force through measures banning a harmless sport. As one sneering New Labour MP put it, if the lords attempted to block the bill, they should be told to "go to hell"—an expression that under any speaker but the present one, would have earned a formal rebuke but which was allowed to pass. The speaker is a member of New Labour.

The minister's appeal to rural Britain to accept and obey a democratic decision made by Parliament is doubly disingenuous. New Labour promised a ban on foxhunting in its manifesto for the 1997 election, in which it won a massive majority of parliamentary seats—but the votes of only 31 percent of the electorate. For every three that voted for Blair's reforming vision, seven voted for somebody else or no one at all. Even if every one of the voters that put Tony Blair in power did so in order that he ban foxhunting, the suggestion that such a law reflects the will of the people as a whole is an absurdity—particularly when surveys commissioned by pro-hunting groups record 59 percent opposition to a ban.

And yet banned it must be, in an act that defies reason, destroys civil liberties, abuses the British constitution, and demonstrates the ever-growing gulf between the created world and the artificially crafted cocoon of sanitized urban existence. It has come about because Britain is now ruled by the kind of government that Lord Hailsham warned of 30 years ago: an "elective dictatorship," in which domination by one party leads to "potential for tyranny." In this case, the tyranny is practiced not by the leader but by the mob. Tony Blair let it loose. He allowed a free vote knowing exactly what his howling majority would do with it and promised that he would let nothing in the constitution prevent them having their way.

All this must seem rather puzzling in the United States of America, where, less than 18 months ago, Tony Blair told both houses of Congress that our two countries were fighting for "the inalienable right of humankind . . . to be free—free . . . to be you, so long as being you does not impair the freedom of others."

No man has a window into Tony Blair's soul, so no man can confidently damn him for a liar, a fraud, or a hypocrite. But no man possessed of reason could deny that his behavior in the hunting debate makes him look like all three—and, in Blair's Britain, it is what things look like that counts.

Michael McMahon does not hunt, but he shoots. And shooting will be next.

Letter From Victoria

by Kevin Michael Grace

Just Win, Baby

◆

In 1968, George Wallace said that there wasn't a "dime worth's of difference" between Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey. Implicit there was the suggestion that Americans were not satisfied with echoes and preferred choices. As it happens, Wallace was the last third-party presidential candidate to win Electoral College votes. Besides 14 percent of the popular vote, he took Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. In 2000, the difference between George W. Bush and Al Gore was barely quantifiable. Yet, despite the Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan candidacies, the Republicrats took over 96 percent of the popular vote. In 2004, they will likely top 98 percent. In America, third-party votes were once thought wasteful; now, they are sinful.

In Canada, we have many choices: third, fourth, even fifth parties. Forming new parties is easy and cheap, as there are strict limits on campaign spending. Any party that manages two percent of the vote gets taxpayer funding and free airtime. In the 2004 election, the two leading parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, together won less than two thirds of the vote and only 234 of the 308 seats. Curiously, however, the leaden echo of political uniformity is as loud here as in America.

No, I haven't forgotten Canada's separatists, the Bloc Québécois, who rebounded to take 54 of Quebec's 75 seats. However, considering that Quebec independence can occur only as the result of a *provincial* election, the presence of separatist MP's in a *federal* assembly remains something of a mystery. Yes, the Bloc fights for ever more money and privileges for Quebec, but given that, for 34 of the last 36 years, Canada's prime ministers have been Quebeckers (Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin), its efforts in this respect appear somewhat otiose.

In all other respects, the Bloc is a typical Canadian party: "fiscally conservative, socially liberal." That is, corporatism and globalism in economics and perpetual revolution in society: the destruction of the historical and traditional Canada and its replacement with the proposition nation set out in the 1982 Constitution and Charter of Rights.

One method used to accomplish this transformation is the election of a new people—a continuous onslaught of Third World immigrants combined with official multiculturalism, ethnic quotas, hate speech laws, *etc.* You might think that the Bloc, sworn as it is to the preservation of French culture, would oppose these policies. Separatist Premier Jacques Parizeau blamed the defeat of the 1995 separatism referendum (by a mere 50,000 votes) on "money and the ethnic vote." The ethnic vote did split at least 9-1 against separation, while the Francophone majority (80 percent at the time) split 60-40 in favor. So Parizeau was correct, and, clearly, Canada's immigration policy is death to the separatist cause. The Bloc has never stopped apologizing for Parizeau, however, and it has become received wisdom that he must have been drunk that night. You don't need to be drunk to speak the truth in Canada, but it helps.

Canada already has the highest legal immigration rate in the world, but the Bloc believes it isn't high enough. Neither does the New Democratic Party, which purports to speak for the "working class." I once pointed out to a leading NDP intellectual that Canada's immigration policy separates the working class from its work and constitutes an enormous transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich. Judging by her astonishment, she had never this before. She called it a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"right-wing argument." I pointed out that Alan Greenspan, the *Wall Street Journal*, and Conrad Black's *National Post* would disagree, but, by then, she had stopped listening.

The Liberals also support higher immigration, as well they might. They have established a goal of one percent annually, 310,000 per year, of which about 225,000 will become Liberal voters after attaining citizenship. Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are now majority non-Canadian and elect Liberals almost exclusively.

The Conservatives, too, support higher immigration. So all four of Canada's major federal parties support a policy that benefits only the Liberals, even though opinion polls have demonstrated consistently that as many Canadians oppose as support Liberal orthodoxy on immigration. I have highlighted immigration and multiculturalism here, but I could have chosen any number of issues to make my point—there's not a dime's worth of difference between Canada's political parties.

How did this happen? Isn't the multiparty system supposed to prevent uniformity? And whatever happened to the Reform Party, anyway? Didn't it flourish by providing a choice and not an echo?

It is a chastening experience to read one's past political prognostications. After the 1997 election, I informed the readers of *National Review* that Canada's Progressive Conservatives were "finished." They had, I insisted smugly, "learned that the wages of pragmatism are death." Three years later, Reform was dead, euthanized by its founder, Preston Manning. Four years after that, the Conservatives, no longer "Progressive" but more pragmatic than ever, were back as Canada's perpetual me-too Official Opposition.



Elizabeth Wolf

Reform (1987-2000) was the most successful federal third party in Canadian history but ultimately accomplished nothing, squandered a generation of activism, and left Canadians even more cynical. Its rise and fall deserves close study by anyone contemplating the establishment of a right-wing American third party in opposition to Karl Rove's Republicans.

Reform (like the successor parties it spawned) is proof of O'Sullivan's Law: *An organization that is not explicitly right-wing will become left-wing over time.* Reform was never right-wing, even though almost all of its MP's and early supporters were. At Preston Manning's insistence, Reform was a *populist* party. Like all populists, however, Manning had the uncanny knack of conflating his own obsessions with the popular will and then manipulating his supporters into the belief that his ideas were actually theirs. Primary among Manning's ideas was that he should be prime minister.

Manning declared that he stood outside the superannuated binary categories of "right/left" and "liberal/conservative." This was no challenge to the hegemony of Canada's liberal elite, however, to which Manning became captive. He was terrified lest Reform be "perceived" as "extremist," "racist," or "homophobic" and "moderated" his party accordingly and futilely.

Manning's unconditional surrender on immigration took place as early as 1991, when he threw William Gairdner to the wolves. Gairdner was, amazingly enough, a best-selling Canadian conservative, author of an erudite monograph called *The Trouble With Canada*. Unlike Manning, Gairdner *was* willing to challenge liberal hegemony. A popular speaker, he raised a lot of money (without fee) for the fledging Reform Party. For his pains, Gairdner was traduced as "an extreme libertarian with strong nativist sentiments" and "anti-Asian"—and banished.

The crowning irony of this squalid incident is that the hatchet job on Gairdner was published by *Alberta Report* magazine, itself traduced routinely as "extremist," "racist," "homophobic," *etc.* The hatchet was wielded by editor Ken Whyte, later the founding editor of the *National Post*.

Manning always played by elite rules. He was determined to make Reform the most politically correct party, and Canada's electoral laws made this possible. Here in Canada, just like everywhere else in the British Commonwealth, the parliamentary ideal has been turned on its head: The leader elects his caucus, his candidates, and even his membership. He is an absolute dictator.

By 1997, it had become obvious that Manning had been too cute by half. Reform suffered the consequences of being tarred as right-wing; not being right-wing, however, it could not reap the benefits. Manning had taken the party as far as he could: from zero to Official Opposition in a decade. A remarkable achievement, but Manning wasn't about to step aside voluntarily. Instead, he announced the United Alternative, Phase One of a merger with the Progressive Conservatives Reform had left moribund. This resulted in the loss of most of Reform's principles, as well as Preston Manning himself.

In 2000, the new party, the Canadian Alliance, improved on Reform's result, while the Progressive Conservatives had their worst popular vote result ever. The reaction of the Alliance, of course, was to initiate Phase Two. The terms of the merger were this: In exchange for the loss of the word *Progressive*, the new Conservative Party lost the rest of Reform's principles and committed itself to being further to the left than the Progressive Conservatives had been back when the right deserted them to start Reform in 1987.

Under leader Stephen Harper, Manning's former deputy, the Conservatives fought the 2004 election as more "pro-choice" than the Liberals. Harper refused to say whether he would support a parliamentary veto if the Supreme Court ruled that Christian churches must marry homosexuals. His slogan had seemingly been borrowed from Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis: *Just win, baby*. Harper lost, despite a Liberal Party weaker than it had been for a generation. In response, he announced a further "moderation" and purged what remained of the party's timorous "social conservatives."

The moral? Elite values determine party values, not the other way around. All the new parties in the world cannot change this truth, and, until the right internalizes it, its partisan efforts serve only to bolster its enemies. Fool me once, shame on you; fool me 17 times, shame on me—as someone once said.

Kevin Michael Grace runs the website TheAmbler.com.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Srdja Trifkovic

After Beslan: Change Course on Russia

It is hardly possible to envisage an orgy of terrorist savagery more depraved than that staged by Chechen jihadists and their foreign cohorts, who butchered, tortured, and raped hundreds of Russian children in the town of Beslan last September. The bloodbath at School No. 1 came at the end of a week in which two Russian passenger planes were blown up in mid-air and a lethal bomb exploded outside a Moscow metro station.

All of these attacks were terrorist in character and Islamic in the method of execution. And yet the reaction of the elite class in much of the Western world was steeped in visceral Russophobia. In blaming the victim, ridiculing Russia's claim to be battling the same enemy that caused September 11, and advising "dialogue" with the Chechens, opinion-makers in Europe and America have displayed a surprising identity of cultural assumptions and ideological preferences. The tone was set firmly by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, parroted by countless local Gannett clones, and replicated at both ends of Europe's political spectrum.

On the right, London's conservative *Daily Telegraph* opined that, "given the deep-seated corruption of the Russian security forces and bureaucracy, this is unlikely to be the last incident of its kind." France's Catholic *La Croix* also found the cause of Beslan in Russia's shortcomings, declaring Putin responsible "for the perpetuation of the war," the "dirtiest" since Yugoslavia. *Le Figaro* fumed at Putin's claim that Russia is a victim of the same terrorism that has hit the West, "as if the dirty war the Russian army is waging had nothing to do with the determination of terrorists." In Stockholm, *Svenska Dagbladet* condemned Russia's attempt "to disguise the war in Chechnya as one part of the war against terrorism." It would be immoral "to shut one's eyes to Russian atrocities," it said and called for "a tougher approach from the U.S. and the EU" to pressure Putin to seek a "peaceful solution." *Financial Times Deutschland* lambasted Russia's stated intention to attack terrorist bases anywhere in the world by preemptive strikes as "an attack on the sovereignty of other countries." "Even a mature democracy like the U.S. has its problems with such a war," it opined, reminding us of Abu Ghraib, and concluded that "an autocratic country like Russia" must not be allowed to embark on a similar path. *Frankfurter Allgemeine* also advocated "dialogue"—"Is every Chechen a child murderer?" it asked ironically—and blamed "Putin's policy of oppression" for the attacks.

The left, for once, abandoned its usual penchant for the pornography of compassion, since, at Beslan, the victims were real Christian Orthodox children, rather than the fictitious Muslim victims of Kosovo's "genocide" or the Bosnian "rape camps." The *Guardian* thus insisted that Russia had to "seek political dialogue that promises some slender hope beyond the bloodshed." France's *Le Monde* wondered why Western leaders "give so much support to Vladimir Putin," while *Liberation* accused him of having "excluded every option and reverted exclusively to repression . . . in the famous Russian tradition." The editor of Belgium's *Le Soir* accused Putin of acting "in a Stalinist—and therefore frightening—manner." *Die Tageszeitung* of Berlin went even further, accusing the Kremlin of "acting as a gravedigger" in the Caucasus because Putin "does not see any link between the hostage-taking in Beslan and the barbarian war Moscow has been waging in Chechnya." The paper ridiculed the Russians' claim to be "innocent victims of international terrorism."

The U.S. government added insult to injury, two days after Beslan, by expressing willingness to talk again with "moderate" Chechen separatists. "We do have a policy that says we will meet with political officials, leaders who have different points of view," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said. "Our view of some of these political figures has been different than [*sic*] the Russians," he added, but a "political solution" must be found. U.S. officials, however, "don't meet with terrorists . . . with people who are involved in violence or fomenting violence."

The second part of Boucher's statement was untrue. Numerous U.S. officials not only met with the KLA—a terrorist group *par excellence* that was "heavily involved in violence"—they also actively aided and abetted the Albanian campaign of terror in Kosovo that paved the way for Clinton's war against the Serbs in 1999.

The first part of Boucher's statement reflected the continuation of a long-standing policy that is as harmful to American interests as it is immoral and illogical. After September 11, President Bush told the countries of the world that they were either on the side of the United States or on the side of terrorists. Continuing to receive any Chechen separatists—formal denials of a "terrorist" label notwithstanding—is tantamount, in this case, to being on the wrong side.

The same mind-set appeared a week before Beslan, in the aftermath of a general election in Chechnya that was won by Alu Alkhanov, who supports his republic's autonomy within Russia. His claim that turnout was at 85 percent appeared exaggerated, but the election passed peacefully—in spite of earlier warnings by separatists that they would disrupt the proceedings—and thus represented a success for Putin's policy of "Chechenization." Some separatists predictably dismissed the election as fraudulent, but international monitors from the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe said that there was no evidence of ballot-rigging or voter intimidation.

That a jihadist-infested hot spot in a sensitive area was a step closer to a political solution should have been considered good news for America. The Bush administration was nevertheless quick to criticize the election, claiming it had "serious flaws." Mr. Boucher said that it "did not meet international standards for a democratic election," demanded more "pluralism in the political process,"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

called for "an end to human rights abuses in Chechnya," and urged that "those who committed such abuses be held accountable."

Righteous insistence that all those responsible for human-rights abuses should be held accountable sounds hollow in the aftermath of the Iraqi prison scandal. The U.S. demand for greater "pluralism in the political process" is even less convincing, since it does not apply to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's fastidious refusal to talk to the "unreformed" and "corrupt" Palestinian Authority. As for the Bush administration's concern about "serious flaws" in foreign elections and insistence on "international standards," it did not condemn the referendum in April 2002 that gave Pakistan's ruler and self-appointed president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, a five-year extension of his "mandate." If Mr. Boucher thinks that 73 percent of votes for Alkhanov was suspiciously high, it is curious that Musharraf's "victory" with over 97 percent of the vote was accepted at face value.

Musharraf was left alone because the United States still looks on him as an ally in the "War on Terror." By any token, Putin should be seen as a much more important and reliable ally in the same struggle. His constant complaint that the United States is reluctant to call Chechen terrorists by their right name ("there cannot be good and bad terrorists, our terrorists and others") needs to be addressed in the spirit of appreciation of Russia's importance to the global struggle we all face.

Putin's complaint of American hypocrisy is not new. The Clinton administration effectively supported the Chechen separatists in the late 1990's, even blocking a proposed $500-million loan guarantee from the U.S. Export-Import Bank to a Russian oil company that was going to be used to purchase American-made equipment.

The proponents of a tough line on Moscow in Washington—notably Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz—continued this policy under Bush. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Alexander Vershbow, conceded that "Osama bin Laden and other international networks have been fueling the flames in Chechnya." Only weeks later, however, the ubiquitous Mr. Boucher commented that "the lack of a political solution and . . . massive human rights violations" in Chechnya fanned terrorism.

Such rhetoric did abate temporarily toward the end of 2001, when Moscow's full cooperation was needed in getting the Central Asian republics on board for the war in Afghanistan. As soon as the first phase was over, however, the old ambiguity was back. Exactly four months after September 11, Mr. Boucher accused the Russian forces in Chechnya of "disproportionate use of force against civilian facilities" and "further human rights violations." To the Russians' dismay, State Department officials received Ilyas Akhmadov, a self-styled foreign minister in Chechnya's separatist leadership.

Terrorist attacks in the United States stopped after September 11, but, in Russia, they have continued at a steady pace over the years. In May 2002, a bomb blast killed at least 41 people, including 17 children, in the southwestern town of Kaspiisk near the Chechen border. In October 2002, over 700 hostages were seized by Chechen attackers in a Moscow theater, and 120 died in the rescue operation. In December 2002, a dual suicide-bombing attack on the government building in the Chechen capital, Grozny, killed 83 people. On May 14, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell's trip to Moscow was accompanied by a suicide bombing in Grozny that killed 20 people, only days after a similar attack killed 59. The parallel with three suicide bombings in Riyadh (May 12) that killed 29 people, including seven Americans, was obvious. Only weeks later, on August 1, 2003, a hospital in the city of Mozdok was destroyed in a suicide attack, killing 42 people.

The willingness of the Bush administration to offer refuge to top Chechen leaders accused of masterminding terrorist attacks—most recently last August, when the United States granted asylum to the aforementioned Mr. Akhmadov—is incomprehensible. Such people are a danger to the national security of the United States. Under them and their ilk, gangsterism and radical Islam went arm-in-arm in Chechnya, just as they did in Bosnia and Kosovo. While they were in power, following Russian withdrawal in 1996, hundreds of Westerners and Russians—including women and children—had been taken hostage. Ransom was extracted through the use of videos that record torture and dismemberment. The Chechen leaders, like their Balkan counterparts, enjoyed the support of Islamic militants from abroad, including Osama bin Laden's network.

The harmful ambiguity of U.S. policy on Chechnya needs to be ended immediately. It compromises the War on Terror, jeopardizes U.S. national security, and gains nothing.

The amazingly hostile reactions to Russia after Beslan by the Western elite class are not necessarily rooted in prejudice, however. Their vehemence hints that the cause is not in a misunderstanding of the Eastern European tradition but in the elite class's accurate assessment that that tradition is an obstacle to the realization of their political, economic, and cultural preferences in the modern world.

As the shadow of global *jihad* grows darker, the Bouchers, assorted editorialists, and talking heads of the Western world are following in the footsteps of their ancestors that are exactly 800 years old: the sack of Constantinople during the infamous Fourth Crusade. The Franks did not understand, or care, that New Rome was the guardian and protector of the West against the same enemy we face today. Their treachery opened the way for the jihadist onslaught against Europe that did not stop until it reached Vienna in 1683. Replicating the same folly with Russia today brings to mind Talleyrand's comment on Napoleon's execution of the Duc d'Enghien: "It is worse than a crime; it is a mistake." c

Beslan: The Rest of the Story

"Who can imagine an orgy of terrorist savagery more depraved than that staged by some thirty Chechens and their foreign cohorts at the school in Beslan last September? The reaction by our elite class betrays complete misunderstanding of Chechen problem. In blaming the victim, ridiculing Russia's claim to be battling the same enemy that caused 9-11, and advising 'dialogue' with the Chechens, our opinion creators display a harmful ambiguity that compromises the 'war on terror,' jeopardizes American national security, and gains nothing—not even brownie points for the U.S. in the eyes of the Muslim world."

For an eye-opening report on the scope and nature of Chechen terrorism, send $10.00 to

The Rockford Institute's Center For International Affairs
928 North Main Street
Rockford, IL 61103

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ECONOMICS

Can We Trust Economists on Free Trade?

by Ian Fletcher

"Oh, yes, I know, we have recently been told by no less than 365 academic economists that such a thing cannot be . . . Their confidence in the accuracy of their own predictions leaves me breathless. But having been brought up over the shop, I sometimes wonder whether they pay back their forecasts with their money."
—Margaret Thatcher, 1979

As our $500-billion-per-year trade deficit, with its attendant job destruction and long-term damage to our industrial base, continues to spiral out of control, the public may be forgiven for wondering whether there might be problems with the free-trade theories that have gotten us into this mess. And this inescapably raises the question of whether American economists have been doing their jobs, since, as a recent study revealed, 97 percent of them support free trade.

Economics enjoys the highest prestige of any social science (when was the last time a president begged a sociologist for advice or the king of Sweden congratulated a demographer?), and the public believes economists to be trustworthy. We have seen before, however, that the experts can be wrong and, indeed, have a uniquely destructive arrogance when they are.

The public is unaware of the degree to which free trade is a theory full of holes but varnished with a façade of certainty for ulterior reasons. People imagine that the nice Ph.D. technocrats who are the guardians of economic orthodoxy wouldn't get such a thing wrong.

So how can an entire respectable academic discipline be wrong about so fundamental a question?

To some extent, it isn't, but economists who know better allow lies about the disciplinary consensus to be foisted on the public. Economists know a lot more about the problems with free trade than one might suppose from reading their colleagues who speak to the public in the business press and elsewhere. However, they let these shills determine what the public, and the political class, thinks the discipline has discovered.

Worse, they often note these problems and go on believing in free trade anyway, for various reasons. The good news here, of course, is that there is a voluminous and reputable literature on the shortcomings of free trade just waiting to be pushed into the public debate.

So why do economists remain silent? First, many believe that, whatever free trade's problems, the alternative would be a mess because of politics; thus, we are better off accepting the problems. Mentioning the problems might provoke the public into doing something stupid.

For example, it might demand a 30-percent tariff on steel to save declining Rust Belt jobs at a cost of $300,000 apiece and give no thought to the cost of making American car manufacturers pay nearly a third more for steel than their foreign competitors do. Then every other industry would want in, and, before you know it, we would have an industrial policy set by congressional log-rolling: a mess based on political pull without a rational economic basis.

Obviously, this is not a wholly baseless fear. It is not an economic argument at all, however: It is a political argument within public-choice theory. It may be true, but economists do not have any special scientific expertise to pontificate on politics. They especially do not have the right to cover up what they know for political reasons. The public has the right to hear both sides and to make its own decision.

This fear may also be false: Our political system is sometimes corrupt and stupid, but also sometimes effective. Although controversial, there is good evidence that some foreign nations, principally in the Far East, have successfully used tariffs and non-tariff barriers to enhance their economic development and protect against the mercantilism of other nations. Japan certainly did not become the second-richest nation in the world practicing free trade.

Many economists who know free-trade theories have serious problems are enervated by ivory-tower indifference to the real world. They are not given tenure for picking fights with *BusinessWeek*. Their careers are determined by their ability to impress other academic economists. Those who are interested in playing a role on the public stage quickly learn on which side of the trade debate the rewards lie.

Nevertheless, they should, as scholars, see that the intellectual authority of their discipline is not hijacked to serve selfish agendas.

To be fair, most actual economists—as opposed to pundits, politicians, lobbyists, and ideologues—will privately talk about flaws in free trade, if you approach them in a way that makes clear that you know that such flaws exist.

What economists say to the public is often very different from what they say to one another. Paul Krugman, for example, who writes a witless column in the *New York Times*, has done superb academic work critiquing free trade.

Because the academically rigorous critique of free trade—as opposed to interest-group protests and fine but nontheoretical polemics such as Pat Buchanan's and Ross Perot's—is relatively young, it has not yet had time to inform the consensus of the economics profession as a whole.

This consensus tends to lag behind the work of individual economists and such subspecialties as trade economics. Because it takes years to gather the data and think through the objections needed to resolve controversial questions, 20 years can pass before an insight becomes the general consensus. Thus, actual trade economists are often less dogmatic on free trade than their brethren in other subspecialties, who cling to what they remember from their grad-student days.

Right now, the consensus of the profession is derived from work that reached acceptance in the 1980's—the heyday of Milton Friedman and the free-marketers who did brilliant work debunking the Keynesian interventionist consensus under which they grew up. And this consensus, which was dogma in the 1950's and 60's until it died under the stagflation of the 70's, was itself the product of the Great Depression of the 1930's, which overturned an economic ortho-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doxy founded on the (domestic) *laissez-faire* world of 1900.

This chronology is symptomatic of a deeper problem. Economists, despite their pretensions to objective social science, are suspiciously reliable sock puppets of the political *status quo*. In 1900, when the American political consensus was protectionist, the economics profession was protectionist. In 1960, when our political consensus was Keynesian, the profession was Keynesian.

Neither idea, in its orthodox form, is taken seriously by significant numbers of economists today. This is, frankly, quite a record of failure, given how loudly they insisted at the time that they were right. Economists deserve to be taken seriously, but the public should get over its deference to them as if they possessed some perfect and reliable knowledge beyond the criticism that citizens of a republic rightly apply to ideas that determine how they are governed.

Another concern is that economic theorists keep saying things that practitioners who have to deal with actual economic facts—executives, investors, trade negotiators—cannot take seriously without risking bankruptcy. Even economists employed by business schools are notorious for being out of sync with the rest of the profession. If engineers and physicists did not see eye to eye, might we not wonder about physics?

Some economists are simply paid shills of one variety or another. This is more true the more the theory in question concerns policy questions where somebody will make big money if Congress or regulatory agencies can be persuaded of certain things.

Economic consulting firms such as Global Insight, MiCRA, and Strategic Policy Research basically retail the service of providing whatever conclusions are desired. (Call them up and pretend to be a potential client. After some boilerplate about integrity, you get to negotiate what the study should conclude and how.)

Some economists are hired guns not of ordinary corporate interests seeking money but of political interests who want globalism for more sinister reasons and see free trade as a way to get it. A one-world economy may not directly imply one-world government, but it is a step in the right direction.

Economics has a certain number of true believers for whom the infallibility of free markets is a "beautiful idea" like Marxism used to be. These faithful will warp any facts to vindicate their dream.

Then there are people who are not economists at all but libertarians or Ayn Rand cultists who try to pass off mere ideology as if it were economics. They may object that restrictions on trade are a violation of economic freedom—they are—but this is not economic analysis at all: It is a political value-judgment.

The fact that economics aspires to be a mathematically rigorous science creates a bias in favor of free trade because it creates a bias in favor of nice, conceptually clean arguments and equations. The case *against* free trade largely consists in the observation that, in the real world, empirical facts do not correspond perfectly with the simplified abstractions that purport to describe them. Free-trade math is pretty; trade-realist math is ugly.

Take, for example, the theory of comparative advantage, the very core of free-trade theory. Realistic analysis of how nations acquire their comparative economic advantages reveals that these are mainly the product of accidents of economic history, not of nature. Ralph Gomory and William Baumol, in their new book *Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests*, mathematize this insight. The elegant graphs we all remember from Economics 101 dissolve into fields of dots, and the curves that used to intersect reliably at the point of free trade no longer unequivocally support this policy as optimal. Uglier, but closer to the facts on the ground in Silicon Valley and Bangalore.

Economics as a discipline has a bias toward free-market solutions such as free trade for the same reason biologists have a bias toward evolution: It is the theory that best exalts the status of their profession. If free-market solutions are always right, economists are the final arbiters of what is serious policy and can intellectually trump anyone else who wants to "interfere" with markets for political, moral, or other reasons. They can sniff "futile" at anyone's pretences to produce better outcomes than what they have to offer. If free markets are not always right, however, this is not so.

And please do not be intimidated by economists' equations, which dazzle with their seeming objectivity. The problem is not that the actual math is wrong but that mathematical economics depends on simplifying assumptions that are themselves not mathematical. These mathematical ice castles rest on swamps.

Take, for example, the blithe assumption that people have benign time preferences—*i.e.*, that they do not want a short-term consumption binge at the cost of later indebtedness. If they want this under free-trade conditions, it can cause them to sell their country into debt for cheap imports.

By themselves, none of these points proves that free trade is bad; other arguments are needed to do that. They do, however, show that economists are capable of being wrong and that members of the public who are prepared to use intellectually legitimate arguments have a right to question them. The stakes are too high not to.

Ian Fletcher is the vice president for government relations of the American Engineering Association.

DEMOCRACY

Democracy and God

by Thomas Storck

Since at least the 1960's, federal judges in the United States have overturned a number of state and federal laws dealing, broadly speaking, with marriage, sexuality, and the family—most notoriously in the 1973 *Roe* v. *Wade* decision on abortion. And numerous commentators have pointed out the constitutional absurdity of these decisions, based on no clear text of the written Constitution but on "penumbras, formed by emanations from [the Bill of Rights]," as Justice William Douglas called them in the 1965 *Griswold* opinion invalidating Connecticut's anticontraception statute. Of course, the reason those opposed to such remnants of Christian morality have resorted to the judiciary in order to gain their ends is that rarely, if ever, would they be able to get their measures enacted by an honest appeal to voters. The current debate on same-sex "marriage" is another case in point. Neither in Hawaii nor in Massachusetts—two very liberal states—would a majority of voters ever approve same-sex "marriage" in the foreseeable future. So what we have in such cases are nothing but examples of "raw judicial power," as Justice Byron White termed it in his dissent in *Roe* v. *Wade*.

Unfortunately, however, many of these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

critics and commentators who quite rightly point up these instances of judicial usurpation do not understand the issue completely. For while complaining of the tyranny of unelected judges, they seem to think that, if only such measures were enacted by elected legislators, there would be nothing much to complain about. Sen. Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, for example, in a graduation address that he gave at Christendom College in 2003, said that,

> While much of our culture is removing moral guideposts, so too is the government. With this I have no dispute. We are a representative democracy and eventually the collective conscience of the popular culture is going to be reflective [*sic*] in our laws. My concern is the usurpation . . . by the United States Supreme Court, of the people's rights, through their elected representatives, to decide these crucial moral issues and the resulting dulling of our collective consciousness and that this vital debate of who we are and what we're about is being moved from the living rooms of America to the court room.

Similar were the remarks of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissent in the 2003 case of *Lawrence* v. *Texas*, which invalidated Texas's anti-sodomy statute.

> Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals . . . promoting their agenda through normal democratic means. Social perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is the best. That homosexuals have achieved some success in that enterprise is attested to by the fact that Texas is one of the few remaining States that criminalize private, consensual homosexual acts. But persuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one's views in absence of democratic majority will is something else.

Now, what is wrong with what Senator Santorum and Justice Scalia say here? Do not the people indeed have the right to determine such matters? If not the people, then who? Contrary to what Senator Santorum or Justice Scalia think, however, the people have no more right—either directly or through their elected representatives—to allow abortion or same-sex "marriage" or other such evils than unelected judges do. There simply is no such right, because whatever authority a government exercises comes not from the people but from God, and God does not give governments authority to enact such legislation.

Our Declaration of Independence says that "governments are instituted among men" and that they derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed." This does not exactly accord with the traditional Christian view. St. Paul said that "there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God" (Romans 13:1). There is nothing wrong with the people choosing their rulers or their form of government. But a ruler, even if designated by the people, receives his authority ultimately from God. A man and a woman can freely choose each other in marriage, but the authority and duties of the husband and wife come not from their mutual agreement but from the divinely instituted order of the family. The couple has liberty only as to whether and whom they will marry. The essential order of marriage is from God. It is similar in the political realm. Rulers, however chosen, cannot lawfully enact anything contrary to the law of God. Whether the rulers are kings, an aristocracy, or a popularly elected legislature makes no difference. They govern as administrators of God and by His authority.

One of the wisest political writers of modern times, Gioacchino Pecci (1810-1903), better known as Pope Leo XIII, discussed these points exhaustively in a series of encyclicals beginning in 1885 with *Immortale dei*. In his 1888 encyclical *Libertas*, he speaks of those

> who affirm that the morality of individuals is to be guided by the divine law, but not the morality of the State, so that in public affairs the commands of God may be passed over, and may be entirely disregarded in the framing of laws.

He says of this position that its "absurdity . . . is manifest." And Pope Leo here is simply repeating what is part of the entire tradition of Christian wisdom. Of course, this does not mean that a government is obliged to forbid by its laws every sin, for the tradition is equally clear that political prudence allows many acts that God will punish to remain unpunished by human law. Thus, according to Saint Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I-II:96:2), "by human law not all the vices are prohibited from which virtuous men abstain, but only the more serious, from which it is possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain." This conception of law, then, does not point toward a tyranny but simply toward a subjection of human law, however enacted, to the law and sovereign authority of God.

Democracy is a perfectly legitimate form of government and can, at times, be the best form. The democratic ideology that insists that the people have an inherent right to rule themselves, and thus are answerable to no higher authority, however, must be rejected. In truth, the choice of democracy, or of any of the other just forms of rule that the ancients enumerated (monarchy, aristocracy, or a mixed regime), depends on political prudence, historical traditions, and accidental circumstances. As long as the rulers seek to promote the common good, the type of regime that we have matters less than most people think. Better a monarchy, for example, that governs with a genuine view toward promoting the common good than a faction-ridden democracy that has been hijacked by special interests.

In thinking about issues such as abortion, then, let us not be misled into supposing that the only problem is that our judges rather than our legislators have imposed the practice on us. For the latter have no more right to do so than the former. I am not sanguine about this point of view becoming widespread in the near future. Still, however difficult it would be to convince the majority of our fellow citizens of its truth, it is the correct view.

Any attempt at political wisdom that ignores this point is simply avoiding facing the most important political question of all.

Thomas Storck's latest book is Christendom and the West: Essays on Culture, Society and History. *He is a contributing editor of the* New Oxford Review *and a member of the editorial board of the* Chesterton Review.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by George McCartney

Dim Young Things



Bright Young Things

Produced by Doubting Hall Limited
Written and directed by Stephen Fry
from Evelyn Waugh's novel Vile Bodies
Distributed by Icon Film Distribution and Think Film, Inc.

Stephen Fry's *Bright Young Things* is a vibrant, hectic, but finally disappointing adaptation of Evelyn Waugh's second novel, *Vile Bodies* (1930). Although Fry has assembled an extremely talented and willing cast and has directed with energy and obvious admiration for Waugh, he fails on two counts: theme and style.

Fry seems to misunderstand, perhaps willfully, Waugh's satiric purpose. This is signaled by the title change. He has chosen to rename the narrative with Waugh's mocking sobriquet for the privileged, well-educated, and fatally frivolous young people who populate his elegantly dizzy novel. The new title suggests a gossipy story of foolish, misspent youth. Waugh certainly had this in mind, but he was also after something considerably deeper, darker, and, paradoxically, more hopeful. He took his title from St. Paul's Letter to the Philippians, which chastises those "whose end is destruction," whose "god is their belly, and whose glory is in their shame, who mind earthly things" and then directs us to "look to the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall change our vile body that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself."

Waugh began the novel as a wobbly atheist and ended it at the church door of his conversion to Roman Catholicism. In between, he suffered the soul-bruising betrayal of his first wife, who had been unfaithful within months of their wedding. Accordingly, just beneath its dazzlingly brittle surface, his narrative is suffused with inconsolable pain and metaphysical longing. This is reflected, however dimly, in what passes for a philosophical conversation between the feckless protagonist, Adam Fenwick-Symes, and his fiancé, Nina Blount.

> "Nina, do you ever feel that things simply can't go on much longer?"
>
> "What d'you mean by things—us or everything?"
>
> "Everything."
>
> "No—I wish I did."
>
> "I dare say you're right. . . . I'd give anything in the world for something different. . . ."
>
> "Different from me or different from everything?"
>
> "Different from everything . . . only I've got nothing . . . what's the good of talking?"

As the everythings and anythings pile up in this inarticulate *cri de coeur*, we come very close to Waugh's own distress.

Vile Bodies is an entertainment, but it is one that means to expose the absurdity, futility, and shame of living in a godless world. Fry blithely ignores this. Take, for instance, his alteration of Adam's first appearance. In the novel, Adam is coming back from France where, presumptuously enough, he's been writing a memoir of his 24-year-old life. Examining his luggage at customs, an overly zealous inspector confiscates his manuscript and his copy of Dante's *Purgatorio*, deeming both pornographic. "I knows dirt when I sees it or shouldn't be where I am today," he darkly informs the nonplussed Adam. Thus stripped of both his personal and cultural history, Adam enters England a cipher wholly unprepared to meet the challenges of the ruthlessly secular culture that awaits him. In adapting this scene, Fry tellingly leaves out the Dante. He conveys part of the joke but overlooks its fuller implications. He also skimps on Father Rothschild, the enigmatic Jesuit who serves as the novel's ironic Cassandra. It is Rothschild who tries to inform the older generation that the younger are infected with "a radical instability" and suffer from "an almost fatal hunger for permanence." Jewish by name, Catholic by faith, and capitalist by family, Rothschild is fluent in all the languages of the West, ancient and modern. As such, he is ideally equipped to diagnose the ills of modernity. Of course, no one heeds him.

For someone who clearly loves Waugh, Fry curiously misreads him. His handling of Imogen Quest, Waugh's pivotal fiction within a fiction, is another striking instance. Imogen is Adam's creation. Having by ill chance been made a gossip columnist for the *Daily Excess*, he finds he cannot fill his daily column with nearly enough scandal, so—as most such journalists do—he resorts to invention. His most successful creature is Imogen, "the most lovely and popular of the younger married set." His readers cannot get enough of her comings and goings. Many even claim to be within her closest circle of friends. Then Adam reports that she is giving a party and foolishly includes an actual address. Frenzied gate-crashers rush there by the dozens, outraged to discover an untenanted building. Why does all London find Imogen so compelling? The answer is obvious. In a society so divided between willful, snotty youth and their blinkered, tradition-smothered parents, Imogen appears to be superbly normal. "Her character was a lovely harmony of contending virtues—she was witty and tender hearted; passionate and serene, sensual and temperate, impulsive and discreet." In other words, although fictional, she has more three-dimensional, human substance than the freakish moderns who inhabit Waugh's cartoon world. Fry evidently does not feel the nostalgic tug Imogen exerts on Waugh's lost souls. He has chosen to convert her into a lesbian whose escapades—especially the orgies she throws for the most daring gals in the fast set—titillate Adam's readers. Having passed through a same-sex phase at Oxford before marrying and fathering six children, Waugh enjoyed gently teasing homosexuals, but this is not his Imogen's role. He means her to be a far more interesting joke. In an abnormal society, Imogen's normalcy is exotically tantalizing. By ignoring Waugh's metaphysical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and moral concerns, Fry has betrayed his intentions.

On the matter of style, Fry has run up against the same paradox as other film adapters in trying to bring Waugh to the screen. Without exception, their movies have been much less cinematic than Waugh's texts. Throughout his career, Waugh turned to film for inspiration. In 1929, he declared the medium to be "the one vital art of the century," teaching novelists "a new habit of narrative." This, however, would probably be "the only contribution the cinema [was] destined to make to the arts." He held little hope that commercial films would ever produce anything genuinely significant. Still, the medium's formal qualities continued to intrigue him throughout his career.

In his correspondence, we find him urging would-be writers to "risk the headache" and go to the movies. "The inestimable value of the Cinema to novelists," he explained, is that it teaches how to "bring home thoughts by actions and incidents" rather than making "everything said." As late as 1956, he advised a struggling biographer to approach his subject cinematically. "Instead of seeing [the subject's life] as an historical document, imagine yourself watching a film—each incident as precise and authentic as in [your] present version, but with *continuity* in the technical cinematographical sense . . . and then write as though describing the experience."

Waugh's early novels give ample evidence that he took his own advice. His first published fiction was a short story, "The Balance" (1926), arranged on the page as if it were a silent film, complete with narrative directions and dialogue captions. The scenes of his early novels develop in a rapid, contrapuntal montage, giving them the vertiginous headlong momentum that became his signature. At the same time, his narratives are surprisingly spare of visual description. We rarely learn anything about the appearance of his principal figures. In *Vile Bodies*, we are told that Adam "looked just like young men like him do look," and nothing more. While he occasionally described architecture and landscaping in elegantly visual prose, he left his characters remarkably abstract, suggesting that their lives were much less important than the civilization that housed them. For Waugh, film was not a visual but a structural inspiration.

The films Waugh was thinking of when he was composing his narratives were black-and-white and silent. It was precisely the unreality of these films that he found so congenial. With few exceptions, he wrote about people and events he knew firsthand, but he transfigured his experiences into a stylized two-dimensional world in which seemingly intelligent, alert, well-educated people behave with cartoon-like abandon. Almost any absurdity is not merely possible but quite probable. A drunken major offers to place a bet for Adam on a 35-to-1 racehorse. Although he has never met the man before, Adam forks over £1,000 as if it were no more than a couple of dollars, instead of the $220,000 or more it would be worth in today's currency. Later, we are amused but not unduly surprised by the antics of the lady evangelist Mrs. Melrose Ape, Waugh's parody of Aimee Semple McPherson. With her handpicked choir of nubile angels, she delights London's fashionable set with a rendition of her famous hymn, "There Ain't No Flies on the Lamb of God." We readily accept such lunacies in Waugh's absurd stick-figure world. On the page, these scenes may be startling, but they are also somehow satisfyingly inevitable. We understand that we are dealing with a caricature of our world. Its grotesque distortions are meant to shock us into seeing the daily excesses we would otherwise overlook in our "ordinary" experience. In Fry's film, with its period-perfect sets and highly accomplished actors, however, such goings-on seem jarringly unreal. You cannot keep from asking yourself why these sensible-looking people are behaving so inanely. The apparent reality of the setting and action distracts from Waugh's satiric point.

Waugh found film to be a perfect metaphor of his times. The medium's suspension of the usual limits of space and time, its ability to cut instantaneously from one scene to another, its uncanny way of magnifying the most stray of incidental details—all of this gave him the satiric shorthand he needed to portray an eccentric world hurtling pointlessly into a hopeless future. It would require a far more stylized film production than Fry's to do justice to this vision, and one that exhibited some sympathy for Waugh's religious convictions as well.

For all this, Fry's film is nevertheless worth seeing. Although his players have been directed to act in much too realistic a manner, they now and again contrive to register the antic charm of Waugh's figures. Stephen Campbell Moore gives Adam a wonderfully slack-jawed fecklessness. As Nina, Emily Mortimer is beautiful and suitably mindless. Jim Broadbent brings the proper alcoholic self-assurance to the Drunken Major. Peter O'Toole has been given only a scant three or four minutes on-screen, but his growling Colonel Blount, Nina's ever-forgetful papa, will make you permanently shy of senile aristocrats.

Fenella Woolgar as Agatha Runcible, the ditsiest of the ditsy Bright Young Things, comes closest to Waugh's conception. With her long, beak-nosed English face, she stares out at the world from two round and fanatical blue eyes ever ready to be dazzled by the next foolishness on her madly delectable menu. Hungover though she may be after an all-night frolic, Miss Woolgar knows just how to come down to breakfast in a grass skirt at No. 10 Downing Street, where she has been decidedly uninvited by an outraged prime minister and his fuming wife. And no one could take a sports car's wheel with such magisterial aplomb in a race to oblivion. Miss Woolgar makes a glorious loon with whom Waugh would be well pleased. C

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Chilton Williamson, Jr.

The Deserts of Nations

In "A Mirror for Artists"—his contribution to Agrarianism's classic manifesto, *I'll Take My Stand*, published in 1930—Donald Davidson attacked what he called "the industrial theory of the arts." According to this Maecenas concept, industrialism can be counted on to create an artistic renaissance in which not the wealthy classes only but the plain people will share. Davidson thought otherwise. "Industrialism cannot play the role of Maecenas, because its complete ascendancy will mean that there will be no arts left to foster; or, if they flourish at all, they will flourish only in a diseased and disordered condition."

I am reminded of Mr. Davidson's skepticism roughly once a week, while listening to National Public Radio's *Performance Today*: sponsored, in part, by the National Endowment for the Arts, whose slogan is "A Great Nation Deserves Great Art." Obvious corollaries to this axiom are that a woman of great beauty deserves great wealth to boot and that Lynne Cheney, as director of the National Endowment for the Humanities, deserved a great intellect. I doubt, however, that Donald Davidson would have agreed with these propositions, which would be ridiculed out of hand by any competent moral philosopher. Nations, to a greater extent still than individuals, generally deserve exactly what they have, no more and no less—even when democratic sentiment and demagogic politicians assure them otherwise.

Jefferson was confident that public schooling would produce universal literacy, which, in turn, would promote popular enlightenment; John Adams wrote that he devoted his life to public affairs so that his sons might study history and philosophy, and his grandsons dedicate themselves to the arts. But Jefferson's idea of a great nation was the polar opposite of Hamilton's (or David Brooks'), while his expectations for the success of the public-school system were something short of those entertained by a modern philanthropic behemoth. More importantly, to their more sober and realistic minds, the development of American high culture either preceded national greatness or developed as a concomitant of it. Kenneth Minogue argues that political policy devised to attain the conditions of freedom will end, more likely than not, by destroying free behavior and that the quest for political freedom is necessarily the pursuit of something else. The same is true of anything worth having, including art, of the "great" as well as the not-so-great variety.

Freedom, art, national greatness—these things cannot be created by research and development programs, subsidized by rich foundations, underwritten by federal tax breaks, and promoted by educational programs. They are natural growths occurring organically, not artificial creations imagined as a people's just deserts waiting to be supplied by superjobbers from the private and public spheres. In respect of the arts, the most that philanthropic organizations can hope to accomplish is to preserve and transmit fragments of the dead civilization that the parents and grandparents of their founders helped to destroy. It is meaningless to say that a great nation deserves great art, if only for the reason that the formula is tautological: Lacking a distinguished artistic tradition, a nation cannot be said to be "great" at all. You will never hear a Frenchman say that France, as a great nation, deserves great art, because he understands that his country is both great in its artistic past and artistic in its national greatness. France, in other words, remains a civilization—as the United States was once (however modestly by comparison), before she chose to sacrifice that achievement on the altar of economic success and military power.

The fatuity of the NEA's assertion exemplifies the truth of Davidson's argument and indicates the magnitude of the problem confronting the arts in modern times. Industrial society, being what it is, supposes that industry and commerce can support and encourage art without industrializing it. (Or, perhaps, it assumes that the industrialization of *anything* is an improvement over the same thing in its preindustrialized form.) Its intellectual confusion is the result of industrialism's inability to understand the concept of reason in making (Aquinas's definition of art) that is so at odds with its own shibboleth, which is making for a reason. Donald Davidson knew better:

> For [the arts] have been produced in societies which were for the most part stable, religious, and agrarian; where the goodness of life was measured by a scale of values having little to do with the material values of industrialism; where men were never too far from nature to forget that the chief subject of art, in the final sense, is nature.

The Industrial School of fiction popular around the turn of the last century (Zola, Dreiser, Upton Sinclair, Frank Norris) is an example of how artistic talent may be narrowed and impoverished by the constrictive industrial milieu, when it accepts the industrial world for the world itself. At the opposite end of the creative process, the iron logic, irreversible direction, and irresistible momentum of industrialism are all apparent in the publishing industry today, the former swarm of distinguished small imprints having been consolidated and cartelized into a handful of so-called "major" publishers, themselves owned by corporate giants whose chief business is manufacturing toothpaste and producing gas and oil. The rationale given for consolidation was that bigger publishers meant more money to publish more good books, as well as bigger advances and other emoluments for their authors. Instead (it would have come as no surprise to either Davidson or Maecenas), consolidation has resulted in the commercialization of a once gentlemanly industry, including the ruthless imposition of the rule of the bottom line, the trashing of American letters, and the exponential expansion of a beggarly literary class unable to get its best work (or any work at all) into print by the "major"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

publishers. The condition of the national letters these days appears nearly hopeless. Whether it is or is not, the situation is not one that the NEA is in a position to alleviate or cure, even if it showed any sign of wanting to try (which, so far as I know, it does not).

In the end, the focus of industrialism and the values that determine that focus ensure disaster for the arts in industrial society, even more than its logic does. Industrialism has no use for what T.S. Eliot called the permanent things, since the permanent things are not susceptible to industrialization: Insofar as they can be "produced" at all, they cannot be mass-produced and mass-marketed (though they *can* be exploited in the marketing of the productible, impermanent things). Nor can what is permanent be rendered obsolete and made replaceable, at a profit. It is true, industrialism does its best to make Truth obsolete by offering all sorts of heresies, diversions, and baubles in its place: inventing and reinventing religions, churches, philosophies, "values"—even human nature itself. But industrialism, though enjoying the gift of seemingly endless production, lacks the God-given gift of creation. Thus it can fill the world with artifacts, but not with creatures and the life-given and life-giving creations creatures depend on. (If ever it should succeed in creating "creatures" of its own, they will be mere artifacts, too, of course.) Industrialism, then, produces a world that is ever more artificial and less natural, more passing and less permanent, like the values and ideas its activity expresses, and upon which it depends. And to the extent that the world becomes increasingly artificial, the people who inhabit that world grow increasingly inhuman—which is to say, unreal.

How can the artist succeed in making art from an artificial wasteland populated by a mass of industrialized humanoids? Eliot identified the dilemma poetically in 1922; Donald Davidson posed it in a political and cultural manifesto less than a decade later. Eliot's speculative treatment of the problem was theoretical, philosophical, poetical; Davidson's statement practical, realistic, and thoroughly down-to-earth. What he was pointing to is only the fundamental question concerning artistic enterprise in the 20th and 21st centuries: How does the artist approach reality by the venue of the unreal? How does art—whose final subject is nature, remember—survive its replacement by the artificial environment (the sprawling suburbs and mechanized supermetropolises) that industrialism has substituted for the natural—that is to say, the human—one? How does New Jersey, Houston, or Los Angeles provide artists with the intuition of the permanent things and their objectification—both of which are necessary to the creation of anything beyond a pale imitation, or grotesque travesty, of a genuine work of art? The problem is intensively reinforced by the mass industrialization of education, communication, culture, and, increasingly, political discourse. It begins to seem almost assured, as Davidson expected, that the arts, in the sense of a connected and recognized institution, cannot in the long run survive the industrial system—and now the postindustrial one, which looks more inimical still to their future.

The denatured postindustrial wasteland, hardwired to the empty chaos of cyberspace, cannot provide the kinds, or the variety, of intense human experience that have historically provided the arts with their inspiration, subject, and object. That, really, is the crux of the matter. It was said of Christopher Wren, "If you seek his monument, look around you." So it is with the arts in a postindustrial world—only these monuments are not living stones, but monuments of a different sort: They are tombstones, in fact. Novels, poems, plays; paintings, sculpture, architecture; operas, symphonies, chamber music: They are, most of them, dead—the creations of dead people deprived of the naturally grounded lives human nature requires and art demands. We know the answer to the question, What good can come out of Nazareth? Yet there is something almost infinitely less than Nazareth here. It is called New Canaan, or Terre Haute, or Tempe, Arizona. Perhaps the best writer to have come out of suburbia is John Updike—a talent of Shakespearean breadth and depth by comparison with subsequent generations of American novelists. Industrial civilization, ultimately, gives artists nothing to work with, nothing to get their hands on or their minds into. Art is rooted in reality. When industrialism removes nature from experience, denies the permanence of metaphysical truth, and transforms human multiplicity into a social uniformity imposed by the logic of democratic consumerism, art, in the true sense, becomes an impossibility in a new and unreal world, pioneered and realized most fully by America.

In order for us to love our country, said Burke, our country must be lovely. What goes for patriotism goes for art as well. Before the industrial era, artists did not take for their subjects the ugly, the perverted, the demented, the chaotic: That phenomenon was reserved for the industrialized modern age. Art arranges, rearranges, and heightens reality as the artist perceives and experiences it. For art to reflect loveliness, there must be loveliness for it to reflect—as an influence, as a model, and as a grateful response. Given a nation that is truly lovely, she will see herself reflected naturally and abundantly, without the aid of a national endowment. And alternatively, writers, composers, painters, and sculptors raised in a wasteland of shopping malls, commercial strips, industrial parks, blighted farmland, and plastic suburbs will reflect not just the unloveliness surrounding them, but—since aesthetics is a branch of moral philosophy, as Burke understood—the encompassing moral sink as well.

> "A great nation deserves a great cuisine."
> "A great nation deserves great style."
> "A great nation deserves great learning."
> "A great nation deserves great piety."
> "A great nation deserves great politicians."
> "A great nation deserves a great war."

Perhaps national greatness resembles personal greatness in being a quantity, like freedom, that should not be sought consciously and for itself, and cannot be attained that way. Perhaps, also, the NEA's motto is in need of modification. Or perhaps it should be scrapped altogether. Whether the great society is properly accompanied by great art depends on your notion of greatness, after all. And of art. The important thing to understand is that deserts have nothing to do with it, anymore than the physique of Arnold Schwarzenegger deserves the genius of Mozart or Cervantes. ◈

MOVING?

Send change of address and the mailing label from your latest issue to:

CHRONICLES

Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 800, Mount Morris, IL 61054

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ROCKFORD INSTITUTE

928 North Main Street
Rockford, Illinois 61103

Introducing . . .

THE ROCKFORD INSTITUTE ACADEMY'S
Latin 1 distance-learning course.

Learn Latin using the same method used by St. Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Jefferson. A live classroom experience in the comfort of your own home. Learn at your own pace.

The first semester comprises 20 lectures on audiocassette, with an accompanying study guide and test materials.

The text is Jenny's *First Year Latin*.
The Rockford Institute will be happy to help you locate a copy.

Order the first semester now for only $175.00.

The course is taught by Dr. Thomas Fleming, who holds a Ph.D. in classics from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and has over 25 years experience teaching Latin.

For more information, please call Jan Kooistra at (815) 964-5811 or e-mail info@rockfordinstitute.org.

Black Sea Sketches

BLACK SEA SKETCHES is a travel book written for serious travelers, including armchair travelers. Although the author may take an occasional swim or walk the beaches, the book is much more about the history and prehistory, the culture and the contemporary scene than about recreational opportunities. It is the kind of book you would want to read before or during your own travel in these fascinating countries.

The five countries—Ukraine, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Georgia—often share military and economic history, but cultural contrasts abound: different alphabets and languages, different religions. While most of Ukraine, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Georgia embrace the Orthodox faith, Turkey is largely Muslim, as is part of the Crimean population. All five of the countries reflect, especially architecturally, the common past of ancient Greece and, most of them, of the later Genoan commercial empire.

Rising above the glittering monuments of the past, however, are the people Mills met and the stories of their lives, often of great courage under pressure and of generosity to a stranger and a traveler.

Comments about other works of William Mills

"William Mills' stories draw the reader deeply into the hearts and minds of men and women to reveal the essential nature of Man in a world governed by forces so primal there is no resisting their call, no mitigation of their judgment."

—Gordon Weaver

"Seldom have I found a contemporary poet so intensely and humanly convincing. Mills' voice is very near the fraternal and memorable sounds we all want to make, and say."

—James Dickey

Chronicles

• send check or money order to 928 N. Main Street, Rockford, IL 61103
• call (800) 383-0680 to order with MasterCard, Visa, Amex, Discover
• purchase online at the webstore on *ChroniclesMagazine.org*

Paperback Price $19.95
($16.95 + $3.00 shipping and handling)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is Islam Really a Religion of Peace and Tolerance?

On September 11, 2001, America was, for the first time in her history, forced to confront Islamic militancy as it has assaulted the rest of the world for almost 14 centuries. *The Sword of the Prophet* presents the unvarnished truth about the rise of Islam and the actions of its founder, Muhammad; the historical meaning of *jihad*; the broad sweep of the global military, political, moral, and spiritual struggle that faces us; and what we must do if we wish to survive. Everyone needs to know the real score of the post-September 11 world, and this invaluable volume is the place to start.

"At last, someone has told the real story of Islam and its challenge to the West. No Christian can afford not to read Srdja Trifkovic's masterful account. It is a chilling reminder of what is at stake."
—Thomas Fleming


THE POLITICALLY INCORRECT GUIDE TO ISLAM
The Sword of the Prophet
Islam
history, theology, impact on the world
SERGE TRIFKOVIC

"Dr. Trifkovic understands Islam, knows we were knocking on the wrong door in Baghdad, and is devastating on the absence of historical memory." —Taki
The American Conservative

"Easily the most important (not to mention courageous) book written in response to 9/11–perhaps one of the two or three most important books I've read in my six years as Club editor."
—Jeffrey Rubin
Conservative Book Club

"What Muslims, multiculturalists, and the media hope you never find out about Islam." —*National Review*

"This book pulls no punches in identifying the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as the greatest danger to Western values since the end of the Cold War." —Ambassador James Bissett

The Sword of the Prophet Order Form (please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery)

SWOR

Paperback Price $24.95 X Quantity _____ = Total _____
($19.95 + $5.00 shipping and handling each)

Name _____

_____

Address _____

_____

City/State/Zip _____

_____

☐ Check or money order enclosed

☐ Please bill my: ☐ MasterCard ☐ Visa ☐ Amex ☐ Discover

Card # _____

Expiration Date _____

Signature _____

Please mail form (with payment) to: Chronicles/Products, P.O. Box 800, Mount Morris, IL 61054
or, to order toll-free, call 1-800-397-8160

ASWOR11

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Islam is doubtless the greatest threat to Western civilization, but it is not the only one. Today, China is an economic threat; tomorrow, a military one. Cultural afflictions from "gay marriage" to anti-Christian hate groups are destroying us from within. Today, would the heroes of the Alamo find the civilization they died to defend?

The John Randolph Club Comes to San Antonio!

The Rockford Institute

and

Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture

present

The 15th Annual Meeting of

THE JOHN RANDOLPH CLUB

"The Enemies of the West, from the Alamo to Kosovo"

November 12-13, 2004

Join your favorite *Chronicles* editors and contributors, including:

Thomas Fleming, Samuel Francis, Chilton Williamson, Jr., Roger McGrath, Scott P. Richert, Aaron D. Wolf, Wayne Allensworth, David Hartman, Srdja Trifkovic, William Hawkins, and Tom Piatak

in the city where great men stood their ground and gave their lives in defense of the West.

Details

The conference will be held at the historic Menger Hotel, across the Plaza from the Alamo and right around the corner from San Antonio's charming Pasa del Rio. The Menger's famous bar served as the recruiting office for Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders.

A limited number of rooms are available at a special rate of $108.00 per night, single/double occupancy, breakfast buffet included. To make reservations, please call (800) 345-9285 and mention the John Randolph Club. Room reservations must be made by October 12, 2004.

Special optional lunch program on Friday, November 12: "The Alamo: Characters and Controversies," featuring Native Texan Wayne Allensworth and Old West historian Roger McGrath. Includes a guided visit to the Alamo!

OPEN TO ALL CHRONICLES SUBSCRIBERS

NAME(S) (AS THEY SHOULD APPEAR ON NAME TAGS) _____

ADDRESS _____

PHONE/FAX _____

EMAIL _____

FULL REGISTRATION (ALL PANELS, FRIDAY EVENING OPENING ADDRESS AND RECEPTION, SATURDAY LUNCH, EVENING BANQUET AND PROGRAM)	JRC MEMBER	___ @ $250.00 EA=$	_____
	NON-MEMBER	___ @ $275.00 EA=$	_____
SATURDAY PANELS ONLY (NO MEALS, RECEPTIONS, OR EVENING PROGRAMS)	MEMBER OR NON-MEMBER	___ @ $125.00 EA=$	_____
SATURDAY NIGHT BANQUET ONLY	MEMBER OR NON-MEMBER	___ @ $125.00 EA=$	_____
ALAMO LUNCH PROGRAM AND TOUR	MEMBER OR NON-MEMBER	___ @ $55.00 EA=$	_____

TOTAL ENCLOSED $_____

Enclosed is my donation of $_____ so that worthy young students can attend this important event.

Make checks payable to The Rockford Institute and mail with completed form to

JRC, The Rockford Institute, 928 N. Main Street, Rockford, IL 61103

or pay by credit card by calling Cindy Link at (815) 964-5813

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED